【大学院課題例】イエメンの内戦（英語論文サンプル

下記は、イギリスの大学院で課題用に書いたエッセイです。大学院に通っている方、又は通う予定の方に参考になれば幸いです。（改めて読み返すと修正すべき点が多々あるのですが、参考になるよう、修正せずに掲載します。）

課題

下記は「International Policy Framework」というフレームワークに基づいて、国連事務局長宛に政策文書を提出する課題です。対象国は自由でしたが私はイエメンを選びました。二つのセクションに分かれており、一つ目が要約した文書で二つ目が背景なども記載した文書です。

The number of civilian deaths and economic losses as a result of civil conflict in country X have reached record highs. The international community agrees that serious diplomatic efforts need to be made to resolve the situation and the new UN Secretary-General has promised to personally take on the issue.

エッセイ

To: United Nations Secretary-General
From: An international civil servant
Date: April 20, 2021
Subject: Policy Submission for Yemen Civil War
Attachment: Policy Background Paper

Issue

Due to prolonged civil war, the situation in Yemen has been deteriorating, resulting in an increasing number of civilian deaths and economic losses. Serious diplomatic efforts are needed to enable the resumption of an inclusive, orderly political transition process to meet the aspirations of the Yemeni people for peaceful change.

Recommendations

1. United Nations Secretary-General will set out to address policy measures to mediate extensive negotiation on the nationwide ceasefire, enable the resumption of the political transition process, and mitigate the severe humanitarian crisis in Yemen.

2. A successful effort will require a focus on immediate actions and effects regarding the urgency and seriousness of the current catastrophic humanitarian crisis, and a long-term, comprehensive and inclusive strategy including political, economic, and social reforms.

3. Due to the complexity of the conflict, Secretary-General will strive to work inclusively with local actors, the members of the United Nations Security Council and international partners to ensure strong and consistent domestic and international support for peace and stability in Yemen.

Background

1. Yemen has been torn apart by several international militant groups and foreign nations. Yemen’s civil war began in September 2014 when the Houthis attacked and took control of Sana’a, Yemen’s capital. Saudi Arabia-led coalition of Gulf states, supported by the US, has been engaging in the military operation against Houthis to restore the rule of the Republic of Yemen government. Evidence suggests that Iran has been supporting Houthis, providing significant volumes of weapons and components. Southern Transitional Council (STC), backed by the United Arab Emirates, had shown a threat to the Republic of Yemen government, yet at the end of 2020, STC and the Republic of Yemen government agreed to form a coalition government.

2. Yemen has been in the world’s worst and longest humanitarian crisis. More than 20 million people, 66 percent of its population, need humanitarian aid and protection. Food insecurity and malnutrition present a severe threat to the people, causing 16.2 million people to hunger in 2021. 84 percent of the population live in extreme poverty and cannot afford their basic needs. Lack of funding has affected humanitarian organizations’ capacity to respond to the Yemeni people’s increasing needs. The Covid-19 pandemic further exacerbates the catastrophic situation. The number of confirmed cases has been increasing, yet the number is underreported. The situation is expected to deteriorate unless there is conflict de-escalation and an improvement in the economy and funding.

3. On February 25, 2021, The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2564 (2021) to extend the 2014 international sanctions on those threatening security and stability in Yemen. Following next month, the Members of the Security Council published a press statement on Yemen, calling for a global ceasefire as detailed in resolutions 2532 (2020) and 2565 (2021), which would facilitate COVID-19 vaccine distribution. On March 22, 2021, Saudi Arabia proposed a nationwide truce and offered to ease the air and sea blockade that it has imposed on Houthi-controlled territory. However, as of April 20, Houthis has not considered the offer.

Argument and Policy Options

1. To deliver the optimal outcome for the Yemeni people and the international community, Secretary-General needs to formulate a comprehensive and inclusive measure, coordinating with relevant actors and stakeholders of the conflict.

2. Facilitating expansive negotiations for nationwide ceasefire agreements among relevant actors and stakeholders would be the foremost priority to ease the humanitarian crisis, secure compliance with international humanitarian law and international human rights law, and resume the political transition process. There is growing consensus in Yemen that the two-party settlement the UN had attempted to broker over the years is unstable. The UN needs to adopt an inclusive strategy, expanding the participation of other domestic and international stakeholders to sustain a resilient agreement.

3. Urging donors for more significant international funding is urgent in the world’s worst humanitarian crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic, threatening countless civilian lives in Yemen, while aid operations have been hindered due to international fund cuts. Extending to members of the UN, particularly permanent members of the UN security council, to secure funding for aid operations is needed.

