道徳の系譜（フリードリヒ・ニーチェ著）

以下は、フリードリヒ・ニーチェ著「道徳の系譜」の英語版Wikipedia、第一論文の箇所を抜粋したものである。英文を読み、問いに答えよ。

問い：ニーチェが考えた「奴隷の道徳」とはどのようなものか？

In the "First Treatise", Nietzsche demonstrates that the two pairs of opposites "good/evil" and "good/bad" have very different origins, and that the word "good" itself came to represent two opposed meanings. In the "good/bad" distinction of the aristocratic way of thinking, "good" is synonymous with nobility and everything that is powerful and life-affirming; "bad" has no inculpatory implication and simply refers to the "common" or the "low" and the qualities and values associated with them, in contradistinction to the warrior ethos of the ruling nobility (§3). In the "good/evil" distinction, which Nietzsche calls "slave morality", the meaning of "good" is made the antithesis of the original aristocratic "good", which itself is re-labelled "evil". This inversion of values develops out of the ressentiment felt by the weak towards the powerful.

Nietzsche rebukes the "English psychologists" for lacking historical sense. They seek to do moral genealogy by explaining altruism in terms of the utility of altruistic actions, which is subsequently forgotten as such actions become the norm. But the judgment "good", according to Nietzsche, originates not with the beneficiaries of altruistic actions. Rather, the good themselves (the powerful) coined the term "good". Further, Nietzsche sees it as psychologically absurd that altruism derives from a utility that is forgotten: if it is useful, what is the incentive to forget it? Such meaningless value-judgment gains currency by expectations repeatedly shaping the consciousness.

From the aristocratic mode of valuation, another mode of valuation branches off, which develops into its opposite: the priestly mode. Nietzsche proposes that longstanding confrontation between the priestly caste and the warrior caste fuels this splitting of meaning. The priests, and all those who feel disenfranchised and powerless in a lowly state of subjugation and physical impotence (e.g., slavery), develop a deep and venomous hatred for the powerful. Thus originates what Nietzsche calls the "slave revolt in morality", which, according to him, begins with Judaism (§7), for it is the bridge that led to the slave revolt, via Christian morality, of the alienated, oppressed masses of the Roman Empire (a dominant theme in The Antichrist, written the following year).

To the noble life, justice is immediate, real, and good, necessarily requiring enemies. To slave morality, justice is a deferred event, ultimately taking the form of an imagined revenge that will result in everlasting life for the weak and punishment for the strong. Slave morality grows out of impotence, world-weariness, indignation and envy; it purports to speak for the oppressed masses who have been wronged, deprived of the power to act with immediacy by the masters, who thrive on their subjugation. The men of ressentiment, in an inversion of values, redefine the "good" in their own image. They say: "he is good who does not outrage, who harms nobody, who does not attack, who does not requite, who leaves revenge to God, who avoids evil and desires little from life, like us, the patient, humble, and just."(§13) According to Nietzsche, this is merely a transformation of the effects and qualities of impotence into virtues, as if these effects and qualities were chosen – the meritorious deeds of the "good" man. The deeds of the powerful man, known to themselves as "good", are re-cast by the men of ressentiment as "evil", taking on a mystical moral-judgemental element entirely absent from the aristocratic "bad", which to the noble was simply a descriptor for the inferior qualities of the lower classes.

In the First Treatise, Nietzsche introduces one of his most controversial images, the "blond beast". He had previously employed this expression to represent the lion, an image that is central to his philosophy and made its first appearance in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Beyond the metaphorical lion, Nietzsche expressively associates the "blond beast" with the Aryan race of Celts and Gaels which he states were all fair skinned and fair-haired and constituted the collective aristocracy of the time. Thus, he associates the "good, noble, pure, as originally a blond person in contrast to dark-skinned, dark-haired native inhabitants" (the embodiment of the "bad"). Here he introduces the concept of the original blond beasts as the "master race" which has lost its dominance over humanity but not necessarily, permanently. Though, at the same time, his examples of blond beasts include such peoples as the Japanese and Arabic nobilities of antiquity (§11), suggesting that being a blond beast has more to do with one's morality than one's race. Peter Sloterdijk asserts: "There is no 'eugenics' in Nietzsche."

