G.H. Mead's early theory of animal gesture

The following passages are from George Herbert Mead's early published papers when he was still heavily influenced by Wilhelm Wundt.

Human conduct is distinguished primarily from animal conduct by that increase in inhibition which is an essential phase of voluntary attention, and increased inhibition means an increase in gesture in the signs of activities which are not carried out; in the assumptions of attitudes whose values in conduct fail to get complete expression. If we recognize language as a differentiation of gesture, the conduct of no other form [*1] can compare with that of man in the abundance of gesture. (Mead, 1910, p. 178; 1964/1981, p. 110)

Most social stimulation is found in the beginnings or early stages of social acts which serve as stimuli to other forms whom these acts would affect. This is the field of gestures, which reveal the motor attitude of a form in its relation to others; an attitude which psychologists have conceived of as predominantly emotional, though it is emotional only in so far as an ongoing act is inhibited. That certain of these early indications of an incipient act have persisted, while the rest of the act has been largely suppressed or has lost its original value, e.g., the baring of the teeth or the lifting of the nostrils, is true, and the explanation can most readily be found in the social value which such indications have acquired. It is an error, however, to overlook the relation which these truncated acts have assumed toward other forms of reactions which complete them as really as the original acts, or to forget that they occupy but a small part of the whole field of gesture by means of which we are apprised of the reactions of others toward ourselves. The expressions of the face and attitudes of body have the same functional value for us that the beginnings of hostility have for two dogs, who are maneuvering for an opening to attack. (Mead, 1912, p. 402; 1964/1981, pp. 135-6)

I cannot say for sure yet, but I think the above "inhibition" may be very helpful in considering the "pause" in Chapter VII-A "Symbolic process" of "A Process Model" (Gendlin, 2018). This is still only my hypothesis.

Incidentally, in Mead's later lecture notes, he discusses how dog fighting, though involving gestures, is different from human gestures, as follows:

The very fact that the dog is ready to attack another becomes a stimulus to the other dog to change his own position or his own attitude. He has no sooner done this than the change of attitude in the second dog in turn causes the first dog to change his attitude. We have here a conversation of gestures. They are not, however, gestures in the sense that they are significant. We do not assume that the dog says to himself, "If the animal comes from this direction he is going to spring at my throat and I will turn in such a way." What does take place is an actual change in his own position due to the direction of the approach of the other dog. (Mead, 1934, pp. 42-3)

In any case, I am still unable to draw clear boundaries and articulate which parts of Mead's argument Gendlin inherited and developed, which parts of it  Gendlin criticized and modified, and where the advantage of "A Process Model" lies in explaining the evolution of gestures from animals to humans. That will be my future task.

Note

[*1] The word "form" used in the passages above is an abbreviation for "life form," and is used almost interchangeably with "organism."

… every form maps out its own environment, its line of influence, and so gives rise to other objects existing in relationship to the form itself. The environment emerges, and forms create environments, be they nests or homes. (Mead, 1982, p. 115)

References

Gendlin, E. T. (2018). A process model. Northwestern University Press.

Mead, G.H. (1910). What Social Objects must Psychology Presuppose? The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology & Scientific Methods, 7, 174–80.

Mead, G.H. (1912). The mechanism of social consciousness. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 9 (15), 401–6.

Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, self, and society: from the standpoint of a social behaviorist. (edited by C.W. Morris). University of Chicago Press.

Mead, G. H. (1964/1981). Selected writings (edited by A. J. Reck). University of Chicago Press.

Mead, G. H. (1982). 1927 class lectures in social psychology. In The individual and the social self: unpublished work of George Herbert Mead (edited by D. L. Miller) (pp. 106-75). University of Chicago Press.