The 70th Anniversary of the Nanking Incident: The Controversy That Will Not Go Away －A Perspective on Joint Research on History between China and Japan－
Institute of Peace Report : Takashi Hoshuyama, Senior Researcher
IIPS Policy Paper 328J
Sep 2007
Foundation
World Peace Research Institute
*The ideas and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and not those of the organization to which he belongs.
Introduction
At the end of 1937, shortly after the start of the Sino-Japanese War, the Nanjing Incident, which is said to have been a massacre by the Japanese military, is still strongly etched in the memories of people at home and abroad as a symbol of the war crimes of the Japanese military. The 70th anniversary of the incident will be celebrated in December this year, and there are concerns that if the countries concerned fail to respond to the incident, it will be a spark that will worsen Japan-China relations again.
At the Sundance Film Festival held in the US last February, the American-made film "Nanking," based on the Nanking Incident, won the Best Documentary Editing Award and was also screened in China. Films on the Nanjing Incident will be produced and screened in the U.S. and China in the future. In Japan, too, these movements have inspired the production of films from the standpoint of denying the massacre, the formation of the "Association to Verify the Truth about the Nanjing Incident" by Diet members, and moves to review the incident. In Japan, too, these movements have inspired the production of films from the standpoint of denying the massacre, and the formation of the "Association to Review the Truth about the Nanjing Incident" by members of the Diet. This shows that the incident has not become a thing of the past politically, ideologically, or in terms of history lessons.
There are several reasons why this incident is still attracting the attention and concern of the countries concerned as a spark of international conflict, even after 70 years.
First, there is a major difference of opinion on whether or not the so-called "genocide" actually existed in Nanking, and on the recognition of the "facts" regarding the actual situation.
This is fundamentally different from the "comfort women issue" that was resolved by the U.S. House of Representatives in July of this year, which focused not on the factual dispute over the existence of a large number of comfort women, but on whether the Japanese government and the Japanese military were involved in the mobilization of comfort women, and in particular whether they were "forced" to do so.
Secondly, the Nanjing Incident was recognized as a fact by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (hereinafter referred to as the "Tokyo Tribunal"). Secondly, the Nanjing Incident was recognized as a fact in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (hereinafter referred to as the "Tokyo Tribunal"), and if it is now revealed that the actual situation differed greatly from the verdict, it will not only affect the credibility of the Tribunal as a whole, but will also affect the evaluation of the Sino-Japanese War and the Pacific War in general.
Thirdly, the Nanking Incident has been treated as a symbol of Japan's illegality and inhumanity, as the Japanese military massacred civilians, and is strongly related to the honor of Japan and the Japanese people. On the other hand, if it is denied, the prestige of the United States and China is at stake.
Fourth, the fact that Japan and the U.S. and China have very different perceptions of the Nanjing Incident makes Japan appear to the U.S. and China as a cowardly country that does not reflect on its past and refuses to admit its own faults by saying things left and right, which not only causes international friction, but also hinders mutual understanding at the national level and undermines trust between the two countries in the long term.
As shown in these four points, the issue of how to evaluate the facts of the Nanjing Incident still has a very serious impact on the international community. Even though it is inevitable that nations have different positions on the evaluation of history, it is highly desirable that the countries concerned exercise restraint and cooperate to prevent this issue from becoming politicized.
The Japanese government has avoided making specific judgments and involvement in the evaluation of the Sino-Japanese and Pacific wars, including the truth about the Nanking Incident, as much as possible, as it should be left to future historians. This may have been based on the judgment that modern history is often influenced by ideology and politics, which can easily distort the historical facts, and that it should be left to academic pursuits and avoid political friction that may occur both at home and abroad.
What seems different today is public opinion, especially in Japan, where the debate on reviewing history in Japan, sparked by the Yasukuni controversy between China and Japan over the past five years, has naturally been accompanied by a generational change in Japan, with the Nanjing issue becoming a symbolic and unavoidable issue. The issue of Nanking is becoming a symbolic issue that cannot be avoided. The issue of Nanking is becoming a symbolic issue that cannot be avoided. Freedom of speech and academic freedom cannot be interfered with, and as China has repeatedly stated, the search for historical facts is essential in order to make history a lesson. In this sense, the joint historical research by Japanese and Chinese experts launched last December is timely. The idea is to avoid political friction and to promote long-term mutual understanding through deepening academic research.
With the above basic understanding as a premise, the purpose of this paper is to sort out what kind of controversy is being conducted in Japan, where academic research on the Nanjing Incident is most active, regarding what the truth of the incident is, to clarify once again that this is an issue that is difficult to settle, and to explore what Japan should do. In Japan, there are two main types of theories: the "genocide affirmation theory," which claims that 200,000 to 300,000 people were massacred, and the "genocide denial theory," which claims that there was no genocide. This paper will attempt to sort out and examine why there is such a big gap between the two sides, even though they read the same documents and testimonies, without adopting either side.
In my opinion, the only desirable approach to an issue as complex as the Nanking Incident is to reduce political conflicts in the long run by building up the academic pursuit of historical facts through joint historical research, both domestic and international. It is my view that a long-term approach to reducing political conflict is the only desirable approach to an issue as complex as the Nanjing Incident. It is not constructive for the governments of the countries concerned to repeatedly exchange views on the history of each country, and it is important for the countries concerned to share a consensus that they will not politicize each other and to deal with each other calmly.
I think it is especially important for the time being to share a consensus among the countries concerned not to politicize each other and to respond calmly.
