China Primer: U.S.-China Relations, CRS, Feb. 2, 2023.

Susan V. Lawrence, Specialist in Asian Affairs

U.S.-China Competition

Congress has intensified its legislative and oversight
activity related to the People’s Republic of China (PRC or
China) in response to growing concerns about PRC actions
and intentions. Upon his election as House Speaker in the
118th Congress, Kevin McCarthy identified the ruling
Communist Party of China (CPC) as one of two U.S. “long-
term challenges” for the House to address, the other being
the national debt. On January 10, 2023, the House voted to
establish a Select Committee on the Strategic Competition
between the United States and the Chinese Communist
Party “to investigate and submit policy recommendations
on the status of the Chinese Communist Party’s economic,
technological, and security progress and its competition
with the United States” (H.Res. 11).
The Joseph R. Biden, Jr. Administration presents the United
States as engaged in geopolitical competition with China
over the shape of the future global order, part of a broader
contest between democracies and autocracies. The
Administration’s October 2022 National Security Strategy
outlines a three-part strategy for “out-competing” China:
first, to invest in competitiveness, innovation, resilience,
and democracy at home; second, to align U.S. efforts with
those of allies and partners; and third, to “compete
responsibly with the PRC to defend our interests and build
our vision for the future.” The document states that the
Administration also seeks to “engage constructively with
the PRC wherever we can.” Following a November 2022
meeting with China’s top leader, CPC General Secretary Xi
Jinping, Biden noted, “We’re going to compete vigorously.
But I’m not looking for conflict.”
Top PRC officials have decried the U.S. government’s
identification of China as the leading U.S. competitor and
dismissed the Administration’s assertion of a struggle
between democratic governance and authoritarianism as a
“false narrative.” They have also condemned congressional
actions, including China-related provisions of the James M.
Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for
Fiscal Year 2023 (P.L. 117-263). A PRC readout of the
Biden-Xi meeting paraphrased Xi as saying the two
countries need to “explore the right way to get along with
each other” and seek “peaceful coexistence.”

Mechanics of the Relationship

Under the Biden Administration, in-person interactions
between U.S. and PRC officials at all levels have been
limited. That situation is related in large part—though not
exclusively—to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
pandemic. The PRC government kept China’s borders
largely closed for nearly three years in an ultimately failed
effort to enforce a “zero-COVID” approach to the pandemic
in China; borders reopened on January 8, 2023. During this
period, China’s top diplomats met occasionally with U.S.
counterparts outside China, senior U.S. officials who
traveled to China were subject to onerous COVID-19
protocols, and U.S. diplomats in China faced severe
limitations on their activities. Xi himself did not travel
abroad for 32 months. The November 2022 Biden-Xi
meeting, held on the sidelines of a gathering of the G-20
nations in Bali, Indonesia, was the two leaders’ first in-
person meeting of the Biden Administration. Secretary of
State Antony J. Blinken is scheduled to make his first visit
to China in his current position on February 5-6.
In 2021, the State Department and the PRC’s Ministry of
Foreign Affairs established joint working groups to address
a limited set of issues. The groups, which continue to meet,
have made modest progress on such issues as visas for
journalists, the cases of American citizens subject to
arbitrary PRC exit bans, and diplomatic reciprocity.
Following then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to
Taiwan in August 2022, the PRC government formally
suspended cooperation with the United States in several
areas, including transnational crime and counternarcotics;
suspended climate-change talks; and cancelled meetings of
several military-to-military dialogues. Climate-change talks
have since resumed.
In December 2022, the State Department launched a new
Office of China Coordination, known as “China House.” In
a statement, the department said the office would draw on
regional and functional expertise from across the
department to meet “the most complex and consequential
geopolitical challenge we face.” The Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) launched a dedicated China Mission Center
in 2021. CIA Director William J. Burns said at the time that
it would allow CIA to strengthen its work on “the most
important geopolitical threat we face in the 21st century.”

Select Issues in U.S.-China Relations

Taiwan

Since then-Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, the PRC has
stepped up military activity around the island. The White
House says Biden raised the PRC’s “coercive and
increasingly aggressive actions toward Taiwan” in his
meeting with Xi. In a post-meeting press conference, Biden
said he made clear that differences between Beijing and
Taipei should be “peacefully resolved.” He also stated that
he did not see “any imminent attempt on the part of China
to invade Taiwan.” The PRC claims sovereignty over self-
ruled Taiwan and has long vowed to unify with it, by force
if necessary. Since 1979, the United States has maintained
official relations with the PRC and unofficial relations with
Taiwan. To deter the PRC from use of force or coercion
against Taiwan, the 117th Congress passed the Taiwan
Enhanced Resilience Act (Title LV, Subtitle A of P.L. 117-
263). See CRS In Focus IF10275, Taiwan: Political and
Security Issues, and CRS In Focus IF11719, China Primer:
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

Human Rights

The Biden Administration and many Members have
criticized PRC authorities’ treatment of ethnic and religious
minorities in the western PRC regions of Xinjiang and
Tibet, with the State Department assessing PRC actions in
Xinjiang to constitute genocide and crimes against
humanity. In the PRC’s Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, Secretary Blinken has accused the CPC of having
“imposed harsh anti-democratic measures under the guise
of national security.” In the 117th Congress, enacted
legislation seeking to support human rights in China
included the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (P.L.
117-78), which restricts Xinjiang-related imports. See CRS
In Focus IF12265, China Primer: Human Rights.

