Suga’s Resignation shows the Limits of Gekokujo (the Low Oppress the High) Story, and How the LDP Can Come Back Through the Presidential Election

(Japanese original version is posted to Diamond Online on September 7, 2021)

　　　　　　　　　　　Masato Kamikubo,
　　　　　　　　　　　Professor of Policy Science, Ritsumeikan University

Abstract
Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga has announced that he will not run for the LDP presidency. He had been desperately wielding his "power" until just before the election in order to "prolong his life" as prime minister, but he was finally forced to step down after dissatisfaction erupted from within the party. The dominant power system of Abe and Suga has weakened the LDP. Will the LDP be able to recover from this?

Suga, Who Has Been Exercising His Power, Does Not Have His Numerical Strength.
The reason why Suga was able to fire or eliminate conflicting bureaucrats and politicians before he became prime minister was that he was backed by powerful people who controlled the majority in the party and had a solid party base.

It was important for politicians and bureaucrats to obey the power because they would not lose the election and would get the post. Even though some people were dissatisfied with Suga's cold-hearted "political approach," no one wanted to challenge him outwardly.

On the other hand, if he becomes the prime minister, the highest authority, there will be no one to back him. If Suga's own approval rating drops and it becomes clear that he cannot win the election, no one will listen to him. Suga's attempt to use his most powerful power, the right to dissolve the House of Representatives, has been stopped. Even if he threatened to use his "personnel power," he would not be taken seriously.

In short, Suga has wielded a lot of power as Chief Cabinet Secretary, but he can no longer do so as Prime Minister. The reason for this is that Suga does not have a solid base of "numerous power" within his party.

Therefore, I would like to examine Yoshihide Suga's continued use of the political technique of "forceful exercise of power. This is because he is not a hereditary member of the Diet, but has risen to the position of Prime Minister from nothing.

Suga's Failure to Make Friends, and the Limits of His Gekokujo Story
When Suga became a politician, he must not have thought that he would become the future prime minister.

Japan's political world is a "reverse-academic career-based society. In this society, hereditary lads and ladies are supported by non-hereditary politicians and bureaucrats who studied hard and graduated from the University of Tokyo, Waseda University, Keio University, etc. (Article. No. 233).

Suga must have known that he was the one supporting the hereditary legislators. His political mentors were the "warriors" as Hikosaburo Okonogi, famous for crushing the political reform bill, and Shizuro Kajiyama, known as the "leader in turbulent times”.

Under the power of former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Suga could rise in the political ranks by using his personnel authority to mercilessly fire bureaucrats who resisted his reforms.

On the other hand, Suga was "factionless”. In the political world, it is absolutely necessary to make friends in order to rise to power. However, Suga did not take the time to do so.

From Suga's point of view, if he had the time, he would have preferred to concentrate on the job of crushing those who resisted the reform. In fact, he may have even considered his friends as a hindrance. This was a rational attitude since he understood that he would never become prime minister.

Suga’s role as "dirty cop" has made his tenure as Chief Cabinet Secretary the longest in Japanese politics. He handled the secretariat's budget of 1 to 1.5 billion yen every year, and used his authority to appoint about 500 senior officials at the councilor level and above through the Cabinet Personnel Bureau. He controlled the media by suppressing the Prime Minister's Press Club, and managed all kinds of information gathered at the Prime Minister's Office. In short, He could grasp the people, money, and information gathered in the Prime Minister's Office in his hand (Article, No. 256).

Despite his immense power, Suga's surprisingly narrow personal network became apparent when he became prime minister. In the first round of cabinet and party executive appointments, key ministers and officials from the Abe administration were retained, while Abe's close associates, Suga's peers from his first election, and the sons of his two "masters", Okonogi and Kajiyama, were appointed. It was a very boring and uninspiring lineup (Article, No. 253).

At the same time that Suga showed the limitations of being a "non-hereditary" and "factionless" politicians, it became clear that he was not really prepared to become prime minister. And this became the "fatal wound" that prevented the Suga administration from prolonging its life.

If there had been a "faction" to support Suga no matter what, there would have been no need for him to use his power unwisely, even if his approval rating would have declined. The current prime minister would not have been forced to abandon his candidacy for the presidency.

In short, Suga played a "dirty" role in his rise to the position of prime minister. In the end, however, he exposed his limitations. In Japan's "reverse academic-based society," it is extremely difficult for a non-hereditary figure to rise through the ranks to become prime minister and demonstrate his abilities.

Suga Builds and Protects Abe's Dominant Power
I would like to consider what Yoshihide Suga has brought to Japanese politics. Above all, I would like to point out the significant role of Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga played in the second Abe administration that came into power in 2012.

Prime Minister Abe's administration has won six consecutive national elections, making it the longest-running government in history. Prime Minister Abe has also won three consecutive elections for the presidency of the Liberal Democratic Party. The overwhelming strength of the Abe administration in elections is one of its characteristics. On the other hand, its negative effects have also been pointed out.

The chief cabinet secretary Suga's role in the Abe administration was mainly "damage control," that is, to prevent the rise of political opponents by concentrating information and funds on himself. He has thoroughly favored the "mainstream" faction within the party that supports Prime Minister Abe in party executive and cabinet appointments and in the distribution of funds. On the other hand, he thoroughly eliminated the "non-mainstream" faction.