Chapter 1: The Location of the Problems of the Nanjing Incident
1. What is the Nanjing Incident?
For many Japanese who have no actual experience of the war, the contents of the "Nanking Massacre" that were revealed in the press in the early 1970s came as a great shock. Until then, as in China, the existence of the incident had been almost forgotten in the confusion after the war. The Nanjing Incident is said to have occurred when, after the Rohgok Bridge Incident in July 1937, the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War, the battle jumped from northern China to Shanghai, where the victorious Japanese army, after a fierce battle, pursued the Chinese army and invaded the capital, Nanjing, in December. It is said that the Japanese troops massacred 200,000 or 300,000 Chinese civilians and soldiers there in a short period of six weeks.
Even though the number of victims was so large that common sense dictated that it was impossible, the fact that it was recognized as a fact by the authoritative Tokyo Tribunal and the photos of the alleged massacre with the cruel corpses of the Chinese reminded the Japanese of the tragedy of war and the magnitude of the crimes committed by Japan itself. In fact, General Matsui Ishine, the commander-in-chief of the Battle of Nanking, was sentenced to death at the Tokyo Trials solely for his responsibility for the Nanking Massacre.
In addition, the Nanjing Military Tribunal, which tried BC class war criminals, executed those involved in the massacre, and the existence of the massacre was accepted as an indelible fact.
The image of the Nanking Incident held by many Japanese is that of an act of brutality by Japanese troops who entered the city of Nanking (an area of about 4 square kilometers surrounded by city walls) and indiscriminately plundered, burned, and massacred unarmed Chinese civilians, resulting in the deaths of as many as 300,000 people in a short period of six weeks. Not only Japanese, but also Chinese who learn from national textbooks and Americans who read the best-selling book by Iris Chang cannot help but think of the same situation.
In this way, the Nanking Incident became well known in Japan, and since the 1980s, it has been published in Japanese textbooks as an objective fact. As a reaction, counter-arguments that there was no "genocide" in the first place began to emerge. There was also a so-called "middle-ground" view, which claimed that there was indeed a genocide, but that the number was in the thousands or tens of thousands. The Japanese government has not said much, admitting that there were some illegal acts in Nanking, saying that "it is an undeniable fact that there were killings and looting of non-combatants" [*1], but has not shown any recognition of the scale or content of the acts, or whether there was a so-called "massacre".
In the midst of this situation, the above-mentioned book by an American overseas Chinese, Mr. Chang,[*2] appeared in 1997, and the recognition that Japan committed the Holocaust comparable to Auschwitz has spread to other countries including China. So where exactly is the truth? Why are there so many different conclusions from the same documents and testimonies? This is not only a confrontation between Japan and China, but also a controversy within Japan, where freedom of speech exists and academic verification has been conducted in length and detail.
2. Issues at stake
Today, 70 years after the incident, why is this incident, which was only one of the various incidents that occurred during the entire Sino-Japanese War, being taken up so severely in Japan and China? One of the main reasons is that the sensational nature of the incident has been etched in the memories of many people. The Nanjing Incident is written about in both Chinese and Japanese textbooks, and for the young people who will be responsible for the future of Japan-China relations, it has become a highly influential factor in shaping their views of the other country. For the mutual understanding between the people of Japan and China, it has occupied an important position in the past and will continue to do so in the future. For example, in a Chinese public opinion poll, the top answer to the question "What do Chinese people associate with Japan? [*3] This is obviously a surprising result for the Japanese, who have adopted pacifism as their national policy since the end of World War II, and have harbored both a sense of affinity and a sense of atonement toward China.
Then, how is it described in actual textbooks? For example, the text of a Chinese national textbook states, "After the occupation of Nanking, the Japanese army committed a bloody massacre against the people of Nanking, committing a crime that would cover the heavens. Some peaceful Nanking residents were shot, some were used as stabbing practice, and some were buried alive. According to the statistics of the Military Tribunal for the Far East, in the six weeks following the occupation of Nanking, the Japanese slaughtered more than 300,000 Chinese residents who were not even wearing an inch of iron and more than 300,000 soldiers who had abandoned their weapons" (Chinese History, 2001). Slaughter is the Japanese word for massacre. In addition to this description in the text, a more detailed explanation is provided in the column. There are five brutal photographs suggesting the massacre of civilians by the Japanese military, which seems to further emphasize the brutality of the Japanese military. It is natural to assume that this textbook is one of the factors behind the results of the previous poll.
Looking at Japanese textbooks, the Nanking Incident is mentioned in all of the textbooks (8 companies) that have passed the current (2005) certification examination for junior high school students. As an example, a social studies textbook published by Osaka Shoseki states, "In the capital city of Nanking, which we occupied in December, we killed a large number of residents, including women and girls, in addition to prisoners of war (the Nanking Incident). It was not known in Japan. However, the number of victims has not yet been determined due to various surveys and studies. The number of victims is yet to be determined. In recent years, only one out of eight textbooks specifically mention the number of victims, and the description of the Nanking Incident tends to be simplified[*4]. Thus, although Japanese textbooks describe the results of the Nanking Incident, from the standpoint of Japanese students, the question arises as to why the Japanese military cruelly massacred 200,000 innocent people, and the lack of background explanation seems to leave them with a sense of self-sabotage. In other words, if the public in general is to understand what the Nanking Incident was, the descriptions in the textbooks mentioned above are inadequate, and if they are to be described, they need to be accurately conveyed to future generations. For example, it may be a good idea to make supplementary reading books, but it is important for teachers to be able to teach in an appropriate and objective manner.
