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The Emergence of “New Dark Shogun” Shinzo Abe: Will the Kishida Administration Accelerate Japan's Shift to the Right?

(Japanese original version is posted to Diamond Online on October 5, 2021)


          Masato Kamikubo
          Professor of Policy Science, Ritsumeikan University

Abstract
Former Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka was once called the "Yami Shogun (Dark Shogun)" because of the influence he maintained in the political world even after he left office. The "Dark Shogun" was a politician who was not even officially a member of the LDP, who held no office and had no authority, but had such hidden power that he could make all political decisions by himself. However, through the LDP presidential election, the appointment of party executives, and the formation of the cabinet, a "new Dark Shogun" was born. He effectively grabs the official authority and power of the LDP and the government in terms of funds, personnel rights, the right to endorse candidates in elections, and profit-making. He is former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.

Kishida was allowed to be the "winner" of the presidential election
It is said that new Prime Minister Fumio Kishida "won" the LDP presidential election, but I don't think he "won" at all. He simply emerged as the "winner" after a fierce political battle among various politicians in the election.

Kishida's campaign was hardly that of a "winner. His lack of political instincts and strategic thinking was as bad as ever (Article No. 285).

When Sanae Takaichi, the new chair of the LDP Policy Research Council, ran for the election with Abe's support, she was enthusiastically endorsed by conservatives on the Internet. Her momentum was so strong that before the voting day, it was not clear who would come in second in the first round of voting, Kishida or Takaichi.

Nevertheless, in the first round of voting, Kishida came in first, just one vote ahead of Taro Kono. This was because Abe "loosened his grip" in the final stages of the campaign.

In the middle of his campaign for the presidency, Abe made a series of phone calls, dubbed "Abenophones," to members of a group formed by Tatsuo Fukuda and other young politicians. In order to reduce support for Kono, Abe said, "Support groups are angry with Kono's 'denuclearization. You won't get any support in the next election.” However, “Abenophones” stopped abruptly just before voting day.

At about the same time, it was reported that Kishida and Takaichi camps had agreed to cooperate in the runoff election. Fukuda also announced that he would vote for Kishida in the runoff election. Kishida finally won the presidential election. However, this was not a strategic move by the Kishida camp. One Kishida faction official convinced of Kishida’s victory by the agreement with the Takaichi camp but said self-deprecatingly, "The Kishida administration will become the Abe administration.” This suggests that Kishida's victory was a trick by Mr. Abe. Kishida was only "allowed" to win by Mr. Abe.

Abe's Establishment of the New "Dark Shogun" System
The LDP presidential election is a bloody power struggle. The winner takes all the delicious nectar of power. The loser, on the other hand, is thoroughly deprived of everything. During the Abe administration, former secretary general Shigeru Ishiba was thoroughly eliminated (Article No. 190). After the election, Kono was downgraded to the position of "Party Public Relations Chairman".

However, President Kishida did not just eliminate the losers. He excluded the Kishida faction by not appointing any member of the Kishida faction as one of the four party executives.

The four party executives were Akira Amari, secretary general, who is part of the "3A Group (Abe, Aso, and Amari)”; Sanae Takaichi, chairman of the Policy Research Council, who is a close ally of Abe; Tatsuo Fukuda, chairman of the General Affairs Committee, who was caged by the Abenophones; and Toshiaki Endo, chairman of the Election Campaign Committee, who is in the Tanigaki Group.

The cabinet appointments were also announced, and Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirokazu Matsuno of the Hosoda faction was appointed. The appointment of Koichi Hagiuda was also discussed, but some believe that Matsuno was chosen because of his high number of elections.

What is more important, however, is that Hagiuda has become such an "strong politician" that he openly objected as Education Minister to the "simultaneous closure of all schools" as a covid-19 countermeasure during the Abe administration, and his appointment as Chief Cabinet Secretary was also discussed in the cabinet of the Yoshihide Suga administration (Article No. 253, p. 4). Abe was reluctant to appoint a "strong politician" as Chief Cabinet Secretary. On the other hand, he probably thought that Matsuno would be able to follow the policies of the Kishida administration, which Abe controls, and faithfully carry out his tasks.

In addition, Shunichi Suzuki, a close ally and relative of Taro Aso, one of the "3A," was appointed as finance minister. Suzuki is a veteran, but he has never been called a financial expert. Aso will move on to become the party's vice president, but he intends to keep control of fiscal policy after that. This is the establishment of Abe's "New Dark Shogun" regime.

In the era of the Single-seat constituency-based elections, the "Dark Shogun" would not suppose to appear.
To be honest, I have been skeptical about Abe's "influence" as it is often referred to. It was a long time ago when big-name politicians, like faction bosses, wielded power by distributing money behind the scenes.