4. Encouraging the United Nations Security Council to consider an additional coercion measure, specifically imposing an additional targeted economic sanction against those responsible for jeopardizing the stability and peace of Yemen, is necessary regarding the urgency and seriousness of the current situation.

Attachment: Policy Background Paper

1. Vision/Objectives

1.1 United Nations (UN) aims to enable the resumption of a peaceful, inclusive, orderly, and Yemeni-led political transition process that meets the legitimate demands and aspirations of the Yemeni people, including women, for peaceful change and meaningful political, economic, and social reform.

Responsible for meditating on an agreement to end the conflict and enable the resumption of the political transition process, the Secretary-General sets out to address the objectives and policy options to realize the UN vision.

1.2 The short, medium, and long term objectives to realize the vision is as follows:

1.2.1 Short Term Priorities
・ Facilitate extensive negotiations for immediate nationwide ceasefire agreement and ensure compliance with international humanitarian law and international human rights law. It is the foremost priority to alleviate the humanitarian crisis and meet the need of the Yemeni people.

・Provide humanitarian aid to relieve imminent famine and secure procurement of medical equipment and vaccinations to mitigate the COVID-19 pandemic to prevent further loss of lives.

1.2.2 Medium and Long Term Priorities
・ Mediate a peace agreement to end the conflict and resume the political transition process to meet legitimate demands and aspirations of the Yemeni people for meaningful political, economic, and social reform with long-term, comprehensive, and inclusive efforts among relevant actors and stakeholders.

・ Support the economic independence of Yemeni citizens, including women, to combat poverty, enhance the standard of living, and foster long-term stability in Yemen.

・ Secure the restoration of public services providing healthcare, water, sanitation, and education to strengthen stable governance over the nation.

・ Support safe and stable returns for internally displaced people, which contribute to the revitalization of the nation.

1.3 To achieve these objectives, Secretary-General will strive to work inclusively with local actors and stakeholders, the members of the Security Council, and international partners to ensure strong and consistent international backing for peace and stability in Yemen.

2. Analysis / Background

Source: Congressional Research Service 2021

2.1 Overview of the Crisis

-The situation in Yemen has been deteriorating, resulting in an increasing number of civilian deaths and economic losses. Since 2014, the country has been torn apart by several internal militant groups and foreign nations (see Figure I). Yemen’s civil war began in September 2014 when Houthi insurgents attacked and took control of Yemen’s capital, Sana’a. In January 2015, Houthis seized the presidential palace and resulted in President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi resigning.

-Following March 2015, the Saudi Arabia-led coalition of Gulf states launched economic isolation and airstrikes against Houthis to restore Hadi’s rule. In July 2016, former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and the Houthis announced the creation of a political council; however, Saleh broke with Houthis and was killed in December 2017.

-The intervention of neighbor states has contributed to an increase in the complexity of the conflict. The US military supports Saudi Arabia-led coalition, engaging in the military operation against Houthis. On the other hand, an increasing body of evidence suggests that Houthis have been receiving significant volumes of weapons and components from Iran. Subsequently, Saudi Arabia-led Gulf states and Iran have presented an aspect of a broader Sunni-Shia divide. Since 2015, Saudi Arabia conducted airstrikes in Yemen, while the Houthis have launched ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) into Saudi territory. Additionally, attacks claimed by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and other terrorist groups continue in many parts of Yemen.

-In 2019, the relationship between the Republic of Yemen government and the Southern Transitional Council (STC), backed by the United Arab Emirates, deteriorated, leading to a conflict between the two sides; in 2020, they agreed to implement a power-sharing agreement and formed a coalition government.

-In December 2018, the Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for Yemen Martin Griffiths brokered a ceasefire, known as the Stockholm Agreement, centered on Hudaydah port and city. The Stockholm Agreement included a mutual re-deployment of forces from the port and the city, the establishment of a Governorate-wide ceasefire, an agreement on the exchange of prisoners and detainees, and an understanding on Ta’iz. Although the Stockholm Agreement helped to avert a catastrophic military escalation at the time, the agreement remains unfulfilled. Special Envoy Griffiths continues intensifying his diplomatic outreach to relevant domestic and international actors.

2.2 Humanitarian Crisis

-Yemen has been in the world’s worst and longest humanitarian crisis. More than 20 million people, 66 percent of its population, are in need of humanitarian aid and protection, including 12.1 million people who are in acute need. Food insecurity and malnutrition have been severely threatening people in Yemen. 16.2 million people will go hungry in 2021, including 5 million people facing emergency conditions, and approximately 50,000 are already experiencing catastrophic conditions. More than 2.25 million children and a million pregnant and lactating women are estimated to suffer from acute malnutrition this year.