As can be said for both textbooks, they do not clearly explain what actually happened in Nanking, with what background and causes. As a result, it is easy for the people of both countries and Japan-China relations to unnecessarily strengthen mutual distrust, and the situation is also inadequate in terms of learning history. In this sense, it is desirable that the Nanking Incident be explained in a way that is easy to understand for the people of both countries, taking into account its complexity and importance, and the points of contention between Japan and China. Since these points of contention are the very points that are being debated in Japan, I would like to show them below.
(1) What does "massacre" mean?
When you claim that 200,000-300,000 people were "massacred" in six weeks, what do you mean by "massacred"? Does it mean that large numbers of people were killed in the fighting? Does it mean that the killing was brutal and inhumane? Does it mean that the killings were carried out illegally (in violation of international wartime law), or that the killings were carried out systematically and deliberately by the government and military? The lack of clarity in the definition of genocide has led to misunderstanding and miscommunication.
(2) Is the figure of "more than 200,000" accurate? What is the breakdown?
It is said that 200,000 or 300,000 people were killed in the "public and private sectors" (the Tokyo Tribunal ruled that "the public and private sectors combined numbered more than 200,000".[*5]) How were such a large number of people actually killed? The "public" were soldiers, but weren't they killed in combat? On the other hand, what percentage of the 200,000 people were "civilians"? Were the civilians killed illegally or were they killed in the fighting?
(3) Was the massacre carried out "systematically" by the Japanese military?
Was this massacre "organized" under the orders of the Japanese government or the Japanese military, or was it planned in some way? Or did it happen as a one-off violation of discipline or orders by soldiers? In other words, was it a systematic crime comparable to the Nazi Holocaust of the Jews, or was it just a common type of barbaric act in war?
(4) Was the killing of Chinese soldiers by the Japanese military illegal?
There is no dispute about the fact that a large number of Chinese soldiers were captured by Japanese soldiers and killed in large numbers, but was this illegal in light of international wartime law at the time as the killing of surrendered soldiers and prisoners of war?
(5) How can we judge the credibility of the ROC government's propaganda warfare and massacre testimony?
Is this discrepancy in the assessment of the reality of the massacre the result of propaganda and exaggeration by the government of the Republic of China at the time (hereinafter referred to as the "KMT government") in an attempt to undermine Japan and win over international public opinion, as the massacre deniers claim? In addition, there are various testimonies supporting the massacre. Also, how reliable are the various testimonies and research results that support the massacre?
Chapter 2: Killing Soldiers
The controversy in Japan over the truth of the Nanking Incident can be roughly divided into three groups: (1) the pro-genocide camp, (2) the anti-genocide camp, and (3) the middle camp, which is somewhere in between the two groups. The argument of Mr. Chang, an American, belongs to the pro-genocide camp (1), but in Japan, it is positioned at the most extreme end of the spectrum, close to the Chinese argument[*6].
In the following, I would like to compare the arguments of the two groups, (1) pro-genocide and (2) against genocide, and examine the differences between them[*7].
First of all, in this chapter, I will address the issue of the killing of so-called "captured" Chinese soldiers, which is probably the biggest point of contention in the Nanking Incident. According to some massacre supporters, the majority of the 200,000-300,000 killed belonged to this category. For example, according to Professor Kasahara, of the approximately 150,000 soldiers in the vicinity of Nanking, more than 80,000 were executed in violation of international wartime law, even though they should have been treated as prisoners of war.
Before going into the arguments of the two factions, it would be necessary to look at the particular circumstances under which these killings occurred. It is said that the Battle of Nanking was very unique compared to ordinary battles in the following respects.
(1) The Chinese army became an undisciplined group because its commanders fled en masse just before the fall of Nanking.
(2) With the "commanders" gone, the soldiers may have lacked the conditions to become "prisoners of war" required under international wartime law.
(3) Due to these factors, a large number of Chinese soldiers, in the order of 10,000, lost their will to fight and surrendered before or in the middle of the battle (there was an unusual situation in which soldiers surrendered without fighting, even though the number of soldiers was overwhelmingly larger than the Japanese army). 4.
(4) Westerners living in Nanking set up a neutral zone to protect civilians, and organized and managed an international committee.[*8] The establishment of such a neutral zone itself was unusual, but the lack of a boundary fence led to a large number of soldiers in camouflage who escaped and pretended to be civilians in violation of international wartime law. The neutrality of these Westerners will also be questioned by massacre denialists.
(5) The city of Nanking, which was defended by the Chinese army, was a special battleground surrounded by city walls, and its northern and western parts were surrounded by the Yangtze River, blocking the exit routes, so a large number of Chinese soldiers had nowhere to run.
(6) Therefore, although it was easy to foresee a situation in which a large amount of damage would occur if a battle were to take place, the Nationalist government chose to fight regardless of the prior recommendation by the Japanese military to surrender.
(7) The Japanese army entered the battle of Nanking without sufficient logistical support, and since they were unable to provide their own food and accommodation, they had no system or preparation to treat the mass surrendered Chinese soldiers as prisoners of war. This is said to have been the reason behind the looting by the Japanese army.
In the battle of Shanghai just prior to the end of the war, the Japanese forces were forced to fight an unexpectedly difficult battle, resulting in a loss of 20,000 dead.
As mentioned above, the killing of soldiers in question can be divided into two main cases. One is the killing of soldiers captured during battle without treating them as "prisoners of war," and the other is the killing of soldiers called "soldiers in civilian clothes" who entered the neutral zone and blended in with the general population. Let's take a look at each.
