Retroactive time: Bergson as a precursor of Gendlin

In both his psychotherapeutic and philosophical writings, Gendlin discussed a unique theory of time: “how our present living can change the past.” In this post, I will focus on Henri Bergson’s theory of time as a precursor to the theory. By referring to Bergson’s theory, I will not only understand Gendlin’s philosophical writings but also reconsider his own psychotherapeutic research study that led him to advocate Focusing, in relation to his senior researcher’s study (Bergman, 1951) in Carl Rogers’ group.

Reflecting on a past experience from the present

Regarding Gendlin’s unique idea of “retroactive time,” I have presented the time theory of George H. Mead, an American philosopher, as a precursor (Tanaka, 2024, June). In this post, I will also present the time theory of Henri Bergson, a French philosopher, as another precursor.

Chapter IV-B of Gendlin’s main philosophical work, “A Process Model” (APM), discusses time and the following passage:

... we need our model to let us think about how our present living can change the past; we need to be able to ask: what sort of living changes the past, and what sort does not? (Gendlin, 1997/2018, p. 64)

Let’s look at the corresponding passages to the passage above from his practical main book, “Focusing-Oriented Psychotherapy”:

The present ... gives the past a new function, a new role to play. In its new role the past is “sliced” differently. ... To say it pungently, present experiencing changes the past. (Gendlin, 1996, p. 14)

Reflecting on the antecedent event from a subsequent event

The idea of the antecedent event being “sliced (cut out)” differently by looking back from a subsequent event is also found in Bergson’s writings. What is different from the therapy example, however, is that Bergson’s argument, on which I focus, is primarily concerned with changes in historical events rather than changes within individuals.

How can we fail to see that if the event can always be explained afterwards by an arbitrary choice of antecedent events, a completely different event could have been equally well explained in the same circumstances by another choice of antecedent—nay, by the same antecedents otherwise cut out, otherwise distributed, otherwise perceived, — in short, by our retrospective attention? Backwards over the course of time a constant remodelling of the past by the present, of the cause by the effect, is being carried out. We do not see it ... always a prey to the same illusion.... (Bergson, 1946, p. 122; cf. 1934, p. 114)

While Gendlin admitted that “How a person’s past is sbsed is not quite how historical events do it” (Gendlin, 1997/2018, p. 64), he also notes that there are similarities between them and offered a discussion of the transition of historical events in his philosophical book, APM:

For example: what a historical event really was becomes retroactively determined by how subsequent events develop its significance. The Bosnian war is part of what the fall of the Austrian Empire “was.” The event of its fall is sbsed by current events. (Gendlin, 1997/2018, p. 64)

Such a retroactive determination of events would be more or less true for transitions or developments in various fields such as culture, art, and scientific research. Take an example of literature by Bergson:

If there had not been a Rousseau, a Chateaubriand, a Vigny, a Victor Hugo, not only should we never have perceived, but also there would never really have existed, any romanticism in the earlier classical writers .... Romanticism worked retroactively on classicism .... Retroactively it created its own prefiguration in the past and an explanation of itself by its predecessors. (Bergson, 1946, pp. 24-5; cf. 1934, p. 16)

Since I am not so familiar with literature, let us consider classicism going back from romanticism, by substituting the example of music: If there had not been a Berlioz, a Liszt, a Wagner, not only should we never have perceived, but also there would never really have existed, any romanticism in classical Beethoven. Retroactively romanticism created its own prefiguration in the past and an explanation of itself by its predecessor.

Let us now apply Bergson’s earlier statement that the same antecedent is otherwise cut out. Of Beethoven's nine symphonies, if we look back from the perspective of Berlioz or Liszt, the Sixth Symphony, “Pastorale,” can be taken as the precursor of romantic “program music.” On the other hand, if we look back from the perspective of Wagner, the Ninth Symphony, “Choral,” can be taken as the precursor of his “synthesis of the arts (Gesamtkunstwerk).” In this way, Berlioz, Liszt, and Wagner sliced the same antecedent differently and explained themself by their predecessor.

But how can the same antecedent be “sliced differently”? Perhaps it is because of the idea that the significance of past events does not exist a priori as a fixed list of characteristics but emerges as they are given new significance by those who follow. Take Bergson’s example of the advent of democracy:

The essential fact of modern times is the advent of democracy. It is incontestably true that in the past, as described by its contemporaries, we find the shadows of coming events; but those indications which are perhaps most interesting would have been noted then only had they known that humanity was moving in that direction; now the trend of that movement was at that time no more marked than any other, or rather it did not yet exist, since it was created by the movement itself,—that is, by the forward march of the men who have progressively conceived and realised democracy. The premonitory signs are therefore, in our eyes, signs only because we now know the course, because the course has been completed. Neither the course, nor its direction, nor in consequence, its end were given when these facts came into being; hence they were not yet signs. (Bergson, 1946, p. 26; cf. 1934, p. 17)

For those who were around when the premonitory signs of democracy were being conducted, democracy “did not yet exist” in the same sense that it does for people today.

From the above, it can be said that there is a gap in perception between the successor who looks back at and the predecessor who is looked back at. Beethoven, for example, would have refuted in his grave: “I had no intention of breaking the limits of classical formalism with the Pastoral Symphony because I constructed the first movement of this piece in sonata form, as in my other symphonies.” “I had no intention of breaking the limits of instrumental music with the Choral Symphony because I had already composed an opera before this piece and continuously composed instrumental music after this piece.”

Thus, in literature, art, and thoughts, historical transitions are discontinuous in that they proceed in ways different from those predicted by the precursors, but at the same time they are continuous in that we can see connections when we look back at them from the perspective of those who came after them. In other words, there is a curious asymmetry that varies depending on the direction from which one looks.