-At least 4 million people have been displaced from their homes since 2015. The public institutions that provide healthcare, water, sanitation, and education have collapsed. 84 percent of the population is living in extreme poverty. As a result, millions of Yemeni people cannot afford their basic needs.

-Lack of funding has affected humanitarian organizations’ capacity to respond to the increasing needs of the people. As of April 2021, only 487 million dollars are pledged to the Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan, whereas 1.7 billion is needed. Aid agencies have been helping 9 million people per month, down from 14 million last year due to funding cuts.

-The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the situation in Yemen. According to World Health Organization (WHO), between January 3, 2020, and April 13, 2021, there have been 5,450 confirmed cases with 1,069 deaths in Yemen. However, most health experts concern that the official epi-curve underestimates the extent of COVID-19. The United Nations has procured more than 23,839 metric tons of medical equipment, testing kits, and medicine by January 2021. However, still more equipment, especially oxygen and personal protective equipment, is urgently needed. On March 31, Yemen received 360,000 doses of vaccines through the COVAX initiative and is expected to receive a total of 1.9 million doses, which corresponds to only 6 percent of its population, throughout 2021. The situation in Yemen is expected to deteriorate further unless there is conflict de-escalation and an improvement in the economy and funding. 　

2.3 Recent Development

-On February 25, 2021, The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2564 (2021) to extend the 2014 international sanctions on those threatening security and stability in Yemen, adding Sultan Saleh Aida Aida Zabin, the director of the Criminal Investigation Department in Sana’a, who engaged in violation of applicable international humanitarian law and human rights abuses.

-On March 18, 2021, the Members of the Security Council published a press statement on Yemen, calling for a global ceasefire as detailed in resolutions 2532 (2020) and 2565 (2021), which would facilitate COVID-19 vaccine distribution. In the press statement, the Members of the Security Council condemned the escalation in Marib, which places one million internally displaced people at grave risk and threatens efforts to secure a political settlement. Moreover, if Marib falls and the Houthis seize the governorate, it would affect the balance of power in any future peace process, significantly weakening the government’s position.

-On March 22, 2021, Saudi Arabia proposed a nationwide truce and offered to ease the air and sea blockade that it has imposed on Houthi-controlled territory. Secretary-General António Guterres welcomed the announcement by Saudi Arabia on steps to help end the fighting and restart the political process in Yemen. However, as of April 20, Houthis has not considered the offer.

-The driver behind Houthis’ hard posture is assumed that the longer they remain the de-facto authority, the more their rules become an accepted norm domestically and internationally. Nevertheless, such a recognition of their legitimacy appears unacceptable to President Hadi or the Saudi Arabia government. Additionally, Saudi Arabia’s proposal envisaged the Yemeni government regulating Hudaydah port and Sana’a airport, whereas the Houthis wanted to be entirely open to all international traffic. The proposal also suggested the sharing of revenues on trade in oil through Hudaydah.

3. Scenarios / Alternative Outcomes

The possible scenarios are listed in the order of their optimality for the international community. Approximate percentages of likelihood are also stated for each scenario.

3.1 Optimal Outcome

3.1.1 Scenario A: Agreement on perpetual ceasefire and peaceful unification 
Agreement by all actors and stakeholders on the perpetual ceasefire and peaceful political unification would be the most optimal scenario for the international community. It would drastically mitigate the humanitarian crisis in Yemen. However, due to the complexity of the conflict and fragmentation of the nation, Yemen is unlikely to be reconstituted as a single state in the foreseeable future.

3.1.2 Scenario B: Agreement on a temporary ceasefire 
Agreement by relevant actors and stakeholders on a temporary ceasefire would help to reduce the risk of the rapid spread of the COVID-19 virus, threatening countless civilian lives in Yemen. Along with the temporary ceasefire, the restoration of the peace process should take place. A total of 59 International and local NGOs published the joint statement calling for this scenario in April 2020.

3.2 Unacceptable Outcome

3.2.1 Scenario C: Unilateral withdrawal of a relevant foreign nation 
The unilateral withdrawal of a relevant foreign nation may reduce an aspect of proxy war in Yemen. However, it may create a power vacuum that would likely deteriorate the situation. Especially, unequivocal and sustained US engagement is needed to lessen the scope and scale of the conflict in the region.

3.2.2 Scenario D: Achieving unification by military means
Substantial unification is assumed to be the ultimate goal of local actors. As of April 2021, none of the local actors possess enough strength to achieve unification by military means. This scenario would increase civilian deaths and exacerbate the humanitarian crisis in Yemen. Secretary-General António Guterres has repeatedly reiterated that there is no military solution to the Yemeni crisis.