1. Killing captured soldiers
The problem is that before and after the fall of Nanking on December 13, while fighting was still going on in Nanking Castle and its surrounding areas, the Japanese army killed Chinese soldiers after capturing them. If they had killed them immediately at the scene of the battle, it would have been a clear act of war. The question is whether killing a captured soldier after a certain period of time (e.g., a few days) should be considered a violation of international wartime law as "killing a prisoner of war," or whether there was room for the killing to be considered legal.
The circumstances under which Chinese soldiers were captured by the Japanese were not uniform, and it seems that there were cases in which (1) they showed their intention to surrender from the beginning without fighting on the battlefield, (2) they showed their intention to surrender when they saw a disadvantage during the battle, or (3) the Japanese captured Chinese soldiers who had been defeated.
The Hague Regulations on Land Warfare, signed in 1907 and ratified by Japan, listed the following as the main conditions for qualifying as a "belligerent. There is some dispute as to how to interpret these conditions.
(i) The person responsible for the subordinates must be at his head.
(ii) Possessing a special insignia that can be recognized from a distance.
(iii) Carrying an open weapon.
(1) Claims of genocide deniers
Massacre deniers claim as follows.
(a) In order for a soldier to be recognized as a "belligerent" under the Hague Regulations on Land Warfare and to receive the treatment of a prisoner of war, a commander is required, so these Chinese soldiers cannot be called "prisoners of war" and there is no need to allow their surrender.
(b) In addition, even though Nanjing fell on December 13, there was no systematic surrender of the entire Chinese army, and the resistance of the Chinese army as a whole did not cease, and fierce fighting continued outside the city. Therefore, the killing of these soldiers outside the city was not an execution of "prisoners of war," but a "cleanup" of "defeated soldiers. In addition, there were those who surrendered but later rebelled.
(c) According to the interpretation of international law at the time, in the case of combat, if it is not possible to house or feed prisoners of war (provide food, etc.) and there is no other way to ensure the safety of the military to release them, there was a theory that killing them is not prohibited.
(2) The arguments of the massacre supporters
In response to this, the pro-genocide camp argues as follows.
(b) International law should be applied to "prisoners of war" even in the absence of a commander.
Article 23 of the Hague Regulations on Land Warfare prohibits killing or wounding an enemy who has abandoned his weapons or exhausted his means of self-defense and is begging for surrender. (2) Even if an act of violation of international law exists, the procedures of military tribunals are essential for the punishment of prisoners of war in accordance with the international law of war at the time.
(b) The theory that military necessity takes precedence over the obligation to observe the laws and customs of war under special circumstances has been criticized since that time and is a minority theory. Allowing broad and unclear exceptions would give an easy excuse for violating the laws of war, and strict restrictions such as "only in cases where it is difficult to guarantee one's own safety if one does not kill them" would be necessary, but such a situation did not exist in the Japanese army at the time of the occupation of Nanking.
(c) Therefore, these killings could not be called a "clean-up", but rather an illegal massacre as they were "killings of prisoners of war".
(3) Comparison of the two groups
A comparison of the two sides' arguments raises the following points of contention.
(a) Under the circumstances where the fighting in the Nanking area continued to be all-out or localized, and depending on the situation of the fighting at the time and the situation of the Japanese and Chinese soldiers, is it possible to regard the killing as a part of a combat action in a wide range of battles? It is a question of interpretation of international law at the time as to whether or not the fact that the Japanese military regarded the killing as an act of combat and did not treat them as prisoners of war should be judged as a violation of international law.
(b) As pointed out by Professor Hata, who belongs to the intermediate camp described below, it seems to be a reasonable interpretation that the laws of war should be applied once they have been accepted as "prisoners of war," but if the Japanese military did not subjectively regard them as "prisoners of war," what were the conditions under which they should be treated as "prisoners of war" under international law, and when should the starting point be considered?
(c) The criticism that the theory that killing prisoners of war is not precluded when they are in combat and cannot be housed or fed and there is no other way to ensure the safety of the army by releasing them, as the massacre denialists claim, would provide an unjustifiably broad exception seems reasonable. On the other hand, do the special circumstances of Nanking, such as the surrender of Chinese soldiers who outnumbered the Japanese, justify considering them as exceptional cases from the perspective of security?
(D) These cases are excellent problems for the judgment of international law, but needless to say, as international law essentially has no courts, it seems to come down to the question of who judges whether or not there is a violation of international law.
(e) Considering the above, is it appropriate to consider this killing as a "massacre" and count it in the "number of massacres" or not? There are some who argue that the practice of stabbing to death with bayonets or Japanese swords was cruel.
As is usual in historical studies, such judgments should be comprehensively examined and made in light of international law, the international situation, military practices, etc. of the time, and should not be made based on current concepts, regardless of which historical perspective is used. Neither side seems to disagree on this point.
2. Killing soldiers in civilian clothes
Before and after the fall of Nanking, the commanders fled en masse, and the Chinese soldiers, who were deeply defeated, lost their way and fled to the Neutral Zone in a section of Nanking City. Soldiers who changed into plain clothes and pretended to be civilians were called "soldiers in civilian clothes," and the Japanese troops took refuge in the neutral zone (hereinafter referred to as the "safe zone"). The Japanese army sought out the Chinese soldiers who had blended into the Neutral Zone (hereinafter referred to as the "safe zone") and killed a large number of them, although there was a dispute over the number. The Japanese military did not execute these soldiers in secret, and the media and foreigners witnessed the executions, so there is no dispute as to whether the executions themselves were real or not.
The Tokyo Tribunal's verdict states that 20,000 soldiers in civilian clothes were killed. Professor Higashinakano, a genocide denier who believes that the killing of soldiers in civilian clothes was legal, estimates the number at around 2,000.
