Philosophy I: A Summary of Plato's Charmides, Part I

Introduction

This is part 1. I have no idea when I will get around to writing part 2, but I have decided to publish this as it is, since I worked quite a while on what I have written so far, but never got time to finish it.

This series of posts on philosophy will examine the nature and question posed by various philosophical texts. I will start with the dialogues of Plato, as most of our Western philosophical canon is informed by them. Please understand that I am not an expert in philosophy or an academic of any kind, I simply wish to provide commentary on the Greek philosophical texts for you all the best I can, to elucidate the topics mentioned.

I have debated on whether or not to refer to this post as a commentary or a summary, as it is quite detailed for a summary, but also perhaps not thought-provoking nor original enough to be called a commentary. It is up to the reader to decide.

Plea to my Greek Readers

If I have gotten any of the Greek quotes in this article wrong, or have rendered them inaccurately, please feel free to contact me on Twitter at @paganus6 to correct me. Thank you.

All English quotes are lifted from the Perseus English translation, and likewise the Greek quotes are lifted from the Perseus Greek original.

Setting the Scene

Socrates has returned from the army in Potidaea, where a large battle had apparently just occurred, during which many of Socrates' comrades had fallen. Potidaea was a Corinthian colony in Chalcidice which was a tributary ally of Athens, but they revolted in 433 B.C.. In fact, just a year later, the Athenian army would meet Peloponnesian forces at Potidaea, commencing the Peloponnesian War.

He makes a surprise visit to a place he apparently frequented often, the palaestra, or wrestling-school, or Taureas, where he meets Chaerephon with a band of people. Regarding the location of the palaestra, it was apparently south of the Acropolis, near the Queen's Shrine (about which nothing is known).

Seeing him, Chaarephon immediately runs over and invites him to sit down. Socrates appears to have told the story about his time with the army in Potidaea, but this is glossed over in the actual text:

καί με ὡς εἶδον εἰσιόντα ἐξ ἀπροσδοκήτου, εὐθὺς πόρρωθεν ἠσπάζοντο ἄλλος ἄλλοθεν: Χαιρεφῶν δέ, ἅτε καὶ μανικὸς ὤν, ἀναπηδήσας ἐκ μέσων ἔθει πρός με, καί μου λαβόμενος τῆς χειρός, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, πῶς ἐσώθης ἐκ τῆς μάχης; Ὀλίγον δὲ πρὶν ἡμᾶς ἀπιέναι μάχη ἐγεγόνει ἐν τῇ Ποτειδαίᾳ, ἣν ἄρτι ἦσαν οἱ τῇδε πεπυσμένοι.

καὶ ἐγὼ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀποκρινόμενος, Οὑτωσί, ἔφην, ὡς σὺ ὁρᾷς.

καὶ μὴν ἤγγελταί γε δεῦρο, ἔφη, ἥ τε μάχη πάνυ ἰσχυρὰ γεγονέναι καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ πολλοὺς τῶν γνωρίμων τεθνάναι.

καὶ ἐπιεικῶς, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ ἀπήγγελται.

παρεγένου μέν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, τῇ μάχῃ;

παρεγενόμην.

δεῦρο δή, ἔφη, καθεζόμενος ἡμῖν διήγησαι: οὐ γάρ τί πω πάντα σαφῶς πεπύσμεθα. καὶ ἅμα με καθίζει ἄγων παρὰ Κριτίαν τὸν Καλλαίσχρου.

παρακαθεζόμενος οὖν ἠσπαζόμην τόν τε Κριτίαν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ διηγούμην αὐτοῖς τὰ ἀπὸ στρατοπέδου, ὅτι μέ τις ἀνέροιτο: ἠρώτων δὲ ἄλλος ἄλλο.

And as soon as they saw me appear thus unexpectedly, they hailed me from a distance on every side; but Chaerephon, like the mad creature that he is, jumped up from their midst and ran to me, and grasping me by the hand—

Socrates, he said, how did you survive the battle? (Shortly before we came away there had been a battle at Potidaea, of which the people here had only just had news.)

In the state in which you see me, I replied.

It has been reported here, you know, said he, that the battle was very severe, and that many of our acquaintance have lost their lives in it.

Then the report, I replied, is pretty near the truth.

You were present, he asked, at the fighting?

I was present.

Then sit down here, he said, and give us a full account; for as yet we have had no clear report of it all. And with that he led me to a seat by Critias, son of Callaeschrus. So I sat down there and greeted Critias and the rest, and gave them all the news from the battlefield, in answer to their various questions; each had his inquiry to make.

[153a-153c]

Socrates then asks whether any of the youths in the palaestra are known for their wisdom. Critias responds that he will know when he sees a beautiful youth who is his cousin, the son of Critias' uncle Glaucon, named Charmides.

