Recollections of My Visit to Dr. Gendlin

This blog post is a memoir based on my interview with Eugene Gendlin in New York nearly 20 years ago about his philosophical background. First, I will describe my impression of him and then write about what I discussed with him.

In summary, I got the impression that Gendlin, the founder of “Focusing” and “Thinking at the Edge” (TAE), is a person who could “wait” for me to articulate my felt sense in a relaxed manner without rushing me to put my feeling into words. I also interviewed him about his early main philosophical book and its background.

Background of the interview

The TAE workshop was held at the Garrison Institute in New York in 2004, just as the maple leaves turned bright red.

In this officially recorded video, a man enters the room with a Japanese-style bow behind instructors Eugene Gendlin and Nada Lou, and that man is me.

It was the third day of the workshop, and I asked Kye Nelson, one of the instructors, “I would like to interview Gendlin.” Kye said, “I think it is possible, and I told Gene in advance that you would be coming to the workshop, so I will make an appointment right away.”

As a result, I interviewed Gendlin on the fourth day. About five years before, I had made a lifelong commitment to reading Gendlin’s major early work, “Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning.” My wish to have a philosophical discussion with him was finally fulfilled this time.

That night, while brushing my teeth before going to bed, I met one of the participants, Frans Depestele, and shared my feelings. “I’m nervous because tomorrow night is my first one-on-one talk with Gendlin.” Frans told me, “Don’t worry, Gene is very friendly.” These words made me feel very relaxed.

The next day, when the workshop started, Gendlin showed up at the venue as usual. But on this particular day, I was so surprised that he approached me and shook my hand. He said, “Hi, I’ll see you tonight at 7:00.” I was thrilled to hear that.

The interview began with putting my concerns down

At 7:00 p.m., I went to the room with Chris Honde, the interpreter. I brought the original copy of “Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning” and my notes, which I had been making all night. In the notes, I quoted passages from the writings of past philosophers such as Wilhelm Dilthey, Charles Peirce, and John Dewey, and I put them in a chart illustrating their influence on Gendlin’s philosophy.

When I entered the room again, Gendlin welcomed me warmly. One of the participants I accompanied described him as having an “innocent smile.” I felt that the words fit very well.

After sitting comfortably on the sofa and settling, I began, “Dr. Gendlin, I have been looking forward to meeting and talking with you.”

“(Smiles) You’re welcome.”

“But at the same time, I felt a certain hesitation about coming here,” I continued as if putting my concerns down. “I have been reading ‘Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning,’ and I came here to share my understanding of it with you. But to tell you the truth, I don’t have any degree in philosophy or psychology.

There is a reason why I wanted to say this. “Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning” (Gendlin, 1962/1997) is based on Gendlin’s doctoral dissertation (Gendlin, 1958), which he submitted to the Department of Philosophy at the University of Chicago. He wrote his dissertation based on his own experiences as a psychotherapist.

But Gendlin said plainly, “It doesn’t matter whether you have a degree or not.”

“That’s very kind of you to say so. But, in your article ‘Introduction to Thinking at the Edge,’ you wrote, ‘If it was clear I said, “we don’t need you for this; we have it in the library already”’ (Gendlin, 2004, p. 1; 2018, p. 282). And many people from all over the world have gathered here in response to that call. But I am a university librarian. After work, I went into the archives and compared your book to the philosophy books of the past. I cut out the ‘clear things’ that people said in the past, and I wrote them down and laid them out, and now I am placing them before you like this. I would have guessed that my attitude is probably the one you are least looking for in the participants of this workshop.”

Gendlin added, “Even I started my research by going to the library.” I took his tone as if he was saying, “Don’t worry about it.”

“Oh, I see. However, there is something still stuck inside me. I have only properly read your earlier works. Your recent work, “A Process Model,” is the supplementary reading for this TAE workshop. But I haven’t read even half of it. I thought you would prefer us to focus on your philosophy’s newer and more original aspects rather than digging back into your early writings and other philosophers’ influences on your early works.”

Then Gendlin said, “I keep coming back to that book [“Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning”]. And I’m rethinking. I don’t mind at all if you keep reading the book.”

I was so happy to hear this response because I was convinced that the current practice of TAE has a deep connection with “Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning.” Besides, with my English skills, it took me years to read the book, and that was all I could do.