An example of scientific research

With reference to Bergson, let us return to Gendlin. In his paper on the philosophy of science, “The responsive order” (Gendlin, 1997), Gendlin discusses continuity and discontinuity in the transitions of science. Here is his own commentary on the historian and philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996):

Kuhn has convinced many people that science does not advance; it simply changes. Promising work is thrown out when there is a shift in scientific style. Certain questions are no longer asked. The hypotheses change and so do the findings. But Kuhn does not say that there is never any relationship between the changing statements, or that any and all proposed changes would be equally (un)justifiable. (Gendlin, 1997, p. 394; 2018, p. 264)

As his term “paradigm shift” (Kuhn, 1962/2012) might suggest, Kuhn is usually presented to the public as someone who emphasizes the discontinuity of scientific transitions. Gendlin, however, finds that there are aspects of these discontinuous leaps that are different from disorder and arbitrariness, and he refers to Kuhn in this context. This is what makes the review so typical of Gendlin.

As an example of this asymmetry of discontinuity and continuity, consider a psychotherapeutic research study in which he himself was involved. In the mid-1950s, Gendlin succeeded the research result in Seeman (1954) that “talking about therapeutic relationships is not correlated with the success of therapy,” and found that “what” the clients talk about does not correlate with the success of therapy” (Gendlin et al., 1960). The items related to “what” the clients talk about were called “content variables,” and the other items related to “how” they talk were called “process variables” (Gendlin, 1963). (cf. Tanaka, 2018)

In a footnote to a co-authored paper discussing the results of his research some ten years later, he made a new reference to Daniel Bergman, in addition to Julius Seeman, as another predecessor of Carl Rogers’ group:

However, Bergman’s (1951) study anticipated process variables and was groundbreaking for later developments. Bergman correlated different types of therapist response with different types of ensuing client statements. The type of client statement termed "self-exploration " occurred more frequently after one type of therapist response. (Gendlin et al., 1968, p. 241)

Thus, although Gendlin never mentioned Bergman in the 1950s, when he was actively engaged in quantitative research, he retroactively referred to him after the distinction between content and process variables was established. This was, in Bergson’s words, “The premonitory signs are signs because the course has been completed” or “Retroactively he created his own prefiguration in the past and an explanation of itself by its predecessor.” Or, to use Gendlin’s own phrasing, “What Bergman’s achievement really was becomes retroactively determined by how Gendlin’s own subsequent achievement develops its significance.” In this sense, there is a continuity between Bergman’s and Gendlin's achievements.

I actually read Bergman (1951). There were indeed research items that, from Gendlin’s later perspective, corresponded to process variables. However, I could not find anything in which Bergman himself contrasted process variables with content variables. In other words, Bergman, who is cited as a precursor, would have refuted, “I had no intention of asserting that it is not ‘what’ the clients say but ‘how’ they say that correlates with the success of therapy.” In other words, just as democracy “did not yet exist” in the same sense as it does today for those who were around when the signs to democracy were being conducted, for Bergman, who listed the precursors to process variables as research items, process variables “did not yet exist” in the same sense as they do for Gendlin. In this sense, there is a discontinuity between Bergman’s and Gendlin’s achievements.

Conclusion

In the above, we have advanced our understanding of Gendlin’s assertion that “what a historical event really was is retroactively determined by how subsequent events develop its significance,” with reference to Bergson. The results of our understanding led us to consider the relationship between Gendlin’s own research study and its previous study. Since Gendlin was a renowned psychotherapist, it is clear that in his major practical writings, he primarily described the progression of the client's experiencing. However, in his philosophical writings, he also discussed the historical transition and development between people beyond the individual.

References

Bergman, D.V. (1951). Counseling method and client responses. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 15, 216-24.

Bergson, H. (1946). The creative mind (M. L. Andison, trans.). Philosophical Library. Originally published as Bergson, H. (1934). La pensée et le mouvant. Félix Alcan.

Gendlin, E.T. (1963). Process variables for psychotherapy research. Wisconsin Psychiatric Institute Discussion Paper, 42.

Gendlin, E. T. (1996). Focusing-oriented psychotherapy: a manual of the experiential method. Guilford Press.

Gendlin, E.T. (1997). The responsive order: a new empiricism. Man and World, 30(3), 383–411.

Gendlin, E.T. (1997/2018). A process model. Northwestern University Press.

Gendlin, E.T. (2018). Saying what we mean (edited by E.S. Casey & D.M. Schoeller). Northwestern University Press.

Gendlin, E.T., Jenney, R.H. & Shlien, J.M. (1960). Counselor ratings of process and outcome in client-centered therapy. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 16(2), 210-13.

Gendlin, E.T., J. Beebe, J. Cassens, M. Klein & M. Oberlander (1968). Focusing ability in psychotherapy, personality and creativity. In J.M. Shlien (Ed.), Research in psychotherapy. v. 3 (pp. 217–41). American Psychological Association.

Kuhn, T.S. (1962/2012). The structure of scientific revolutions. 4th ed. University of Chicago Press.

Seeman, J. (1954). Counselor judgments of therapeutic process and outcome. In Rogers, C.R. & Dymond, R. (Eds.) Psychotherapy and Personality Change: co-ordinated Research Studies in the Client-centered Approach (pp. 99-108). University of Chicago Press.

Tanaka, H. (2018). The early days of Focusing and the theory of experiencing: studies on the background of how focusing was formed and practiced. Doctoral Dissertation, Kansai University.

Tanaka, H. (2024, June). Gendlin’s position against the “unit model” or the “content paradigm”: retroactive time in terms of G. H. Mead’s theory of time.