Pragmatistic origins of Gendlin’s en#0: with reference to Dewey and Mead

In “A process model,” en#0 is mentioned less often than en#2 and en#3. Nevertheless, it has been pointed out that “just because it gets rarely mentioned doesn’t mean it is not structurally important.” (Jaaniste, 2021, April). There are many possible backgrounds for Gendlin’s deliberate assumption of en#0. In my view, one of the anticipations of en#0 can be found in the concept of the “natural world” that appears in John Dewey’s later work, “Logic: The Theory of Inquiry.” Finally, I suggest that we can also see some points in the ideas and terminology of en#0 that are closer to G. H. Mead than to J. Dewey.

“Natural world” in “Logic: the theory of inquiry”

In his later work, “Logic: The Theory of Inquiry” (Dewey, 1938), Dewey discusses something not mentioned in his earlier work, “Experience and Nature” (Dewey, 1925/29). The later “Logic” explicitly mentions things or a world that has not yet interacted with the organism.

There are things in the world that are indifferent to the life-activities of an organism. But they are not parts of its environment, save potentially. (Dewey, 1938, p. 25 [LW 12, 32])

There is, of course, a natural world that exists independently of the organism, but this world is environment only as it enters directly and indirectly into life-functions. The organism is itself a part of the larger natural world and exists as organism only in active connections with its environment. (Dewey, 1938, pp. 33-4 [LW 12, 40])

In other words, in the later work, Dewey clearly acknowledged the (potential) existence of things that have not yet interacted with organisms. However, according to Dewey’s definition in this work, without entering into the life function, such a thing may belong to the “natural world.” However, it still cannot be said to belong to the “environment.”

Gendlin’s extension of the concept of “environment”

Gendlin also acknowledged the (potential) existence of something that has not yet interacted with the body in the first Chapter of “A Process Model.” He extended Dewey’s definition of “environment” to include such things and the world.

However, Gendlin distinguished by calling the environment of those that actually enter the life functions “en#2,” and those that have not yet entered the life functions “en#0.”

En#0 is a fourth type. Something may some day affect the life process and be en#2, but is not now.... Since this has no reality as en#2, and since en#3 is the result of en#2, we need a term for "environment" that has never been functioning in a life process. (Gendlin, 1997/2018, pp. 7-8)

Thus, it can be said that Dewey and Gendlin introduce similar classifications, although they differ in the scope of what they refer to by the term “environment.”

Dewey’s idea of “expansion of the Environment”

Dewey discussed the equivalent of en#0 in “Logic: The Theory of Inquiry” outside of the passages I cited earlier.

It follows that with every differentiation of structure the environment expands. For a new organ provides a new way of interacting in which things in the world that were previously indifferent enter into life-functions. (Dewey, 1938, p. 25 [LW 12, 32])

However, Gendlin would probably not say, “A new organ provides a new way of interacting.” He would not have envisioned pre-separated, fixed organs or systems to which they belong.

The spectator could formulate complete and distinct strings of separate processes, for example, digestive, respiratory, reproductive, etc. These are not separate all along their way, nor are their subprocesses at the microscopic level. (Gendlin, 1997/2018, p. 23)

En#0 becomes en#2: Mead‘s terminology of “sensitivity” or “capacity”

Dewey's ally, George Herbert Mead, also discussed “things in the world that were previously indifferent enter into life-functions.” However, he differed from Dewey in using the terminology of “sensitivity” or “capacity” in his discussion.

Gendlin revisits the term en#0 in “Chapter V-A: Intervening Events” of APM. In this section on evolution, he begins by asking the following question:

How does the organism develop new sensitivities to the en? (Gendlin, 1997/2018, p. 71)

To understand the term “new sensitivities” as introduced here, the following passage from Mead may be helpful:

The only environment to which the organism can react is one that its sensitivity reveals. The sort of environment that can exist for the organism, then, is one that the organism in some sense determines. (Mead, 1934, p. 245)

Gendlin then responds to the question above by using the term “capacity” as a synonym for “sensitivity,” referring to En#0.

We have derived an increasing capacity to be affected by the environment or, as we also put it, the body’s engaging the environment in ever new ways (en#0 becoming en#2). (Gendlin, 1997/2018, p. 79)

The fact that en#0 becomes en#2 can be easily understood by referring to Mead's specific example:

When a [life] form develops a capacity, however this takes place, to deal with parts of the environment which its progenitors could not deal with, it has to this degree created a new environment for itself. The ox that has a digestive organ capable of treating grass as a food adds a new food, and in adding this it adds a new object. The substance which was not food before becomes food now. The environment of the form has increased. (Mead, 1934, p. 215)

If in the development of the [life] form there is an increase in the diversity of sensitivity there will be an increase in the responses of the organism to its environment, that is, the organism will have a correspondingly larger environment. (Mead, 1934, p. 245)

With such considerations, it can be said that Mead and Gendlin discussed the mutual influence of the organism and the environment.

The situation is one in which there is action and reaction, and adaptation that changes the form must also change the environment. (Mead, 1934, p. 215)

… new ways of b-en are new ways of engaging the en, new ways in which the organism effects and is affected by changes in the en.(Gendlin, 1997/2018, p. 72)

References

Dewey, J. (1925/1929). Experience and nature (2nd ed.). Open Court. Reprinted as Dewey, J. (1981). The later works, vol. 1 [Abbreviated as LW 1]. Southern Illinois University Press.

Dewey, J. (1938). Logic: the theory of inquiry. Henry Holt. Reprinted as Dewey, J. (1986). The later works, vol. 12 [Abbreviated as LW 12]. Southern Illinois University Press.

Gendlin, E. T. (1997/2018). A process model. Northwestern University Press.

Jaaniste, L. (2021, April). Posting to “A Process Model Study Group” (Facebook)

Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, self, and society: from the standpoint of a social behaviorist. (edited by C.W. Morris). University of Chicago Press.