A typical example of such "non-mainstreamers" is former Secretary General Shigeru Ishiba. Ishiba, who was the runner-up in the 2012 presidential election when Abe returned to the prime minister's office, was initially appointed as the party's secretary general. However, he was later removed from the position. Ishiba, who considers himself an expert on constitutional law and security, often criticized Prime Minister Abe mercilessly for trying to implement a realistic plan. Prime Minister Abe, annoyed by this, began to exclude Ishiba (Article No. 190).

Abe showed no mercy even to factions considered to be mainstream. In the 2018 Upper House election, Anri Kawai was appointed as a candidate to the Hiroshima constituency, where Mizote Akimasa, a close ally of Kishida Fumio, at the "strong will" of Prime Minister Abe and Chief Cabinet Secretary Kan. There is a view that this was an attempt to destroy Mizote, who had criticized Abe in the past. This led to a major scandal in which Kawai and his wife were later sentenced to prison.

Kishida served as the foreign minister in the Abe administration and was seen as a strong candidate for the "post-Abe" era. However, he did not run for the 2018 presidential election (Article No. 193), hoping to be handed the prime ministership after Abe's term as president expires.

He did run for the 2020 presidential election after Prime Minister Abe stepped down, but lost to Kan without the expected support of Mr. Abe (Article No. 253, p. 2).

In this way, Prime Minister Abe and Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga have built up overwhelming power within the party by relentlessly suppressing not only the non-mainstream factions but also the mainstream factions through the relentless use of their personnel power, approval power, and fund allocation power.

However, if we look at it from a different perspective, we can see that the Abe/Suga’s "dominant power" system has actually weakened the LDP. I would like to examine the changes that have taken place in the LDP under the Abe/San "dominant power" system.

The Negative Effects of the Dominant Power System: The Loss of Diversity within the LDP
In the 2012 LDP presidential election, five candidates, including Mr. Abe, ran for the post. Prior to that, an average of three to four candidates had run for the LDP presidency. However, under the Abe administration, the number of candidates running for the LDP presidency itself has almost disappeared. The Abe administration has relentlessly blocked those who seek to run for the LDP presidency, such as former Internal Affairs Minister Seiko Noda.

Disagreements about policy have disappeared from the party ranks. In particular, it became difficult to criticize "Abenomics," the economic policy that bears Prime Minister Abe's name (Article No. 193, p. 2).

However, one of the major reasons why the LDP has been in power for the longest period of time in the world in a liberal democracy was its policy diversity as a "catch-all party" that sometimes took policies advocated by opposition parties and made them its own (Article No. 218).

There was a time when the so-called "San-kaku-dai-fuku-chu" factions of Takeo Miki, Kakuei Tanaka, Masayoshi Ohira, Takeo Fukuda, and Yasuhiro Nakasone waged a bloody power struggle, and the policies of each faction were diverse. For example, there was the "light-armed economic supremacy" faction led by Shigeru Yoshida and Hayato Ikeda, the "profit-driven politics" faction led by Kakuei Tanaka, and the conservative faction led by Ichiro Hatoyama and Nobusuke Kishi.

The factions vying for the position of prime minister were called "pseudo-regime change”. Policy orientation also clearly changed from one prime minister to another. When policies failed and the party fell into a crisis, a prime minister with a "plan B" emerged to save the party from the crisis.

The "pseudo-regime change" has turned the public's attention to power struggles and policy debates within the LDP. The opposition parties were "left out of the loop," and a long period of "one-party rule" by the LDP was realized.

The "dominant power" system of Abe and Suga may have caused the LDP to lose its strength. It has lost its diversity of personnel and policies. There is no longer an opposition within the party with a "Plan B" and no longer a "pseudo-regime change" within the party. The alternative to the LDP has become the oppositions as the Constitutional Democratic Party.

In fact, the Suga administration suffered consecutive defeats by the opposition parties in the supplementary elections and the Yokohama mayoral election. This means that the LDP, with its "dominant power" system, may lose power to the opposition parties. Clearly, the Abe/Suga "dominant power" system has weakened the LDP and increased the possibility of a "regime change.

To put it cynically, future generations may regard the Abe/Suga “dominant power” system as having made a significant contribution to the realization of a "democracy with regime change.”

Can the Candidates Propose a "Plan B" in the LDP Presidential Election?
With Prime Minister Suga's announcement that he will not run for the presidency, candidates such as Fumio Kishida, Shigeru Ishiba, Taro Kono, Sanae Takaichi, and Seiko Noda have emerged. However, no matter who becomes the next prime minister, it will be meaningless if he or she does not have a "Plan B" for policy, carries out the policies of the Suga administration in a way that does not cause public displeasure, and merely becomes the "face of the election. Even if he can maintain his majority in the next lower house election, the LDP will continue to decline in the long run.

However, Kishida has announced a policy to deal with the covid-19. In addition to establishing a "Health Crisis Management Agency" (tentative name) that will be in charge of centrally responding to infectious diseases, the government will take the lead in opening temporary medical facilities such as "field hospitals" in order to achieve "zero medical refugees.

This idea is similar to the "All Japan Expert Committee" (Article No. 265) and the "Self-Defense Forces Large-Scale Field Hospital" (Article No. 283) that I have proposed. I think this plan could be "Plan B" for the covid-19 countermeasures.

It will be interesting to see if the other candidates come up with "Plan B" one after another. If the "dominant power" system comes to an end, and the presidential election becomes one in which a diverse range of people compete for the presidency with a variety of policies, it may be an opportunity for the LDP to regain its true strength.