Step by Step

The words he said earlier reminded me of what he had said repeatedly during the TAE workshop. “There are 14 steps in TAE, but everyone has their way of going about it. You don’t have to try to do them all; go step by step.”

I thought that someday I would like to read “A Process Model,” but I could have to go through his later book step by step at a pace that makes sense to me.

“Something” that I feel even if I can’t put it into words

I said, “But if you were to say to me, ‘And so what? I want to ask you how you feel about these notes,’ I might not be able to put it into words right away.”

Gendlin responded, “But you’re feeling ‘something,’ right?”

These unexpected words momentarily took me aback. But now that he mentioned it, I saw how typical of Gendlin, whom I had come to know through his writings. Yes, I have been reading his work repeatedly because I am feeling ‘something’ for sure.

What is “reading”? Going back and forth between his writing and its background, via felt sense

Gendlin continued, pointing to the book, “Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning,” “Besides, that book makes reading books by past philosophers interesting, doesn’t it?”

I tapped the desk and said, “Yes, that’s right! I came to New York to tell you that as well. I wanted to understand your book better, and I was researching the philosophical background. However, as I continued reading your book, I came to read the writings of past philosophers in a lively way. For example, the writings of George Herbert Mead!”

Mead was a philosopher active in the United States in the first half of the 20th century. Gendlin was a student of a disciple of Mead, Charles Morris. Mead is also known as a social psychologist.

I continued my story like this: “When I was an undergraduate student, I majored in sociology. For sociology students, his main book ‘Mind, Self, and Society’ was required reading. But at the time, I could not get used to his terminology such as ‘role taking’ or ‘generalized other’. But after reading this part of your book, I found Mead’s writings interesting.” And I read the following passage from “Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning” aloud, in front of Gendlin himself:

Let us say that our poet has a felt meaning or many felt meanings, and wishes to symbolize them. No extant symbols exactly mean his felt meaning. Hence, he seeks to put symbols together in a new way so that these symbols will create that experience in a reader, or in himself qua reader. (Gendlin, 1962/1997, p. 117)

And then I added, “This is what Mead meant by ‘significant symbols,’ isn’t it?”

Gendlin nodded broadly. “Yes, you’re right!” and said, “You’ve got a good point about Mead. Usually, in university classes, completely different parts of his writing are taught. For example, ‘I’, ‘Me’, ‘I’, ‘Me’... [with a disgusted look] Especially ‘Me’ is the only thing being taught! So, when I teach about philosophers of the past, I try to teach two things. One is what you might find in so-called philosophy textbooks, exactly what he said. The other is what the philosopher was really trying to say. If I don’t teach what’s in the textbook, the students will have problems when they take tests with other teachers. So what you just said, you better not write that on a regular test. You’ll get a failing grade!” he said mischievously.

I was delighted with his answer. He approved my way of reading, with my felt sense, not just memorized philosophy books. That was precisely what I wanted him to approve.

Let me add an explanation here. I consider the quote above from Gendlin’s “Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning” to correspond to the following passage from Mead’s “Mind, Self, and Society”:

In trying to express a message in something less than ten words, we merely want to convey a certain meaning, while the poet is dealing with what is really living tissue, the emotional throb in the expression itself...If it is going to be language one has to understand what he is saying, has to affect himself as he affects others. (Mead, 1934, p. 75)

What we, as humans, say to others affects us as well. This contrasts with animals, and Mead wrote, “… the lion does not appreciably frighten itself by its roar” (Mead, 1934, pp. 63-4). Mead called such a human-specific expression a “significant symbol”:

Where a vocal gesture uttered by one individual leads to a certain response in another, we may call it a symbol of that act; where it arouses in the man who makes it the tendency to the same response, we may call it a significant symbol. (Mead, 1925, p. 272 [SW, 288])

At the end of the Mead topic, I also added the following: “In ‘Focusing-Oriented Psychotherapy,’ you wrote ‘The present ... gives the past a new function, a new role to play. In its new role the past is “sliced” differently’ (Gendlin, 1996, pp. 14-5). I remember that this statement made me interested in Mead’s book ‘The Philosophy of the Present.’”

Upon hearing this, Gendlin nodded with a smile.