Fentanyl and Other Synthetic Opioids

China ceased to be the primary source of illicit fentanyl
entering the United States after the PRC imposed class-
wide controls over all fentanyl-related substances in 2019.
In the context of the U.S. opioid epidemic, the U.S.
government’s focus is now on addressing flows of
uncontrolled PRC-produced precursor chemicals used to
make fentanyl in third countries, primarily Mexico, and
stemming illicit fentanyl-related financial flows linked to
the PRC. The FENTANYL Results Act (Title LV, Subtitle
C of P.L. 117-263) provides assistance to build the capacity
of foreign law enforcement agencies with respect to
synthetic drugs, but bars such assistance to the PRC or any
of its law enforcement agencies. See CRS In Focus
IF10890, China Primer: Illicit Fentanyl and China’s Role.

Relations with Russia and North Korea

The United States has pressed China to help bring an end to
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war of aggression in
Ukraine. Xi has expressed China’s opposition to the
threatened or actual use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine, but
has otherwise expressed solidarity with Putin. The FY2023
NDAA requires a report on whether and how the PRC has
provided support to Russia with respect to the war in
Ukraine. The Biden Administration has also pressed China
to do more to restrain North Korean leader Kim Jong-un,
who in 2022 presided over an unprecedented number of
missile tests, including multiple intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM) tests, in violation of U.N. resolutions. In
2022, the PRC joined Russia in vetoing a U.S.-led draft
U.N. resolution that would have tightened sanctions against
North Korea over its missile launches. See CRS In Focus
IF12100, China-Russia Relations.

Trade, Investment, and Technology

China was the United States’ fourth-largest goods trading
partner in 2021 (with the European Union considered as
one trading partner). Two-way foreign direct investment
(FDI) flows have slowed since 2016, while investment and
commercial ties not included in FDI data—technology
licensing, research, venture capital, and financial
investments—have expanded.
China is a large market for U.S. firms but poses significant
trade barriers, unfair practices, and a lack of reciprocity in
key areas for these firms. Many Members of Congress have
expressed concern about China’s state-driven economic,
trade, investment, and technology practices and the
challenges they pose to U.S. economic and technology
leadership. China continues to require the transfer of some
critical U.S. capabilities to China as a condition for some
U.S. firms to operate in strategic areas in the country. Some
Members have also expressed concern that China’s
practices distort markets and undermine fair competition as
PRC firms expand globally in areas that China restricts
foreign firms from accessing domestically. China’s system
blurs state and corporate interests, enabling its government
to deploy trade tools (e.g., in such areas as antidumping,
antitrust, standards, and procurement), economic coercion,
and espionage to advantage its firms and advance China’s
industrial and other policies. Experts see the PRC state’s
expanding role in commercial activity—including an
intensification of industrial policies and enactment of
national economic security policies since 2020—as
increasing the business and broader economic risks of U.S.
commercial ties with China.
Some Members have shown interest in addressing risks
related to China’s digital platforms (e.g., TikTok) operating
in the United States and in exerting greater oversight over
executive branch decisions on export control licensing and
foreign investment reviews. Congress has sought to
promote U.S. industry in strategic (e.g., semiconductor) and
emerging (e.g., electric vehicle) technologies and
considered new guardrails on U.S. commercial and research
ties with China, including outbound investment. Recently
enacted legislation intended to address these issues includes
the CHIPS Act of 2022 (Division A of P.L. 117-167), the
Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (P.L. 117-169), and the
Small Business Innovation Research and Small Business
Technology Transfer Extension Act of 2022 ( P.L. 117-
183). See CRS In Focus IF11284, U.S.-China Trade
Relations, and CRS In Focus IF10964, “Made in China
2025” Industrial Policies: Issues for Congress.

Cooperation and Assurances

Areas the two governments have identified for cooperation
include climate change, global macroeconomic stability,
global food security, and public health. Biden and Xi also
appear to have used their November 2022 meeting to clarify
their intentions, with the goal of lessening the risk that
miscalculations lead to conflict. According to the PRC
readout of the meeting, Xi told Biden that, “China does not
seek to change the existing international order or interfere
in the internal affairs of the United States, and has no
intention to challenge or displace the United States.” In a
press conference after the meeting, in addition to stating
that he does not seek conflict, Biden said he believes that
there “need not be a new Cold War.” The PRC readout
paraphrased Biden as saying that the United States
“respects China’s system, and does not seek to change it,”
“does not seek to revitalize alliances against China,” and
“does not support Taiwan independence.” The less-detailed
White House readout of the meeting did not mention those
reported statements.

https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IF10119.pdf