Charmides comes along, and Socrates admits that he was astonished at his beauty:

ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, οὐδὲν σταθμητόν: ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ λευκὴ στάθμη εἰμὶ πρὸς τοὺς καλούς—σχεδὸν γάρ τί μοι πάντες οἱ ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ καλοὶ φαίνονται—ἀτὰρ οὖν δὴ καὶ τότε ἐκεῖνος ἐμοὶ θαυμαστὸς ἐφάνη τό τε μέγεθος καὶ τὸ κάλλος, οἱ δὲ δὴ ἄλλοι πάντες ἐρᾶν ἔμοιγε ἐδόκουν αὐτοῦ— οὕτως ἐκπεπληγμένοι τε καὶ τεθορυβημένοι ἦσαν, ἡνίκ᾽ εἰσῄει—πολλοὶ δὲ δὴ ἄλλοι ἐρασταὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὄπισθεν εἵποντο. καὶ τὸ μὲν ἡμέτερον τὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἧττον θαυμαστὸν ἦν: ἀλλ᾽ ἐγὼ καὶ τοῖς παισὶ προσέσχον τὸν νοῦν, ὡς οὐδεὶς ἄλλοσ᾽ ἔβλεπεν αὐτῶν, οὐδ᾽ ὅστις σμικρότατος ἦν, ἀλλὰ πάντες ὥσπερ ἄγαλμα ἐθεῶντο αὐτόν. [...]

Now I, my good friend, am no measurer: I am a mere “white line”1 in measuring beautiful people, for almost everyone who has just grown up appears beautiful to me. Nay and this time, moreover, the young man appeared to me a marvel of stature and beauty; and all the rest, to my thinking, were in love with him, such was their astonishment and confusion when he came in, and a number of other lovers were following in his train. On the part of men like us it was not so surprising; but when I came to observe the boys I noticed that none of them, not even the smallest, had eyes for anything else, but that they all gazed at him as if he were a statue. [...]

[154b-154c] (Greek)
[154b-154d] (English)

A Question of Body and Soul

A somewhat relevant scene then occurs, setting a theme for the coming discussion. Chaerephon interjects to ask Socrates what he thinks of the beauty of Charmides:

Χαιρεφῶν καλέσας με, τί σοι φαίνεται ὁ νεανίσκος, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες; οὐκ εὐπρόσωπος;
Then Chaerephon called me and said—How does the youth strike you, Socrates? Has he not a fine face?

[154d]

Socrates heavily agrees that the beauty of Charmides is impeccable. Chaerephon then declares that if he were to see the "true form" of Charmides—that is to say, naked—he would consider him to be perfect. The rest of the men agree:

οὗτος μέντοι, ἔφη, εἰ ἐθέλοι ἀποδῦναι, δόξει σοι ἀπρόσωπος εἶναι: οὕτως τὸ εἶδος πάγκαλός ἐστιν.
Yet if he would consent to strip, he said, you would think he had no face, he has such perfect beauty of form.

[154d]

But Socrates, perhaps composing himself a little and turning to Critias, declares that Charmides would indeed be the epitome of beauty if he were to have a well-tempered soul:

εἰ τὴν ψυχήν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τυγχάνει εὖ πεφυκώς
If in his soul, I replied, he is of good grain.

[154e]

This is an allusion for what Socrates will say shortly, regarding the physician of the Thracian King Zalmoxis. It also silently begs the question of whether the soul shapes the form of the body.

Socrates' Cydian Doubt

Critias assures Socrates that Charmides is already an apt philosopher as well as a poet, to which Socrates replies that he is unsurprised, considering Charmides is of Critias' house (Charmides is Critias' cousin).

Critias explains that Charmides has been suffering from headaches, and uses it as an excuse to get Charmides to talk to Socrates. He orders his attendant to call Charmides, claiming he has a physician to talk to him about a cure to the headache.

It is here that some people may be startled by the description of Socrates inner thoughts, if they have not encountered some of Socrates other curious situations. One should know that, the setting being a palaestra, it was generally a place where men were known to show skin. Considering the practice of pederasty was quite widespread throughout Ancient Greece, it is unsurprising that Socrates would be uncomfortable talking to an exposed youth in this fashion.