Let me include additional information. “The Philosophy of the Present” contains the following passage:

...for that past must be set over against the present within which the emergent appears, and the past, which must then be looked at from the standpoint of the emergent, becomes a different past. (Mead, 1932, p. 2)

Gendlin’s philosophy, its depth

Then, I felt more confident in my communication skills and thought, “Okay, let’s give it a try.” I decided to broach the topic of the most challenging chapter in “Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning”—’ Chapter 5: The Principle of Universals: IOFI’:

“In reading this book, I feel that it has strong connections to the philosophies developed in the United States and Germany during the 19th and 20th centuries. However, I also feel that it is difficult to understand the book with only a knowledge of such philosophies and that a broader knowledge of the history of philosophy is also required of the reader. For example, you quote Susanne Langer in the book.” Langer was a philosopher active in the United States in the mid-20th century. I continued the topic of Langer. “It is true that this quote contrasts her famous pair of terms, ‘signal’ and ‘symbol.’”

No human impression is only a signal from the outer world; it always is also an image in which possible impressions are formulated, that is, a symbol for the conception of such experience. (Gendlin, 1962/1997, p. 184; cf. Langer, 1953, p. 376)

“But I see a big significance in the fact that you quoted Langer in the chapter on ‘universals.’ I assumed that the most important reason for you to quote Langer in this context is the use of the word ‘such’ in ‘such experience.’ The word ‘such’ means’ toionde / τοιόνδε’ (*1) in ancient Greek. And the word ‘universal,’ which frequently appears in chapter 5, means ‘(to) katholou / (τὸ) καθόλου’ (*2) in ancient Greek. In other words, I have surmised that through Langer’s writing, you might be looking at a philosophical tradition continuing since the time of Aristotle and tried to reinterpret that tradition in your way through your idea of ‘experiencing’ in Chapter 5, where you are working on ‘universals.’”

That is to say, I asked in a bit of a cheeky way, “Are you just utilizing Langer’s word?”

Then Gendlin replied, “Uh-huh, ‘toionde,’ ‘katholou.”

He added, “But I would never underestimate Susanne Langer. She is a person who has said some very accurate things about ‘experience.’”

Let me add an explanation here. When you hear the word “universal,” you may think of something like “common to all things, never fluctuates.” It may look like something very far from Focusing. Of course, the word may have such a meaning. But the word “universal (katholou)” here means something just “common to two or more things”.

As a supplement, let us look at an example of how Aristotle used them in his work.

If they [=principles] are universal, they will not be substances; for everything that is common indicates not a “this” but a “such”, but substance is a “this“. And if we are to be allowed to lay it down that a common predicate is a “this” and a single thing, Socrates will be several animals—himself and “man” and “animal”, if each of these indicates a “this” and a single thing. (Aristotle, trans, 1941, p. 731; Bekker pagination, 1003a)

Scientific knowledge is not possible through the act of perception. Even if perception as a faculty is of ‘the such’ and not merely of a ‘this somewhat’, yet one must at any rate actually perceive a ‘this somewhat’, and at a definite present place and time: but that which is commensurately universal and true in all cases one cannot perceive, since it is not ‘this’ and it is not ‘now’; if it were, it would not be commensurately universal—the term we apply to what is always and everywhere. (Aristotle, trans, 1941, p. 154; Bekker pagination, 87b)

In addition, let me add a contrast between Langer’s famous pair of terms, “signal” and “symbol.”

To a clever dog, the name of a person is a signal that the person is present; you say the name, he pricks up his ears and looks for its object. If you say “dinner,” he becomes restive, expecting food. (Langer, 1957, p. 30)

Most of our words are not signs in the sense of signals. They are used to talk about things, not to direct our eyes and ears and noses toward them ... They serve, rather, to let us develop a characteristic attitude toward objects in absentia, which is called “thinking of” or “referring to” what is not here. “Signs” used in this capacity are not symptoms of things, but symbols. (Langer, 1957, p. 31)

A term which is used symbolically and not signally does not evoke action appropriate to the presence of its object. If I say: “Napoleon,” you do not bow to the conqueror of Europe as though I had introduced him, but merely think of him. (Langer, 1957, p. 60)

A pattern based on instances

Gendlin continued talking by going back to Aristotle’s teacher, Plato. Plato’s writings are often written as a “dialogue,” like the script of a play. For example, at the beginning of the dialogue, the speaker, Polemarchus, first defines the word “justice.” The listener, Socrates, immediately replies, “Well, then, is the definition still valid in such a situation?” Through such dialogic examination, by repetition of question and answer—refutation (elenchos / ἔλεγχος)—Socrates examines what the speaker really wants to say (cf. Stephanus pagination, Vol. 2, 331e–336a). Gendlin told us such stories, citing Plato’s “Republic” and “Meno.” I happened to have read both dialogues, so what Gendlin said was very clear to me.