(1) Claims of genocide deniers
Massacre deniers claim the following
(b) A group of stooges who took off their military uniforms and mingled among civilians, sometimes carrying concealed weapons, are not entitled to "prisoner of war" privileges. This is similar to how al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters held at the U.S. military base in Guantanamo, Cuba in 2002 were treated by the U.S. as unlawful combatants rather than prisoners of war (POWs) under international wartime law. (b) The Japanese military treated them as such unlawful combatants.
(b) The Japanese did not kill all such unlawful combatants, but only executed those who defied them, so this was not a massacre. (c) At the same time, these killings are not illegal under international law.
(C) At the same time, these killings are part of the Japanese military's mopping-up operations and are part of combat activities.
(D) In April 1938, Mr. Corville of the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo conducted an unofficial field survey in Nanking and met with Mr. Bates and Mr. Smythe, both Americans who gave important testimony on the Nanking Incident. In other words, at the time, this act was not considered illegal because foreign countries, including the U.S., did not condemn the Japanese government for violating international law, and the League of Nations did not put it on its agenda. (e) The KMT government itself did not consider the act illegal.
(e) The KMT government itself did not protest at the time. (e) The KMT government itself did not protest at the time. It is known from the government's own documents that it examined whether the execution of soldiers in civilian clothes could be considered a violation of international law, but it did not protest because it knew that the execution was not a violation of international law, but that the existence of soldiers in civilian clothes was.
(f) As for the number of executions, the records of the 7th Regiment, which was in charge of sweeping the castle, state that the number of executions was 6,670, but Professor Higashinakano estimates that about 2,000 were executed, since reports of this kind are said to have been padded by a factor of three.
(2) Arguments of the genocide supporters
In response to this, the pro-genocide camp argues as follows.
(b) While it is true that "stooges" are a wartime felony, stooges after the fall of Nanking were different from stooges in the original sense of the word (guerrilla fighters), and their resistance was so weak that they "hardly existed in Nanking. Even if they were stooges, military trial procedures were necessary for their execution.
(b) With regard to the denialists' opinion that the fact that there was no condemnation of the Nanjing Massacre from other countries or the League of Nations at the time is one of the proofs that the Nanjing Massacre did not occur, the following statement was made: "The reason why the Nanjing Incident was judged as serious among the atrocities committed by the Japanese military in the Sino-Japanese War at the Tokyo Tribunal was because the government and people of the Allied Powers were aware of the incident in real time and did not condemn it. The reason why the Nanking Incident was judged as serious among the atrocities committed by the Japanese military during the Sino-Japanese War was because the Allied governments and people were aware of the incident in real time and were shocked by its inhumanity. This was because the Allied governments and people knew about the incident in real time and were shocked by its inhumanity. In addition, the League of Nations General Assembly passed a resolution condemning Japan, and Japan's invasion of China itself was severely condemned and protested, and the fact that there was no mention of the Nanking Massacre itself does not mean that there was no massacre.
(C) As for the reason why the U.S. did not condemn the incident, Ambassador Gruffudd was aware of the situation in Nanking, but "it was beyond his authority to protest the Nanking Incident itself, even to the point of souring diplomatic relations with the Japanese government.
(D) It is also clear that the Nationalist government knew of the existence of the massacre in Nanking at the time, and the fact that there is no explicit mention of a "massacre" in Nanking in the government documents of the time does not mean that there was no massacre.
(3) Comparison of the two groups
Comparing the arguments of the two groups, the following points of contention emerge.
(a) At that time, was the act of killing soldiers in civilian clothes who were considered guerrillas as soon as they were found considered a violation of international law? (a) Was it considered a violation of international law at the time to kill soldiers in civilian clothes who were considered to be guerrillas as soon as they were found? At present, there are no records showing that foreign countries, including the Nationalist government, clearly criticized the actions of the Japanese military as a violation of international law.
(b) Did the Japanese military kill all the soldiers in civilian clothes, or did they execute only those who rebelled? In addition, it is not clear how much resistance there was among the soldiers and how serious the situation was in terms of concealed weapons.
(c) Should the soldiers in uniform inside Nanking be regarded as "prisoners of war" under international law? In other words, was it a violation of international law to execute them without a military trial?
3. Organized crime?
In the case of "massacre," it is also important to consider whether the Japanese government carried out such an act in an organized and planned manner. General Matsui Ishine, as the commander-in-chief of the Battle of Nanking, was held responsible for the massacre in Nanking and was hanged, so whether there was organization is also important in this respect. Whether or not the term "massacre" implies "organization" is also a matter of debate, but as an example, the historian Professor Qin, who will be discussed later, says that "massacre" is a concept related to organization and planning. As an example, the historian Professor Hata, who will be discussed later, says that "genocide" is a concept related to organization and planning. So, was there a systematic crime committed by the Japanese government or the Japanese military?
Before I introduce the arguments of the genocide deniers and the affirmers, I would like to take a look at the documents that both groups cite in arguing their positions. It is noteworthy that both groups draw different conclusions from the same documents. For convenience, we will refer to these documents as A, B, C, and D.
(1) Documents related to the policy on prisoners of war
As field-level documents, there are documents in the battle report and the camp diary that can be regarded as the Japanese military's "no prisoners of war" policy and instructions at that time. A typical example is the camp diary of Lieutenant General Nakajima Imacho-go, commander of the 16th Division.
Document A: "As it was generally the policy not to take prisoners, we could not even disarm a crowd of 15,000 to 10,000 people without clearing them from one end to the other."