As Charmides is walking over, Socrates catches eye of some of his flesh on the inside of his garment. This causes Socrates to become uneasy, in his own words:

ἐνταῦθα μέντοι, ὦ φίλε, ἐγὼ ἤδη ἠπόρουν, καί μου ἡ πρόσθεν θρασύτης ἐξεκέκοπτο, ἣν εἶχον ἐγὼ ὡς πάνυ ῥᾳδίως αὐτῷ διαλεξόμενος: ἐπειδὴ δέ, φράσαντος τοῦ Κριτίου ὅτι ἐγὼ εἴην ὁ τὸ φάρμακον ἐπιστάμενος, ἐνέβλεψέν τέ μοι τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἀμήχανόν τι οἷον καὶ ἀνήγετο ὡς ἐρωτήσων, καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ παλαίστρᾳ ἅπαντες περιέρρεον ἡμᾶς κύκλῳ κομιδῇ, τότε δή, ὦ γεννάδα, εἶδόν τε τὰ ἐντὸς τοῦ ἱματίου καὶ ἐφλεγόμην καὶ οὐκέτ᾽ ἐν ἐμαυτοῦ ἦν καὶ ἐνόμισα σοφώτατον εἶναι τὸν Κυδίαν τὰ ἐρωτικά, ὃς εἶπεν ἐπὶ καλοῦ λέγων παιδός, ἄλλῳ ὑποτιθέμενος, εὐλαβεῖσθαι μὴ κατέναντα λέοντος νεβρὸν ἐλθόντα μοῖραν αἱρεῖσθαι κρεῶν: αὐτὸς γάρ μοι ἐδόκουν ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιούτου θρέμματος ἑαλωκέναι. ὅμως δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐρωτήσαντος εἰ ἐπισταίμην τὸ τῆς κεφαλῆς φάρμακον, μόγις πως ἀπεκρινάμην ὅτι ἐπισταίμην.

But here, my friend, I began to feel perplexed, and my former confidence in looking forward to a quite easy time in talking with him had been knocked out of me. And when, on Critias telling him that it was I who knew the cure, he gave me such a look with his eyes as passes description, and was just about to plunge into a question, and when all the people in the wrestling-school surged round about us on every side—then, ah then, my noble friend, I saw inside his cloak and caught fire, and could possess myself no longer; and I thought none was so wise in love-matters as Cydias, who in speaking of a beautiful boy recommends someone to “beware of coming as a fawn before the lion, and being seized as his portion of flesh”; for I too felt I had fallen a prey to some such creature. However, when he had asked me if I knew the cure for headache, I somehow contrived to answer that I knew.

[155c-155e]

Socrates then quotes Cydias, stating that he felt like the victim about to be devoured by a lion.

The Magical Remedy

Charmides starts talking to Socrates while Socrates feigns that he is a physician. He claims to know of a special leaf that must be accompanied by a charm in order to work. One must say the charm while using the leaf to be cured:

καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ὅτι αὐτὸ μὲν εἴη φύλλον τι, ἐπῳδὴ δέ τις ἐπὶ τῷ φαρμάκῳ εἴη, ἣν εἰ μέν τις ἐπᾴδοι ἅμα καὶ χρῷτο αὐτῷ, παντάπασιν ὑγιᾶ ποιοῖ τὸ φάρμακον: ἄνευ δὲ τῆς ἐπῳδῆς οὐδὲν ὄφελος εἴη τοῦ φύλλου.

So I told him that the thing itself was a certain leaf, but there was a charm to go with the remedy; and if one uttered the charm at the moment of its application, the remedy made one perfectly well; but without the charm there was no efficacy in the leaf.

[155e]

Charmides asks that he consent to dictating him the charm. Instead of dictating him the contents of the charm immediately, Socrates decides to discuss the nature of the charm, claiming that it will cure more than just his headache, in the same way that a doctor must treat the eye by treating the head, and treat the head by treating the body. He asks Charmides whether or not he agrees with this principle:

καλῶς γε σύ, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ποιῶν: μᾶλλον γάρ σοι παρρησιάσομαι περὶ τῆς ἐπῳδῆς οἵα τυγχάνει οὖσα: ἄρτι δ᾽ ἠπόρουν τίνι τρόπῳ σοι ἐνδειξαίμην τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς. ἔστι γάρ, ὦ Χαρμίδη, τοιαύτη οἵα μὴ δύνασθαι τὴν κεφαλὴν μόνον ὑγιᾶ ποιεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ ἴσως ἤδη καὶ σὺ ἀκήκοας τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἰατρῶν, ἐπειδάν τις αὐτοῖς προσέλθῃ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἀλγῶν, λέγουσί που ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε αὐτοὺς μόνους ἐπιχειρεῖν τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἰᾶσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον εἴη ἅμα καὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν θεραπεύειν, εἰ μέλλοι καὶ τὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων εὖ ἔχειν: καὶ αὖ τὸ τὴν κεφαλὴν οἴεσθαι ἄν ποτε θεραπεῦσαι αὐτὴν ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτῆς ἄνευ ὅλου τοῦ σώματος πολλὴν ἄνοιαν εἶναι. ἐκ δὴ τούτου τοῦ λόγου διαίταις ἐπὶ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα τρεπόμενοι μετὰ τοῦ ὅλου τὸ μέρος ἐπιχειροῦσιν θεραπεύειν τε καὶ ἰᾶσθαι: ἢ οὐκ ᾔσθησαι ὅτι ταῦτα οὕτως λέγουσίν τε καὶ ἔχει;