So, I responded as follows: “I see. In dialogue, a pattern changes through instances.” I told him, in my own words, how I felt after listening to him.

Gendlin replied, “Through instances. Yes, you are right! You understood what I meant before the interpreter came in. That’s exactly what I meant.”

The terms “instance” and “pattern” here appear repeatedly in TAE. In other words, I wanted to convey that the “universals” mentioned above correspond to the patterns in TAE and that Plato’s dialogue method is also practically woven into TAE.

I continued to talk to him. “By the way, you already wrote what you just said in your doctoral dissertation. But when the dissertation was published as “Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning,” the section was omitted.” I also showed him a copy of his dissertation. For example, it states the following:

Socrates often shows that what a speaker asserted really implies something the speaker did not mean and hence forces him to improve his statement. (Gendlin, 1958, p. 21)

Taking for example Plato’s Meno and Republic, we can say that the dialectic is a process by which things are related to each other. As a result of contradictions thus found, new formulations are fashioned which resolve the contradictions and still retain the true meanings originally intended in the contrary assertions. (Gendlin, 1958, p. 22)

After reading the copy, he jokingly said, “It’s true. That’s what it says. You know more about it than I do. Please pass this on to Frans Depestele, the bibliographer.”

Upon publication, the omission (of Section D in Chapter 1 of his doctoral dissertation in which Gendlin discusses relevant work of various ancient philosophers) did not seem to be his intention.

After the interview

Time flew, and the promised 30 minutes of the interview was sadly ending.

“I see you still have more to tell me.” Gendlin seemed a little apologetic, but he understood my feelings. The next interviewer knocked and entered, ending the interview for the moment.

The next day, Kye Nelson told me that Gendlin wanted to continue corresponding with me as long as it was okay with me. I was glad to hear that he approved of my hard work to read his books on my own.

It was the last day of the workshop, and everyone from Japan was asked to give their impressions. When it was my turn to speak, again holding “Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning” in my hand, I shared my impression as follows:

“When Kye came to Japan in April, she and I talked about Gendlin’s philosophy and invited me to attend this workshop. Then I replied, ‘I want to attend it to understand this book.’ I think my goal was accomplished. When Dr. Gendlin explained the first half of the steps, he casually used the word ‘recurrence’ as he went back and forth between instances and patterns. This was very easy for me to understand. I will reread this book, remembering the explanation at that time. I am sure I can read it better than before.”

As the interpreter translated what I said, Gendlin looked me in the eye and said, “[You are referring to] Chapter 5,” as recorded in this official video.

In addition, Gendlin nodded with a smirk and said, “Yes,” he said, “that’s right. What he just said is exactly what is in the book. It’s called ‘instance of itself’—’ IOFI.’ But, well, we don’t necessarily need everyone to remember the terminology here.”

His comments helped me moderately harmonize my impression of the workshop’s atmosphere.

That ended my workshop experience in New York, and I returned to Japan.

Afterward

It was the perfect timing for me to interview him because I was writing papers (Tanaka, 2004; 2005) on how Gendlin came to write “Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning.”

Seven years later, I entered graduate school and completed my doctoral dissertation (Tanaka, 2018) on “Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning.” A part of the dissertation was contributed to the English book, “Senses of Focusing” (Tanaka, 2021).

More recently, I have been working on reading his later works, such as “A Process Model” (Gendlin, 1997/2018) and “Thinking beyond Patterns” (Gendlin, 1991), and I am gradually incorporating the results into my writings in English (Tanaka, 2024).

I can say that the interview I did almost 20 years ago was a great experience that shaped who I am today.