Nietzsche insists that it is a mistake to hold beasts of prey to be "evil", for their actions stem from their inherent strength, rather than any malicious intent. One can not blame them for their "thirst for enemies and resistances and triumphs" because, according to Nietzsche, there is no "subject" separate from the action:

A quantum of force is equivalent to a quantum of drive, will, effect—more, it is nothing other than precisely this very driving, willing, effecting, and only owing to the seduction of language (and the fundamental errors of reason that are petrified in it) which conceives and misconceives all effects as conditioned by something that causes effects, by a "subject", can it appear otherwise. For just as the popular mind separates the lightning from its flash and takes the latter for an action, for the operation of a subject called lightning, so popular morality also separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum behind the strong man, which was free to express strength or not do so. But there is no such substratum; there is no "being" behind doing, effecting, becoming; "the doer" is merely a fiction added to the deed—the deed is everything.(§13)

The "subject" (or soul) is only necessary for slave morality. It enables the impotent man to sanctify the qualities of his impotence by making them into "good" qualities, chosen for moral reasons, and the actions of his oppressor into morally "evil" choices.

Nietzsche concludes his First Treatise by hypothesizing a tremendous historical struggle between the Roman dualism of "good/bad" and that of the Judaic "good/evil", with the latter eventually achieving a victory for ressentiment, broken temporarily by the Renaissance, but then reasserted by the Reformation, and finally confirmed by the French Revolution when the "ressentiment instincts of the rabble" triumphed.

The First Treatise concludes with a note calling for further examination of the history of moral concepts and the hierarchy of values.

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解答

ニーチェが考えた「奴隷の道徳」は、彼の著書『道徳の系譜』の中で詳しく議論されています。これは、貴族的な価値観とは対照的に、力強さや肯定的な生命力を表す「良い」という言葉が、弱者たちの反感から生じた「奴隷道徳」によって、その意味が反転されたことを指します。

まず、ニーチェは「良い/悪い」と「善/悪」の対立が異なる起源を持ち、「良い」という言葉自体が対立する意味を表すことを示しています。貴族的な考え方では、「良い」とは気高さや力強さ、肯定的な生命力を表し、「悪」とは単に「一般的な」や「低い」という意味であり、それは統治貴族の戦士精神とは対照的です。一方、「善/悪」の対立では、「善」という意味が元々の貴族的な「良い」の反対語にされ、「悪」がそれ自体が「悪」というラベルが貼られたものとされます。これは、弱者たちが強者への反感から生じる「ressentiment（反感）」によって価値観が反転される過程で生じます。

ニーチェは、「英国の心理学者」を批判し、彼らが利他的行動の有用性から利他主義を説明しようとするが、その行動が規範化されるとその有用性が忘れられるという歴史的感覚を持たないと主張します。利他的行動の恩恵者からはなく、むしろ利他的行動の有用性を忘れるという心理的に不条理なことが起こるとニーチェは見ます。そのような無意味な価値判断は、期待が意識を形作ることによって通貨となります。

ニーチェは、貴族的な価値観から、もう一つの価値観が分岐し、それがその反対に発展すると述べます。この価値観の分岐は、司祭階級と戦士階級の間の長い対立から生じると彼は提案します。そして、「奴隷道徳」は無力感、世界に対する倦怠、憤り、嫉妬から生じ、強者による抑圧の結果行動する力を奪われた被支配者の大衆を代弁するとされます。

ニーチェは、このような「奴隷道徳」が「良い」という言葉を自らのイメージに再定義し、無力さの効果や特性を美徳に変えると主張しています。つまり、これらの効果や特性が選択された「良い」人の功績であるかのように振る舞います。強者の行為は彼ら自身にとって「良い」とされているものが、ressentiment（反感）の男たちによって「悪」とされ、貴族的な「悪」から完全に欠落していた神秘的な道徳的判断要素を帯びるように再構築されます。

結論として、ニーチェは、ローマの「良い/悪」の二元性とユダヤの「善/悪」の間で巨大な歴史的闘争があったと仮定し、後者が結局はressentiment（反感）の勝利を達成し、一時的にはルネサンスによって打ち破られましたが、その後宗教改革によって再確立され、最終的にはフランス革命によって「下層の反感本能」が勝利したと結論付けます。