Vague image of “experiencing”: with reference to W. James and H. Bergson

It is undoubtedly true that Gendlin's key term “experiencing” was proposed under the influence of W. Dilthey. However, for an intuitive understanding of the term, I also refer to W. James and H. Bergson.

In Gendlin's writings, "experiencing" is often used as an uncountable noun, as opposed to "a unit experience."

When Dilthey speaks of erleben (to live through), we shall here say “experiencing", referring to the process or functioning. Dilthey's word Erlebnis means a unit experience. (Gendlin, 1950, p. 13)

Nor is it [experiencing] made up of two, five, or a million other unit experiences. There are no units. Anything like a unit experience is always a product, embodying its experienced production and selection. (Gendlin, 1962/1997, p. 153)

However, to understand the experience as uncountable and flowing, I would prefer the writings of William James or Henri Bergson to those of Wilhelm Dilthey.

First, William James' idea of "stream of consciousness" is, of course, helpful.

Consciousness, then, does not appear to itself chopped up in bits. Such words as 'chain' or 'train' do not describe it fitly as it presents itself in the first instance. It is nothing jointed; it flows. A 'river' or a 'stream' are the metaphors by which it is most naturally described. In talking of it hereafter, let us call it the stream of thought, of consciousness, or of subjective life. (James, 1890, p. 239)

Next, something else has helped me intuitively understand these features of “experiencing” in images. It is a passage from Bergson's “Introduction to Metaphysics,” in which he discusses the unbroken primordial state of “duration” that is unique to him.

What I find beneath these [perceptions’] clear-cut crystals and this superficial congelation is a continuity of flow comparable to no other flowing I have ever seen. It is a succession of states each one of which announces what follows and contains what precedes. Strictly speaking they do not constitute multiple states until I have already got beyond them, and turn around to observe their trail. (Bergson, 1946, p. 192; 1934, p. 183)

Note, however, that Gendlin, unlike Bergson, does not take the position that “Words or concepts are unreliable” or that “priority is given to pure time—‘duration,’” which is not spatialized at all.

References

Bergson, H. (1946). The creative mind (M. L. Andison, trans.). Philosophical Library. Originally published as Bergson, H. (1934). La pensée et le mouvant: Essais et conférences. Alcan.

Gendlin, E. T. (1950). Wilhelm Dilthey and the problem of comprehending human significance in the science of man. MA Thesis, Department of Philosophy, University of Chicago.

Gendlin, E. T. (1962/1997). Experiencing and the creation of meaning: a philosophical and psychological approach to the subjective (Paper ed.). Northwestern University Press.

James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology. Vol. 1. Henry Holt.