3.2. 3 Scenario E: Continuation of conflict
Continuation of conflict would deteriorate and prolong the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. Millions of Yemeni would suffer from imminent famine, economic collapse, and a global pandemic. It would result in hampering humanitarian efforts and leading Yemen towards total collapse and loss of lives.

4. Decisions / Policy Options

Discussed below are policy options to achieve scenario B (agreement on temporary ceasefire), an optimal and most achievable option.

4.1 Mediate expansive negotiation on the nationwide ceasefire

Facilitating expansive negotiations for the nationwide ceasefire agreement among relevant local actors and stakeholders would be the foremost priority to archive any objectives listed, including easing the humanitarian crisis, securing compliance with international humanitarian law and international human rights law, and resuming the political transition process.

There is a growing consensus that the two-party settlement the UN had attempted to broker over the years is unstable. The UN must open talks up to other domestic and international stakeholders to sustain a resilient agreement. In addition, the reopening of Sana’a airport and Hudaydah port needs to be encouraged, enabling resuming fuel and food imports for Yemeni civilians.

4.2 Urge donors for more significant international funding

Securing the funding for aid operations is essential to mitigate the humanitarian crisis. The most significant donors have been the US, the UK, and Saudi Arabia. Extending members of the UN, particularly Russia and China as permanent members of the UN security council, to secure funding for aid operations is urgent.

Although Gulf states have revealed their will to support Yemen financially in the past, they are also currently under financial constraints because of the decrease in oil prices and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, aid agencies would be compelled to allocate more resources to the health response at the expense of other sectors due to the pandemic.

4.3 Encourage the Security Council to consider imposing additional sanctions

Encouraging United Nations Security Council to consider an additional coercion measure against those responsible for jeopardizing the stability and peace of Yemen is necessary regarding the urgency and seriousness of the current catastrophic situation.

Under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, imposing additional targeted economic sanctions against individuals would be a reasonable option, considering the risk to Yemeni civilians. It would be an addition to Resolution 2564 (2021).

5. Planning and Doing

Measures to ensure effective implementation of the policy options are recommended as below. 

・Confirm commitments by relevant local actors and stakeholders to participate in an incremental process. It should not be open-ended that may delay or prevent the settlement. National Dialogue Conference participation quotas could be a potential guide on participation. The priority should be given to the short-term de-escalation measures due to the urgency of the crisis.

・Build a consensus among local actors and stakeholders that the current precarious situation would ultimately undermine any goals or gains they may possess and only result in the total collapse of Yemen and loss of lives.

・Outline a clear roadmap by working with relevant actors and stakeholders to stabilize the situation and ensure long-term resilience.

・ Mediate regular communication between the Republic of Yemen government and the Houthis as a process of confidence-building measures to manage their security concerns and avoid contingent disputes.

・ Suggest the Republic of Yemen government work closely with the International Monetary Fund and World Bank to manage the government’s cash flows and imports of goods.

・ Prepare immediate sanctions relief measures for the Houthis when they implement a ceasefire agreement and comply with international humanitarian law and international human rights law. It would prevent them from being attracted to attack and seize control of resource-rich regions such as Marib for economic interests.

・ Establish a neutral regional body that works closely with WHO and local actors to collect, analyze, and share relevant data on the COVID-19 pandemic and to monitor the distribution of vaccinations.

・ Urge Houthi to fulfill the commitment to allow the UN to deploy a team on the FSO Safer oil tanker in the Red Sea, which poses a significant environmental threat to the region.

・ Encourage inter-regional trade for shared benefits of local actors. Also, encourage local individuals, including the youth and women, to engage in broader regional communication to deepen mutual understandings.

・ Demand the Security Council to publicly condemn violence and threats against women in Yemen, encourage the Member States to provide material and legal support for their protection.

・ Closely Work with UNHCR to assist and protect internally displaced people (IDP) by providing technical expertise and undertaking practical interventions through shelter, camp management, and protection activities. Ensure IDPs’ rights are protected, and the risks they face are minimized.

・ Invest in developing the UN’s diplomatic capability and support Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen.

6. Evaluation

・Continue close communication with the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen to enable the Security Council to take immediate punitive action in the event of a unilateral breach of the ceasefire agreement or violation of international humanitarian law and human rights law.

・ Support aid operations that regularly monitor and inspect the humanitarian crisis situation. Ensure that food and supplies reach Yemeni civilians in a transparent and fair manner.

・ Continue analyzing and monitoring relevant data on the COVID-19 pandemic and distribution of vaccinations across the nation. Action should be taken if there is a considerable regional imbalance in the spread of the virus or the distribution of vaccinations.

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