In order to conclude from the division commander's diary that the Japanese Army had a "policy" of executing prisoners of war, it is important to consider the following three points.
(1) Can we assume from the diary that there was an overall policy on POWs?
(2) Does the phrase "take no prisoners" mean "execute prisoners of war"?
Or does it mean "release and expulsion of prisoners of war"?
(3) How did they act in the field, including other divisions?
(a) Treatment of prisoners of war
In determining whether or not there is an overall policy on prisoners of war, the following two documents describing the treatment of prisoners of war are often cited.
Document B: 1933 pamphlet entitled "A Study of the Methods of Warfare against the Chinese Armed Forces" (excerpt) Prisoners of war do not necessarily need to be sent back to confinement and await the outcome of the war as is the case with other nations.
Not only are the family registration laws not complete for the Chinese, but there are also many vagrants, especially among soldiers, and few of them have been confirmed to exist.
If they were killed or released to other regions, there would be no public problem.
Document C: "Instructions on Battle" issued by the 13th Division Headquarters of the Shanghai Dispatched Army in October 1937 (excerpt)
If there are a large number of prisoners of war, they should not be shot, but disarmed, gathered in one place, monitored, and reported to the division headquarters. In addition, officers among the prisoners of war shall not be shot dead, but shall be disarmed and escorted to the division headquarters. As these are used by the army not only for information gathering but also for propaganda, it is necessary to make sure that each subordinate unit is thoroughly informed on this point. However, a small number of prisoners of war shall be interrogated as necessary and dealt with accordingly.
(b) Execution in the field
In addition to the Nakajima diary mentioned above, the following two records are important and often cited as to what was actually going on in the field.
Document D: Detailed combat report of the 1st Battalion, 66th Infantry Regiment, 114th Division
I have received the following orders from the regimental commander.
"A. By order of the brigade, kill all prisoners."
Document E: Battle Diary by Major General Yamada of the 65th Infantry Regiment, 13th Division
Dispatched 2nd Lieutenant Honma of the Cavalry to Nanking to deal with prisoners of war and other matters. He told me to kill them all.
(2) Claims of genocide deniers
Massacre deniers claim the following.
(a) The "no prisoner of war policy" mentioned in Document A does not even appear in the official records of the 16 divisions to which he belonged, except in his diary. In addition, if there was a policy of "immediate execution of surrendered soldiers," it should have been announced to the other divisions, but that also does not appear in the official records.
(b) "No prisoners of war policy" means "the policy of expelling surrendered soldiers after disarmament and not taking them as prisoners of war"; Document B clearly states the policy of expulsion, and Document C denies immediate execution. (c) Four months before the Battle of Nanking
(c) The policy of the War Ministry, issued four months before the Battle of Nanking, also stated the policy of respecting the laws of war.
Army Circular, August 1937 (excerpt)
In the "Convention on the Laws and Customs of Warfare and Other Treaties Relating to the Laws of Warfare," efforts should be made to respect the provisions regarding the selection of means of harming the enemy. .....
(d) There were some cases of executions, but the Japanese military's approach was to execute surrendering soldiers who were defiant. There are actual examples of expulsion.
(e) Although it is described as "prisoners of war," it is actually the execution of "defeated soldiers" that is legal. (e) Although the term "prisoners of war" is used, it is actually the execution of "defeated soldiers" that is legal.
(3) Arguments of the pro-genocide camp
On the other hand, the arguments of the pro-genocide camp are as follows.
(a) With Document B, the Japanese military considered that "unlike the case of Russian and German soldiers, it is OK to kill Chinese soldiers.
(b) Document C should be interpreted as indicating that a policy of "shooting prisoners of war" existed.
(c) Documents D and E are unquestionable proof that orders to execute "POWs" were literally issued in the field.
(4) Comparison of the two groups
Comparing the arguments of the two groups, the following points of contention emerge.
(a) With regard to the military's overall POW policy, the same document led to completely different conclusions, namely, that POWs should be executed or released. In this respect, both groups agree that the overall military policy was ambiguous and confusing in the field. Therefore, it is necessary to judge the military's prisoner-of-war policy in accordance with the actual situation by carefully examining other cases of the Japanese military in China in the past.
(b) It seems that there are not a few opinions that deny the "organizational nature" of the massacre, even among the massacre supporters.[*9]
(C) From the perspective of the genocide deniers, not only were the Chinese soldiers at the time of the Nanjing Incident not "prisoners of war," but they were also killed in the course of a wide range of combat activities, and the discussion of "organization" can be interpreted as meaningless.
(d) In actual practice, there are some cases of killing, some cases of expulsion, and some cases of internment as POWs, although there are differences in whether they are recognized as "POWs" or not.
(e) As for whether or not it is comparable to Auschwitz, the above mentioned points of view on organization, ideology of racial extermination, scale of killings, etc. are clearly different, but in the view of the pro-genocide camp, there are similarities in terms of brutality and contempt for Chinese people. Mr. Chan, focusing on the short-term killing of six weeks, says that it is a crime even greater than Auschwitz.
Chapter 3 Killing of Civilians and Total Number of Killed
1. Killing civilians
Next, I would like to look at the scale of the killing of civilians who were not soldiers. This is because the killing of innocent civilians in a dimension unrelated to combat activities is undoubtedly a war crime and deserves to be called a "massacre. I would like to exclude the view that a soldier in uniform who blends in with the civilian population is considered a civilian as a former soldier because he has laid down his arms and lost his will to fight.