That is a good thing, I said: for I shall speak more freely to you about the charm, and its real nature; just now I was at a loss for the way to apprise you of its power. For it is of such a nature, Charmides, that it cannot cure the head alone; I daresay you have yourself sometimes heard good doctors say, you know, when a patient comes to them with a pain in his eyes, that it is not possible for them to attempt a cure of his eyes alone, but that it is necessary to treat his head too at the same time, if he is to have his eyes in good order; and so again, that to expect ever to treat the head by itself, apart from the body as a whole, is utter folly. And on this principle they apply their regimen to the whole body, and attempt to treat and heal the part along with the whole; or have you not observed that this is what they say, and is done in fact?

[156a-156c]

The Physician of King Zamolxis

Charmides replies that he agrees with the principle. Socrates then goes on to narrate a story as follows:

The physicians of the Thracian King Zamolxis (who was also said to be a God) were said to have been able to grant immortality. When Socrates when in the army, he learned from one of King Zamolxis' physicians that, like one can't cure the eye without curing the head, and thus the whole body, furthermore one can't cure the whole body without curing the soul, for all good and evil in the body originate in the soul. The great mistake of the Greek physicians is that they separate the health of the body from the health of the soul. It is the Thracian physician that supposedly taught Socrates the charm. Thus, if the charm is said, the virtue of temperance will be imparted into the soul, and the cure will work. Otherwise, the cure is to prove worthless.

...ἀλλὰ τοῦτο καὶ αἴτιον εἴη τοῦ διαφεύγειν τοὺς παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἰατροὺς τὰ πολλὰ νοσήματα, ὅτι τοῦ ὅλου ἀμελοῖεν οὗ δέοι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι, οὗ μὴ καλῶς ἔχοντος ἀδύνατον εἴη τὸ μέρος εὖ ἔχειν. πάντα γὰρ ἔφη ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς ὡρμῆσθαι καὶ τὰ κακὰ καὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ τῷ σώματι καὶ παντὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ἐκεῖθεν ἐπιρρεῖν ὥσπερ ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἐπὶ τὰ ὄμματα: δεῖν οὖν ἐκεῖνο καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα θεραπεύειν, εἰ μέλλει καὶ τὰ τῆς κεφαλῆς καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἄλλου σώματος καλῶς ἔχειν. θεραπεύεσθαι δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἔφη, ὦ μακάριε, ἐπῳδαῖς τισιν, τὰς δ᾽ ἐπῳδὰς ταύτας τοὺς λόγους εἶναι τοὺς καλούς: ἐκ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων λόγων ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς σωφροσύνην ἐγγίγνεσθαι, ἧς ἐγγενομένης καὶ παρούσης ῥᾴδιον ἤδη εἶναι τὴν ὑγίειαν καὶ τῇ κεφαλῇ καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ σώματι πορίζειν.

...and this was the reason why most maladies evaded the physicians of Greece—that they neglected the whole, on which they ought to spend their pains, for if this were out of order it was impossible for the part to be in order. For all that was good and evil, he said, in the body and in man altogether was sprung from the soul, and flowed along from thence as it did from the head into the eyes. Wherefore that part was to be treated first and foremost, if all was to be well with the head and the rest of the body. And the treatment of the soul, so he said, my wonderful friend, is by means of certain charms, and these charms are words of the right sort: by the use of such words is temperance engendered in our souls, and as soon as it is engendered and present we may easily secure health to the head and to the rest of the body also.

[156e-157a (English) / 157b (Greek)]

Socrates then goes on to explain that the physician made him swear that he would not offer the physical cure—the leaf—without also offering the metaphysical cure—the charm. He offers to say the charm for Charmides, while Critias jokes that his headache has done him more good than harm, since he has learned great wisdom from Socrates in the process. He also assures Socrates that Charmides is rich in the value of temperance, and is excelled by none for his age. Socrates agrees that he is of upstanding birth, and goes on to recount Charmides' lineage. He then tells Charmides that he if he has temperance, he has no need for any charms whether they be "of Zamolxis or Abaris the Hyperborean... ." He then asks Charmides to admit whether or not he truly has such a quality of temperance. This gets a long conversation going about temperance which is to serve as the main subject for this dialogue.

