Uncharted Waters, The Wire China, Jan. 29, 2023.
By Yun Sun
Is the recent positive trajectory in U.S.-China relations temporary and tactical in nature? Or sustainable and strategic in essence?
This year has already seen some rather positive signs for U.S.-China relations, signs that have been absent practically since great power competition began under the Trump administration. For the first time in the era of strategic competition, the two countries are trying to take serious measures to stabilize bilateral ties, as attested by the two presidents’ summit in Bali last November. With Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s upcoming trip to Beijing and potential China visits coming up by other cabinet members such as Secretary of Treasury Janet Yellen, many observers are hoping for some meaningful improvement in bilateral relations.
The question that everyone has been asking, however, is whether this positive trajectory is temporary and tactical in nature, or sustainable and strategic in essence. The answer to that question may not be known until later because much depends on events, and interactions between the two countries. Nevertheless, an examination of the reality behind the recent positive developments offers reason for caution and well-managed expectations.
WHY THE CHANGE?
While the desire to stabilize relations originated from both Washington and Beijing, most observers have perceived a significant change of direction in China’s foreign policy posture, especially since the end of the 20th Party Congress, toward improving ties with the outside world — including the United States. The timing is hardly coincidental. At least two factors underlie China’s current diplomatic charm offensive .
First, having secured his third term at the Party Congress, President Xi Jinping has wanted to return to the world with an image of someone other countries can embrace and work with. Throughout China’s history, coronations or the beginnings of new dynastic or political eras have traditionally been accompanied by an amnesty at home and the bestowing of gifts to tributary and vassal states, to demonstrate the emperors’ benevolence. It is certainly true that Xi would not want to project an image of harshness or vengeance, at least not immediately after the Party Congress.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, after three years of the strict zero-COVID policy and self-imposed isolation, China is operating from a position of weakness. Last year was particularly difficult due to the unexpected Russian war in Ukraine, widespread COVID lockdowns and the economic damage they caused. China experienced its slowest growth rate in more than four decades, estimated to be around 3 percent for the year. Any recovery requires China to reopen and reengage with the global economy, which in turn demands a relatively friendly external environment. The Chinese have been horrified to realize that globalization has continued on, just without China and Russia; and that so-called “de-globalization” is in fact more of a “de-Sinicization”, led by the U.S. effort to decouple from China economically. As China tries to reopen and reintegrate with the world, assertive foreign policy such as the wolf warrior diplomacy of the last few years no longer fits the bill.
IS THE CHANGE SUSTAINABLE?
There are many reasons to believe that such a change of position is not going to be sustainable. The need for a positive reception for Xi’s third term, or for a conducive external environment to aid China’s economic recovery, are both situational phenomena rather than anything that represents a fundamental shift in China’s world view and grand strategy. Once these situational factors are removed, China will have no compelling reason not to return to its previous assertive and bold path.
After all, Xi is the same leader that he has been for the past ten years, with the same aspiration of the “China Dream”, or “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”. China’s recent economic difficulties might have temporarily shifted the priority list, pushing economic growth back to the top of the agenda, over the aspiration for a world-class military and unification with Taiwan. But there is no indication that Xi’s fundamental worldview has changed.
Furthermore, the removal of term limits on Xi has effectively eliminated dissenting views within the bureaucracy. The negative consequences of having such an information cocoon have been amply demonstrated in China’s handling of COVID. Any dissidents within the system who might have hoped for a change of direction through a leadership succession have been rendered practically hopeless. Healthy policy disagreements, debates and checks and balances hardly still exist.
There are possible exceptions which could lead China onto a sustainably “nicer” path. The first is that the Chinese economy faces prolonged difficulties: the increasingly popular prediction that “China has peaked” follows this vein of thought. The next debate that arises is of course whether a “peaked” or declining China will be a stabilizing or destabilizing factor in global affairs. At least in China’s recent history, domestic economic problems have generally not led to provocative Chinese behavior, largely because the government has enough credit from China’s long period of growth to assuage domestic discontent.
Given the difficulty of discerning the true nature of China’s shifts in stance, the U.S. needs to carefully calculate the steps to be taken, and their short-term implications and long-term ramifications.
Another exception would arise if Xi comes to the realization that his previous foreign policy course has only made China less safe, and his aspirations for the country’s rise less likely. China’s swift abandonment of the zero-COVID policy has shown that change is possible, even for Xi. But there is still insufficient empirical evidence to suggest that China has come to see its previous foreign policy course as misguided, and that it needs a strategic reorientation. This lack of evidence is why many would rather believe that China is using temporary, tactical adjustments to ride out its current strategic low tide.
ON U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS…
All this only translates into challenging messages for the management of U.S.-China relations. Given the difficulty of discerning the true nature of China’s shifts in stance, the U.S. needs to carefully calculate the steps to be taken, and their short-term implications and long-term ramifications. For example, while the U.S. wants to manage risks in its relationship with China, a principled framework such as “mutual respect” would hardly be wise as Beijing would simply use it to prevent the U.S. from having a position on issues from Taiwan to Xinjiang. Similarly, the U.S. wants to pursue issues that require bilateral cooperation, such as on climate change or the management of fentanyl, but it also needs to be clear-headed about China’s transactional approach that requires U.S. “reciprocity”. Even when it comes to risk management and conflict prevention, there are challenges ahead such as House Speaker Kevin McCarthy’s potential trip to Taiwan that could derail any positive developments and lead again to the suspension of mil-to-mil dialogues.
The good news might be this: after six years of deteriorating U.S.-China relations, people on both sides of the Pacific have very low expectations about the degree to which U.S.-China relations can actually be improved. If no one expects the earth to move, any achievements, however minor, will be seen as a win.