The three-step “order” beginning with “animal gestures” (Symbolic process beginning with “animal gestures”— Gendlin and Mead: 2)

“The three-step order” and Mead

In the section “(c) The order” of “VII-B Proto-Language” in “A Process Model” (APM), Gendlin briefly discusses the three-step order that begins with “animal gestures” and continues on the way to a primitive language called “protolanguage.” In APM, he refers to Mead when discussing the second step, but as far as I can tell from actually reading Mead’s work, the second step does not seem to be discussed in much detail.

First, let's take a look at the three-step order proposed by Gendlin:

(1) In the first dance the whole bodylook of each carries the other forward. There is no sequence without the other.

(2) The individual alone gestures at objects and also perceives the object’s look. (We called this “seen-formation.”) Let me also call this “lone carrying forward.”

(3) If they are now together again, when one of them gestures at an object, the others watching that individual are also carried forward by that individual’s gestures. (They know what that individual is gesturing.) (Gendlin, 1997/2018, p. 155-6)

Next, in the following argument, “lone carrying forward” (2) is discussed as developing after “response to each other” (1):

It is ... true, as G. H. Mead said, that our lone carrying forward develops in a prior context of interactional carrying forward (of response to each other) ... (Gendlin, 1997/2018, p. 156)

It cannot be said that there is no corresponding Mead’s argument. For example, the following passage can be cited:

It is only in the social situation of converse that ... gestures, and the attitudes they express could become the object of attention and interest. Whatever our theory may be as to the history of things, social consciousness must antedate physical consciousness. A more correct statement would be that experience in its original form became reflective in the recognition of selves, and only gradually was there differentiated a reflective experience of things which were purely physical. (Mead, 1910, p. 180 [SW, 112-3])

However, such an argument is only seen in a few of Mead's works. This is just my personal opinion at this stage, but I think that the “seen-formation” corresponding to (2) is more influenced by Susanne Langer’s symbol theory (Tanaka, 2024, March) than by Mead’s.

This is because, in Mead’s writings, it seems that the contrast between the first and third steps is discussed more centrally, skipping the second step, in terms of “the order” by Gendlin.

Contrast between the first and third steps

It is argued that when one gestures at an object, it is shared with others in the context of “also carrying forward”:

(3) If they [several individuals] are now together again, when one of them gestures at an object, the others watching that individual are also carried forward by that individual’s gestures. (They know what that individual is gesturing.) Let me call this “also carrying forward.” (Gendlin, 1997/2018, pp. 155-6)

This has already been discussed in Mead’s writings:

There is no capacity in the lower forms to give attention to some analyzed element in the field of stimulation which would enable them to control the response. But one can say to a person “Look at this, just see this thing” and he can fasten his attention on the specific object. (Mead, 1934, p. 95)

The gesture in general ... indicates some object or other within the field of social behavior, an object of common interest to all the individuals involved in the given social act thus directed toward or upon that object. (Mead, 1934, p. 46)

How does the role of the gestures above differ from that of “In the first dance the whole body look of each carries the other forward” in the first step?

Interaction after the third step is quite different than at the first. Each now knows (is carried forward by) what the other does, and they are also each carried forward by what they themselves do. (Gendlin, 1997/2018, p. 157)

Let's return to Mead’s writings and consider what “they are also each carried forward by what they themselves do” means.

... the conduct and the gesture of the individual which calls out a response in the other should also tend to call out the same response in himself. In the dog-fight this is not present... (Mead, 1934, p. 68)

This leads to the first step being “not carried forward by what they themselves do.”

An animal as opposed to a human form, in indicating something to, or bringing out a meaning for, another form, is not at the same time indicating or bringing out the same thing or meaning to or for himself; for ... there is no meaning here in the significant or self-conscious sense. (Mead, 1934, p. 81)

Also, “Each now knows (is carried forward by) what the other does” by Gendlin would correspond to “The significant gesture or significant symbol makes him conscious of the other individuals’ attitude toward it (as a component of his behavior)” by Mead:

The function of the gesture is to make adjustment possible among the individuals implicated in any given social act with reference to the object or objects with which that act is concerned; and the significant gesture or significant symbol affords far greater facilities for such adjustment and readjustment than does the non-significant gesture, because it calls out in the individual making it the same attitude toward it (or toward its meaning) that it calls out in the other individuals participating with him in the given social act, and thus makes him conscious of their attitude toward it (as a component of his behavior) and enables him to adjust his subsequent behavior to theirs in the light of that attitude. (Mead, 1934, p. 46)

In this way, by taking into account Mead’s argument corresponding to “also carrying forward” (3), the characteristics of “animal gesture” in (1) become clear, highlighting what was lacking:

In the behavior of [life] forms lower than man, we find one individual indicating objects to other forms, though without what we term signification. The hen that pecks at the angleworm is directly though without intention indicating it to the chicks. The animal in a herd that scents danger, in moving away indicates to the other members of the herd the direction of safety and puts them in the attitude of scenting the same danger. The hunting dog points to the hidden bird. The lost lamb that bleats, and the child that cries each points himself out to his mother. All of these gestures, to the intelligent observer, are significant symbols, but they are none of them significant to the forms that make them. (Mead, 1922, p. 160 [SW, 243-4])

The sentinel of a herd is that member of the herd which is more sensitive to odor or sound than the others. At the approach of danger, he starts to run earlier than the others, who then follow along... There is a social stimulus, a gesture, if you like, to which the other forms respond. ... The sentinel does not regard itself as the individual who is to give a signal; it just runs at a certain moment and so starts the others to run. (Mead, 1934, p. 190)

As we have seen, in “animal gestures” in (1), “they are also each carried forward by what they themselves do” is lacking.

References

Gendlin, E. T. (1997/2018). A process model. Northwestern University Press.

Mead, G.H. (1910). What social objects must psychology presuppose? The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 7(7), 174-80.

Mead, G.H. (1922). A behavioristic account of the significant symbol. Journal of Philosophy, 19, 157-63.

Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, self, and society: from the standpoint of a social behaviorist. (edited by C.W. Morris). University of Chicago Press.

Mead, G.H. (1964/1981). Selected writings [Abbreviated as SW] (edited by A.J. Reck). University of Chicago Press.

Tanaka, H. (2024, March). Responding to a picture as a picture: Eugene Gendlin and Susanne Langer.