Inquiry into Temperance

Charmides blushes, affirming that he cannot respond as to whether he is, in fact, temperate or not. If he says that he is temperate, it would be praising himself, which is bad manners. If he says that he is not temperate, it would be an odd thing to say about himself. Socrates understands and begins an inquiry into the nature of temperance.

Socrates asks if the nature of temperance may be known, to which Charmides says yes. He then asks Charmides what he thinks temperance is. Charmides hesitates at first, but affirms that he thinks that temperance is what is done "orderly and quietly," thus temperance is "quietness" (ἥσῠχος, hḗsukhos):

καὶ ὃς τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὤκνει τε καὶ οὐ πάνυ ἤθελεν ἀποκρίνασθαι: ἔπειτα μέντοι εἶπεν ὅτι οἷ δοκοῖ σωφροσύνη εἶναι τὸ κοσμίως πάντα πράττειν καὶ ἡσυχῇ, ἔν τε ταῖς ὁδοῖς βαδίζειν καὶ διαλέγεσθαι, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ὡσαύτως ποιεῖν. καί μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, συλλήβδην ἡσυχιότης τις εἶναι ὃ ἐρωτᾷς.

He at first hung back, and was not at all willing to answer: but presently he said that, to his mind, temperance was doing everything orderly and quietly—walking in the streets, talking, and doing everything else of that kind; and in a word, he said, I think the thing about which you ask may be called quietness.

[159b]

Questioning the Nature of Temperance

Socrates agrees that the temperate are generally quiet, but questions whether temperance is necessarily quietness. Socrates then goes on to ask Charmides a bunch of questions. He starts out by asking Charmides whether or not temperance belongs to the class of qualities which are noble and good, that is, what we would call virtue. Charmides answers yes. He then goes on to ask a few more questions:

1. Which way is better to write for the writing-master, quickly or quietly?
Charmides responds, "quickly."

2. Which way is better to read, quickly or quietly?
Charmides responds, "quickly again."

3. When playing the lyre, are quickness and sharpness far better than quietness and slowness?
Charmides responds, "yes."

4. The same for boxing, and in the pancratium?
Charmides responds, "yes."

5. In leaping, running, etc. agility and quickness are to be desired, and slowness and quietness are bad?
Charmides responds, "yes."

6. In all bodily actions, then, agility and quickness are the noblest and good, over slowness and quietness?
Charmides responds, "yes."

Socrates makes Charmides reaffirm whether temperance is in fact a good, which he does, he goes on to ask:

οὐ τοίνυν κατά γε τὸ σῶμα ἡ ἡσυχιότης ἂν ἀλλ᾽ ἡ ταχυτὴς σωφρονέστερον εἴη, ἐπειδὴ καλὸν ἡ σωφροσύνη.

Then in the body, at least, it is not quietness but quickness that will be the more temperate thing, since temperance is honorable.

[159d]

To which Charmides agrees, that what he says seems to be correct. Socrates has thus refuted Charmides' point. If temperance is honorable, and is necessarily what is quiet, then what about in contexts where quietness is impractical? He has also made the point that quickness is to be desired of the body, which will be important in just a moment.

Quickness of the Soul

Socrates goes on to ask more questions, as follows:

7. What is better, facility or difficulty in learning?
Charmides replies, "facility."

8. Is it that facility in learning is learning quickly, and that difficulty in learning is learning quietly and slowly?
Charmides replies, "Yes."

9. Is it better to teach someone quickly than slowly?
Charmides replies, "Yes."

10. Is it better to remember quickly than slowly?
Charmides replies, "Yes."

11. Is shrewdness quickness or cleverness of the soul, and not quietness and slowness?
Charmides replies, "Yes."

12. In inquiry of the soul, is not the quickest and cleverest most shrewd and worthy of praise, and not the quitest?
Charmides replies, "Yes."

13. Thus in all matters concerning body or soul, is not quickness and activity superior to quietness and inactivity?
Charmides replies, "This is true."

Socrates therefore concludes that temperance is not quietness and the temperate life is not quiet. In his own words:

οὐκ ἄρα ἡσυχιότης τις ἡ σωφροσύνη ἂν εἴη, οὐδ᾽ ἡσύχιος ὁ σώφρων βίος, ἔκ γε τούτου τοῦ λόγου, ἐπειδὴ καλὸν αὐτὸν δεῖ εἶναι σώφρονα ὄντα. δυοῖν γὰρ δὴ τὰ ἕτερα: ἢ οὐδαμοῦ ἡμῖν ἢ πάνυ που ὀλιγαχοῦ αἱ ἡσύχιοι πράξεις ἐν τῷ βίῳ καλλίους ἐφάνησαν ἢ αἱ ταχεῖαί τε καὶ ἰσχυραί. εἰ δ᾽ οὖν, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι μάλιστα μηδὲν ἐλάττους αἱ ἡσύχιοι τῶν σφοδρῶν τε καὶ ταχειῶν πράξεων τυγχάνουσιν καλλίους οὖσαι, οὐδὲ ταύτῃ σωφροσύνη ἂν εἴη μᾶλλόν τι τὸ ἡσυχῇ πράττειν ἢ τὸ σφόδρα τε καὶ ταχέως, οὔτε ἐν βαδισμῷ οὔτε ἐν λέξει οὔτε ἄλλοθι οὐδαμοῦ, οὐδὲ ὁ ἡσύχιος βίος κόσμιος τοῦ μὴ ἡσυχίου σωφρονέστερος ἂν εἴη, ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῶν καλῶν τι ἡμῖν ἡ σωφροσύνη ὑπετέθη, καλὰ δὲ οὐχ ἧττον τὰ ταχέα τῶν ἡσυχίων πέφανται.

So temperance cannot be a sort of quietness, nor can the temperate life be quiet, by this argument at least; since, being temperate, it must be honorable. For we have these two alternatives: either in no cases, or I should think in very few, can we find that the quiet actions in life are more honorable than the quick and vigorous ones; or at all events, my friend, if of the more honorable actions there are absolutely as many quiet ones as forcible and quick, not even so will temperance be acting quietly any more than acting forcibly and quickly, either in walking or in talking or in any other sphere; nor will the quiet life be more temperate than the unquiet; since in our argument we assumed that temperance is an honorable thing, and have found that quick things are just as honorable as quiet things.

[160b-160d]

The Second Inquiry

Socrates then tells Charmides to reflect again on the nature of temperance. More specifically, what quality temperance imbues him with. Charmides responds that temperance is perhaps the same as modesty:

καὶ ὃς ἐπισχὼν καὶ πάνυ ἀνδρικῶς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν διασκεψάμενος, δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ἔφη, αἰσχύνεσθαι ποιεῖν ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ αἰσχυντηλὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ εἶναι ὅπερ αἰδὼς ἡ σωφροσύνη.

He paused a little, and after a quite manly effort of self-examination: Well, I think, he said, that temperance makes men ashamed or bashful, and that temperance is the same as modesty.

[160e]

It is notable here that he defines modesty as something which makes men ashamed or bashful. Socrates then goes on to ask another set of questions:

1. Is temperance honorable?
Charmides responds, "yes."

2. Are temperate men good?
Charmides responds, "yes."

3. Can the good produce bad men?
Charmides responds, "no."

4. Thus temperance is honorable and good?
Charmides responds, "yes."

5. Is Homer right in saying, "Modesty, no good mate for a needy man?"
Charmides responds, "yes."

Socrates concludes that modesty is thus somehow good and bad at the same time. If this is the case, that would refute temperance making men good. Therefore, temperance is not modesty. Charmides agrees:

οὐκ ἄρα σωφροσύνη ἂν εἴη αἰδώς, εἴπερ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν τυγχάνει ὄν, αἰδὼς δὲ μὴ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν ἢ καὶ κακόν.

So temperance cannot be modesty, if it is in fact good, while modesty is no more good than evil.

[161a-161b]

A Third Definition (The Riddle)

Charmides then asks whether temperance is simply "doing one's own business:"

ἀλλ᾽ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο μὲν ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι: τόδε δὲ σκέψαι τί σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι περὶ σωφροσύνης. ἄρτι γὰρ ἀνεμνήσθην—ὃ ἤδη του ἤκουσα λέγοντος— ὅτι σωφροσύνη ἂν εἴη τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν. σκόπει οὖν τοῦτο εἰ ὀρθῶς σοι δοκεῖ λέγειν ὁ λέγων.

Why, I think, he said, Socrates, that is correctly stated; but there is another view of temperance on which I would like to have your opinion. I remembered just now what I once heard someone say, that temperance might be doing one's own business. I ask you, then, do you think he is right in saying this?

[161b]

Socrates remarks that Charmides must have heard this definition from Critias, but Critias denies. Socrates goes on to say that this statement sounds like a riddle:

νὴ Δία, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ. ἀλλ᾽ εἰ καὶ εὑρήσομεν αὐτὸ ὅπῃ γε ἔχει, θαυμάζοιμ᾽ ἄν: αἰνίγματι γάρ τινι ἔοικεν.

Yes, on my word, I said: but I shall be surprised if we can find out how it stands; for it looks like a kind of riddle.