The "political and administrative reforms" of the 1990s gave the prime minister (party president), the party secretary general, and the chief cabinet secretary authority over funding, personnel, and candidate endorsement. Meanwhile, the factions lost their power. So, without these authorities, even the former prime minister, who had the longest and most successful government in history, could not wield power. Thus, I thought it would be difficult for a politician who had retired as prime minister and was no longer in office to maintain a hidden influence in the political field.

However, Abe made a smart move in the presidential election and let Kishida win. He must have talked a lot to Kishida, whose strength is that he listens well to others. The secretary general and chief cabinet secretary, who hold the power to allocate funds, appoint personnel, and candidate endorsement, are now in Abe's hands. Even the finance minister and the policy research council chief, who decide how to benefit their supporters and have a direct impact on the election, are now under Abe's influence.

This, I believe, is the birth of the new "Dark Shogun" of the "Single-seat constituency era," which is completely different from the "medium-sized constituency era" dominated by faction bosses.

Originally, the electoral system was reformed in order to break down the "dual structure of power" in which the faction bosses, who were supposed to have no official authority or power, had more influence than the prime minister and the party secretary general.

In other words, the "dark shogun" was not supposed to appear in the era of the constituency system. In fact, politicians who actually obtained positions such as prime minister or party secretary general would exercise their power and authority during their term of office. The results will be judged democratically by the people through elections. In the long run, power and authority were not supposed to be concentrated in any particular politician (Article No. 115).

However, Abe has become the "new Dark Shogun" of the "single-seat constituency era" by allowing Prime Minister Kishida to "remove the president's faction" and seize all positions of power and authority.

If the Kishida administration becomes a long-term power, the power of the "New Dark Shogun" will grow stronger
What will happen if Abe firmly establishes this control system during the Kishida administration, and if the Kishida administration survives the general election and the upper house election and becomes a long-term government? It is possible that the "New Dark Shogun" will continue to control the personnel, fund allocation, and candidate endorsement authority, and that the new candidates will be those recommended by the "New Dark Shogun. Even today, about 40% of the LDP members are young people who were first elected during the Abe administration, but more and more politicians under his influence will become the majority in the party. The only ones who can win the election for the presidency will be those who follow the "New Dark Shogun.

Then, no matter who becomes the prime minister, only politicians under the influence of the "New Dark Shogun" will be in positions to exercise personnel, fund allocation, and candidate endorsement rights. Therefore, it would be naive to regard Abe as merely the "guardian of the prime minister. " It would be more appropriate to call him the "New Dark Shogun.”

Regardless of the new Dark Shogun in Nagata-cho, what is important for the people is whether politics will protect the lives, safety and livelihood of the people. Several pundits point out that the Kishida administration would become more conservative or right-leaning as the influence of the new "Dark Shogun" grows. However, I do not agree with it.

In fact, the domestic policies of the Abe administration tended to be more social democratic, such as the "women’s participation in society," "social security for all generations," "free education," and "new immigration policy" (Article No. 218). These were implemented in spite of strong dissatisfaction among conservatives.

It was characteristic of the Abe administration to take a "pragmatic response" to changes in public opinion and social conditions, including its "Abenomics" economic policy (Article No. 163). I suspect that this trend will continue in the Kishida administration.

As for policies related to diversity and human rights, such as "same-sex marriage" and "selective surname separation," which were the subject of controversy during the election for the presidency, several pundits argue that discussions within the LDP would stagnate under the leadership of Policy Research Council Chairman Takaichi. However, I believe that steady progress will be made.

Takaichi is essentially a thoroughgoing realist rather than a conservative. This was her way of surviving in the political world as a female politician (Article No. 285, p. 3). For example, she has explained in her campaign for the presidency that she has been working on "expanding the use of the maiden name" regarding the issue of selective surname separation. Selective marital surnames are often perceived as an issue of discrimination against women, but it also has the aspect of "competition policy" to promote women's participation in society. Rather than denying women’s participation in society, Takaichi has taken a pragmatic approach. Discussions within the party have become more active with many female members and other "proponents" of the policy. The increased debate is in line with Prime Minister Kishida's statement at the time of his election as president.

As the LDP prepares for the upcoming lower house and upper house elections next year, it will show its reality to defend its power. The opposition will lose its raison d'etre if the LDP continues to debate social democratic policies such as same-sex marriage and selective surname separation.

LDP ignores conservatives' support in general election
For the LDP, the support of "conservatives" will be important in the party's presidential election, but in the general election, the importance of the support of "conservatives" will be diminished. In the LDP presidential election, each candidate has given consideration to conservative groups such as Nihon Izokukai (the Japan Bereaved Family Association) and Nihon Kaigi (the Japan Council). This is because they have a certain influence on the outcome of the election.

In the general election, however, the LDP will no longer pay attention to conservatives. Rather, it will aim to win the votes of the so-called "middle class" of the child-rearing and working-age generations. This is because the loudest right-wingers and left-wingers are not actually the majority. For the LDP, gaining the support of the middle class, which is the "silent majority" that rarely raises its voice in politics on a daily basis, will be the key to defeating the opposition and remaining in power.

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