As for the scale of the civilian killings, Mr. Bates, an American who was living in Nanking at the time, testified at the Tokyo Tribunal that "12,000 people" were killed, and although it is said that the verdict was strongly influenced by this testimony, "12,000 non-combatants" were killed.
As we will see below, the basis for the killing of civilians lies mainly in the testimony of Westerners and Chinese, but the main point of contention is how to view the reliability of that testimony. Massacre deniers are particularly concerned about the reliability of the testimony of the American, Mr. Bates, and the investigation by Mr. Smythe.
(1) Claims of genocide deniers
Massacre deniers claim the following.
(a) The military discipline of the Japanese army was strict. (a) The Japanese military discipline was strict. General Matsui issued detailed instructions to all troops, including warnings not to involve the Chinese people in the war, and took the stance that they would be severely punished.
(b) There are no historical documents that show the massacre of the Japanese people. If there are historical documents, they should be presented to the affirmative side. There is not a single case of civilian killings witnessed in the records of Japan, the U.S., Britain, and Germany.
(c) The Chinese witnesses' stories lacked corroboration. In addition, most of the testimonies from foreigners are hearsay from Chinese people and are not credible. In addition, the objectivity of the testimonies cannot be trusted because many of the foreigners who testified or reported on the events had public or private relationships with the Chinese government or key figures, and were involved in propaganda efforts for the ROC.
(d) In particular, it was an American, Professor Bates, who had the greatest influence on the Tokyo Trials' fact finding. He anonymously wrote a book titled "What is War?" during the war, and as he testified at the trial, he claimed that about 30,000 soldiers were killed after they were disarmed, and 12,000 men, women, and children were killed in the castle. The book itself was a "propaganda book" of the KMT's Central Propaganda Department, according to the KMT's top-secret documents, and both the editor, reporter Timperley[*10], and Mr. Bates, as it turned out later, were involved in the KMT's propaganda work as "advisors" to the KMT government. Mr. Bates was also an informant to reporters Steele (Chicago Daily News) and Darden (New York Times) who reported on the massacre at the time. As for Mr. Bates' testimony, he himself did not see the scene of the massacre and did not provide any evidence for the killing of 12,000 civilians; to assume that 12,000 were civilians is dogmatic without even burial evidence.
(e) According to secret KMT documents unearthed in 2003, the emphasis of the KMT's propaganda efforts after the fall of Nanking was to "expose the enemy's assault after the fall of the capital," and judging from the censorship by the propaganda department and press conferences, the KMT government was aware that there had been no massacre of civilians and prisoners of war by the Japanese forces.[*11]
(f) Before the Tokyo Tribunal, the Allied Command announced that "20,000 men, women and children were beaten to death and Nanking was turned into a sea of blood over a period of four weeks", but this was based on "what the witnesses said" and was never confirmed until the end of the trial.
(g) There are intentional fabrications such as blurring and forgery in the photographic evidence used by the massacre supporters. Of the photographs used as evidence of the Nanjing Massacre, not a single one has been found that can stand up to rigorous criticism and can be said to be evidence of the massacre of civilians by the Japanese military.
(h) It is a clear violation of international wartime law for civilians to engage in combat. In China, there are many cases where civilians participate in combat or cooperate with the Chinese military, and it is not illegal for such civilians to be killed or for civilians to be involved and killed on the battlefield. Since Chiang Kai-shek was driving anyone who could fight to the battlefield, there was a strong suspicion that the young and old were defeated soldiers. If a family member had been mistakenly identified as a soldier and shot dead, there would have been an outcry with the specific names of the victims, but there was no such outcry from the International Committee for the Safety Zone.
However, there was no such protest from the International Committee for the Safety Zone. The International Committee for the Safety Zone protested the killing of 47 civilians to the Japanese military, some of which are of questionable authenticity. (In Professor Higashinakano's view, the number of civilians killed by the Japanese "in violation of international law was only about 10, which is quite common in conventional warfare.)
(i) The Smythe survey, which is used as evidence by the pro-genocide camp, was conducted by an American professor of sociology at Jinling University at the request of the aforementioned Mr. Timperley, and not only does it produce results that are more in line with the KMT government, but the survey methodology is clearly not objective.[*12]
(j) The civilian deaths include cases of killings committed by Chinese soldiers and crimes blamed on Japanese soldiers, as well as victims of illegal killings by Chinese troops.
(2) Arguments of the genocide supporters
On the other hand, the pro-genocide camp argues as follows.
(a) During the Tokyo Trials, the prosecution presented overwhelming evidence of atrocities. While foreign nationals who were in Nanking at the time, the surviving victims, and remaining documents from the U.S. and Germany were presented to the court, the defense's rebuttal was too weak. One of the characteristics of the massacre deniers is that they completely ignore the mountain of testimonies of the victims
(b) It is clear that there were assaults on civilians. It is clear that many key figures in the Japanese government knew that the Nanking Incident had occurred and that there had been atrocities committed by the Japanese military. According to Professor Kasahara, (1) although there is no official survey data on the number of civilian casualties, the figures estimated by those who were on the scene at the time, 100,000 by the Chinese and 50,000 or 60,000 by the Europeans, are helpful. (2) According to Mr. Smythe's research, 12,000 civilians were killed inside the city of Nanjing and approximately 27,000 outside the city in the suburbs of Nanjing, including civilian casualties who were caught up in the fighting outside the city of Nanjing and civilians who were executed on suspicion of being Chinese soldiers during the residual cleanup operation after the fall of Nanjing
(c) Under the strict control of the Japanese military, it is not surprising that there are few photographs of the scene of the atrocities. Nonetheless, photographic evidence does exist.