[161c]

Charmides asks why Socrates thinks it is a riddle, to which Socrates replies that he thinks the speaker did not mean what he said. He then goes on to ask more questions:

1. Do you consider that the scribe does nothing when he reads and writes?
Charmides replies, "no."

2. Does the scribe teach you to write your own name only, or your enemies names just as often?
Charmides replies, "our enemies just as much."

3. Were you meddlesome or intemperate in doing this?
Charmides replies, "not at all."

4. Weren't you not doing your own business then, if reading and writing are doing something?
Charmides replies, "certainly."

5. And medical work, and building, and weaving, and indeed producing anything, counts as doing something?
Charmides replies, "yes."

6. Would the following kind of society work, where the state mandated that one weaves his own coat, and cobbles his own shoes, and molds his own flask and scraper, and produces everything else for himself on account of not doing the work of others?
Charmides replies, "I think not."

7. Is a state with temperate conduct a good state?
Charmides replies, "of course."

8. Then doing one's own business in this sense will not be temperance?
Charmides replies, "apparently."

Socrates then declares that the speaker was riddling, for he could not have been such an idiot as to define temperance as such:

ἠινίττετο ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὁ λέγων τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν σωφροσύνην εἶναι: οὐ γάρ που οὕτω γε ἦν εὐήθης. ἤ τινος ἠλιθίου ἤκουσας τουτὶ λέγοντος, ὦ Χαρμίδη;

So that person was riddling, it seems, just as I said a moment ago, when he said that doing one's own business is temperance. For I take it he was not such a fool as all that: or was it some idiot that you heard saying this, Charmides?

[162a-162b]

Charmides says that the man who said it was a wise man, to which Socrates reaffirms that it must be a riddle in order for the man not to be declared a fool. He then asks Charmides to define the meaning of "doing one's own business." Charmides laughs, and, turning to Critias, states that perhaps the man who said it didn't even know what he meant by "doing one's own business."

Critias Gets Angry

At this point Critias is visibly angry, leading Socrates to believe it true that Charmides heard that temperance was "doing one's own business" from Critias. Critias then goes on to scold Charmides for his answer that perhaps he did not know what "doing one's own business" meant. Socrates in return scolds Critias for criticizing Charmides, since Charmides is, as of yet, too young to understand his position fully. He challenges Critias to be his partner in the inquiry rather than Charmides. From here, the discussion, and Socrates further questions, carry on with Critias:

1. Do you agree that all craftsmen make something?
Critias responds, "yes."

2. Do they make their own things only, or those of others also?
Critias responds, "those of others also."

3. And are they temperate in not making their own things only?
Critias responds, "yes."

Critias asks what reason there is against them not being temperate. Socrates specifies that if Critias were to believe that temperance would be "doing one's own business," this would refute his argument.

It is here that Critias tries to trip up Socrates by playing with language. He claims that "doing something," and "making something" are not necessarily the same, since the Greek verb poiein (ποιεῖν) can mean either:

ἐγὼ γάρ που, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, τοῦθ᾽ ὡμολόγηκα, ὡς οἱ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράττοντες σωφρονοῦσιν, εἰ τοὺς ποιοῦντας ὡμολόγησα. [Not sure if this is the right Greek quote.]

And have I, pray, he said, admitted that those who do others' business are temperate? Or was my admission of those who make things?

[163a]

Working and Doing, and Making

Socrates goes on to ask:

1. Do you not call making and doing the same?
Critias responds, "no." Nor is working and making the same, he adds, quoting Hesiod:

Work is no reproach.

Hes. WD 309

2. If we were to give the same names of working and doing to such works as pickle-selling and shoe-making and stew serving, would Hesiod have said there is reproach in them?
Critias responds, "no." Critias holds that anything made might be of reproach if it had no connection with the honorable, and that a work could not be of reproach, for things that are honorably and usefully made are called works. These works are our proper concerns, and what is outside of them is what is harmful to others, constituting the dishonorable. Thus, Critias makes a distinction between that which is made, and that which is worked or done. Thus, temperance is defined as doing one's own business.

The Helpful Doctor

Socrates asks Critias to define his terms more plainly. Then Socrates goes on to ask some more questions:

1. Do you say that the doing or making of good things, is, in fact, temperance?
Critias replies, "I do."

2. Then doing evil is not good, and is therefore not temperate?
Critias responds, "yes."

3. Are temperate men ignorant of their temperance?
Critias responds, "no."

4. Didn't you say before that men are still temperate when making others' things as well?
Critias responds, "yes. What of it?"

5. Does a doctor make a helpful result both for himself and the man whom he cures?
Critias responds, "yes."

6. And he who does this does his duty?
Critias responds, "yes."

7. Is he who does his duty temperate?
Critias responds, "yes."

8. Must the doctor know when his medicine will be helpful, and when not?
Critias responds, "probably not."

9. Then a doctor may not know whether he is doing something which is harmful or helpful based on his own actions, yet, he does so temperately?
Critias responds, "yes."