Footnotes

*1. “Of this sort (here),” “such (as this here)”: τοιόνδε (tionðe) [masculine: τοιόσδε, feminine: τοιᾱ́δε, neuter: τοιόνδε]: adjective. Etymology: from τοῖος (“such”) + δε (deictic suffix). [Nikolaos Kypriotakis wrote this footnote.]

*2. Noun and adjective (in modern Greek: ‘(το) καθολικό / (to) katholiko’). “What is universal” (in Aristotle) can only be conceptualized in connection with “what is particular” ‘(τὸ) καθ ̓ ἕκαστον / (to) kath’ hekaston’ (also, noun and adjective), like “this” or “this somewhat” in the present text. [Nikolaos Kypriotakis also wrote this footnote.]

Note and acknowledgments

This blog post is an expanded English translation of “Gendlin could ‘wait’ for me to articulate my felt sense: reflections on a happy half-hour interview” (Tanaka, 2005b). I would like to thank Kye Nelson and Chris Honde for their assistance arranging the interview with Eugene Gendlin. I would like to thank Yoshiko Kosaka, Luke Jaaniste, Yacine Haffar, and Jeff Falzone for the English language supervision and Nikolaos Kypriotakis for the Greek language supervision.

References

Aristotle (trans, 1941). The basic works of Aristotle (edited by R. P. McKeon). Random House.

Gendlin, E. T. (1958). The Function of Experiencing in Symbolization. Doctoral dissertation. University of Chicago, Department of Philosophy.

Gendlin, E. T. (1962/1997). Experiencing and the creation of meaning: a philosophical and psychological approach to the subjective (Paper ed.). Northwestern University Press.

Gendlin, E. T. (1991). Thinking beyond patterns: body, language and situations. In B. den Ouden, & M. Moen (Eds.), The Presence of Feeling in Thought (pp. 21–151). Peter Lang.

Gendlin, E. T. (1996). Focusing-oriented psychotherapy: a manual of the experiential method. Guilford Press.

Gendlin, E. T. (1997/2018). A process model. Northwestern University Press.

Gendlin, E.T. (2004). Introduction to “Thinking at the Edge”. The Folio, 19(1), 1-8.

Gendlin, E. T. (2018). Saying what we mean: implicit precision and the responsive order (edited by E. S. Casey, & D. M. Schoeller). Northwestern University Press.

Langer, S.K. (1957). Philosophy in a new key: a study in the symbolism of reason, rite, and art (3rd ed.). Harvard University Press.

Langer, S. (1953). Feeling and form: a theory of art developed from Philosophy in a new key. Scribner.

Mead, G. H. (1925). The genesis of the self and social control. International Journal of Ethics, 35(3), 251-77.

Mead, G. H. (1932). The philosophy of the present (edited by A. E. Murphy). Open Court.

Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, self, and society: from the standpoint of a social behaviorist (edited by C. W. Morris). University of Chicago Press.

Mead, G.H. (1964/1981). Selected writings [Abbreviated as SW] (edited by A.J. Reck). University of Chicago Press.

Tanaka, H. (2004). A bibliographic survey about E. T. Gendlin’s early theory of experiencing: influences on his psychotherapeutic studies from W. Dilthey’s philosophy, Part 1 [in Japanese]. Bulletin of Meiji University Library, 8, 56-81.

Tanaka, H. (2005a). A bibliographic survey about E. T. Gendlin’s early theory of experiencing: influences on his psychotherapeutic studies from W. Dilthey’s philosophy, Part 2 [in Japanese]. Bulletin of Meiji University Library, 9, 58-87.

Tanaka, H. (2005b). Gendlin could “wait” for me to articulate my felt sense: reflections on a happy half-hour interview [in Japanese]. The Focuser’s Focus: Japan Focusing Association Newsletter, 8(1), 4-6.

Tanaka, H. (2018). The early days of Focusing and the theory of experiencing: studies on the background of how focusing was formed and practiced [in Japanese]. Doctoral Dissertation, Kansai University.

Tanaka, H. (2021). Tapping “it” lightly and the short silence: applying the concept of “direct reference” to the discussion of verbatim records of Focusing sessions (with the English language supervision of A. Ikemi). In N. Kipriotakis & J. Moore (Eds.), Senses of Focusing, Vol. 1 (pp. 125-38). Eurasia Publications.

Tanaka, H. (2024, April). Collection of links: North American Philosophical Roots of “A Process Model”