Socrates concludes that the doctor may very well be ignorant of his own temperance:

οὐκοῦν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐνίοτε ὠφελίμως πράξας πράττει μὲν σωφρόνως καὶ σωφρονεῖ, ἀγνοεῖ δ᾽ ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ;

Then it would seem that in doing what is helpful he may sometimes do temperately and be temperate, but be ignorant of his own temperance?

[164c]

Know Thyself

Critias denies that he meant this, and says that he would rather reevaluate his position. He also goes on to make some remarks about the temple at Delphi. He thinks that the inscription, "Hail!," a greeting of the gods, should be changed to, "Be temperate!" He also thinks the inscription, "Know thyself!," was really a riddle for "Be temperate!," for self-knowledge and temperance are the same thing.

Critias states that his reevaluated position is that temperance is knowing oneself. Socrates reaffirms that he has no knowledge of the answer to the questions posed, as he usually does, but rather wants to refute what the other person has to say. He goes on to ask some more questions, about the nature of temperance as "knowing oneself:"

1. If temperance is knowing anything, it must be knowing a science of something, correct?
Critias replies, "yes. The science of itself."

2. And medicine is the science of health?
Critias replies, "indeed."

3. And the science of health produces a very grand result, since it produces health?
Critias replies, "yes."

4. What does temperance thus produce, as the science of self?
Critias responds that there are certain sciences that don't produce anything specifically, like geometry, or reckoning, in the same way that the science of building produces a house or the science of weaving produces a coat.

Socrates replies that what Critias says is correct, but that the subject specific to each science other than itself can be determined. He goes on to ask:

5. Is not that the science of reckoning concerns the even and the odd, and their relations to themselves and one another?
Critias responds, "yes."

6. And the even and the odd are different from the science of reckoning itself?
Critias responds, "yes."

7. And weighing is concerned with the heavier and lighter weight, but the heavy and the light are different from the art of weighing, correct?
Critias responds, "yes."

Socrates follows by asking Critias what temperance can be the science of other than itself, if it is to be called a science.

Critias claims that Socrates is being disingenuous, because he already stated that the science of temperance was different from all other sciences. The science of temperance differs from all other science by being the only science of itself and itself only. He declares that Socrates hasn't refuted him.

Socrates asks Critias to clarify what he means be temperance again, to which Critias answers with this poignant quote:

λέγω τοίνυν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ὅτι μόνη τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν αὐτή τε αὑτῆς ἐστιν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη.

Why, I mean, he said, that it alone of all the sciences is the science both of itself and of the other sciences.

[166e]

The Science of Sciences

Socrates goes on to ask:

1. Would temperance be the science of the lack of science also, since it is the science of science?
Critias replies, "Certainly."

2. Therefore temperance is knowing what one knows and what one doesn't know?*
Critias replies, "Yes."

Socrates declares that they inquire into this further, as a "third offering to the Saviour." In the footnotes of my English translation, it states the following:

It was the custom at banquets to dedicate a third and final wine-offering or toast to Zeus the Saviour.

I believe the specific epithet of Zeus here was "Ζευς Σοτηρ" (Zeus Soter).

Furthermore, Socrates declares that a science also being of the lack of science itself is an impossibility. Critias asks him to clarify.

* Here is the exact quote, since it is a bit longer:

ὁ ἄρα σώφρων μόνος αὐτός τε ἑαυτὸν γνώσεται καὶ οἷός τε ἔσται ἐξετάσαι τί τε τυγχάνει εἰδὼς καὶ τί μή, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὡσαύτως δυνατὸς ἔσται ἐπισκοπεῖν τί τις οἶδεν καὶ οἴεται, εἴπερ οἶδεν, καὶ τί αὖ οἴεται μὲν εἰδέναι, οἶδεν δ᾽ οὔ, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδείς: καὶ ἔστιν δὴ τοῦτο τὸ σωφρονεῖν τε καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ τὸ ἑαυτὸν αὐτὸν γιγνώσκειν, τὸ εἰδέναι ἅ τε οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν. ἆρα ταῦτά ἐστιν ἃ λέγεις;

Then only the temperate person will know himself, and be able to discern what he really knows and does not know, and have the power of judging what other people likewise know and think they know, in cases where they do know, and again, what they think they know, without knowing it; everyone else will be unable. And so this is being temperate, or temperance, and knowing oneself—that one should know what one knows and what one does not know. Is that what you mean?

[167a]

To be Continued

This post will be continued in part 2. I don't know when I'll get around to writing it, but it might take a while. Thank you for reading!