"Many of the photos of the Nanking Massacre that have been published, including Iris Chang's book, are not, in the strictest sense of the word, photos of the scene of the Nanking Massacre. However, many of them cannot be identified as being taken during the Nanking Massacre, and the atrocities committed by the Japanese military as described in the photos are often true."
(d) There are various motives for the Japanese military to resort to massacres. These included a desire for revenge after the bitter battle of Shanghai, a lack of supplies, a decline in the quality of soldiers, and a feeling of contempt for the Chinese people.
(3) Comparison of the two groups
Comparing the arguments of the two groups, the following points of contention emerge.
(a) How should we evaluate the credibility of Bates' testimony that 12,000 people were killed inside Nanjing City in light of his involvement with the KMT government?
(b) However, doubts have been raised about the objectivity of the Smythe survey itself, and it is not clear whether the deaths calculated were killed illegally by the Japanese military or by being caught up in the fighting. A more objective evaluation of the Smythe Survey seems necessary.
(c) The testimonies of Westerners who were in Nanking at the time should have been considered highly objective as the testimony of a third party, but the deniers of the massacre have pointed out that many of them were related to the Nationalist government and have questioned the reliability of their testimonies. However, the massacre deniers have pointed out that many of them were associated with the KMT government, and have questioned the reliability of the testimonies. The massacre supporters have not yet refuted the doubts about the testimonies of the Westerners, and the future controversy will be closely watched.
(d) In the controversy, the idea of how to take civilian casualties is not clear, and the lack of reliable figures has been a source of contention between the two factions. In particular, there are some cases where civilians are defined as "non-combatants" and even those who have taken off their uniforms are included as civilians, which is a source of confusion.
(e) Since this paper focuses on the "massacre"[*13], I will not go into the other barbaric acts such as rape, arson, and looting that did not result in killing, but there is a major difference of opinion in this area as well. The deniers of the massacre argue that only a limited number of Japanese troops entered the city of Nanking and that they were under strict discipline, and they also cite examples of other barbaric acts, such as the Chinese torching of almost all of the outskirts of Nanking in Operation Qinye (burning and killing) and anti-Japanese disturbances by Chinese soldiers hiding in safe areas. The possibility that the massacre was committed by the Chinese is pointed out. Those who support the massacre say that there is a lot of evidence and testimonies of the Japanese military's barbaric acts, and that the "anti-Japanese disturbance" is just imagination and speculation without any historical support. The International Committee for the Safety Zone estimates that "by February and March 1938, tens of thousands of women had been raped. According to Professor Kasahara, the core of the Nanking Incident was the high number of rapes of women and the rape and murder of women. Professor Kasahara states that the core of the Nanking Incident was the high number of rapes of women and the rape and murder of women. With regard to the number of rapes within the city of Nanking, Bates states that there were 20,000, Chang states that there were 20,000-80,000, and Professor Higashinakano states that there were at most a dozen rapes committed by Japanese soldiers.
2. Total number of persons killed
In the Tokyo Trials, the KMT government claimed that the total number of people killed, including the massacres of soldiers and civilians, was 300,000, and the verdict was that "the total number of civilians and prisoners of war killed in and around Nanking was more than 200,000. So what are the facts?
As we have seen in the past, the total number can vary greatly without clarifying the following assumptions. As mentioned at the beginning of this article, the most important factor that causes a large difference in conclusions despite looking at the same materials and testimonies is how "massacre" is defined. Even if we define genocide simply as illegal killing, we can come to opposite conclusions depending on whether or not we consider many of the killings to have been illegal under international law at the time. In addition, as shown in Professor Kasahara's view below, the Chinese government may have included the number of soldiers killed in ordinary combat in the number of massacres.
(1) Claims of genocide deniers
Massacre deniers claim the following
(a) There is no record of a "massacre" of any number of people in Nanjing. The post-war trials were based solely on hearsay evidence from the Chinese. For example, neither Mr. Bates nor Reverend Magee, who testified at the Tokyo Trials, witnessed the scene.
(b) It was taboo from the beginning to discuss the authenticity of many of the testimonies given at the Tokyo Trials. The verification of documents was completely out of the question. Japan was judged by the Tokyo Tribunal and officially accepted the "judgements" of the Tokyo Tribunal with the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, but this does not mean that Japan accepted the unjust values that constituted the Tokyo Tribunal.
(c) At the time, "the population of Nanjing was 200,000. How is it possible to massacre 300,000 people in a city with a population of 200,000?" How is it possible to massacre 300,000 people in a city with a population of 200,000? As for the burial records that the massacre supporters rely on, the only one whose existence and activities can be confirmed is the "Red Manjidang," while the other groups, including the "Chongzen Hall" mentioned by the massacre supporters, are groups that were fabricated by the Chinese side afterwards in order to inflate the death toll. According to the records, the number of bodies buried in the Red Manjidang Hall is over 40,000, including the number of war dead. Even that number is clearly padded, and the Japanese military (Nanjing Special Service Organization) burial official testified that they tacitly approved the padding from the perspective of revitalizing civilian life, so the actual number of burials is probably 15,000 at most.
(d) The "Nanking Massacre" was created by the Kuomintang government with the intention of propaganda warfare to discredit the Japanese military, as evidenced by the secret documents of the Kuomintang.
(2) Arguments of the pro-genocide camp
On the other hand, the main arguments of the pro-genocide camp are as follows.
(a) The Tokyo Tribunal's ruling stated, "Later estimates indicate that the total number of civilians and prisoners of war killed in and around Nanking during the first six weeks of the Japanese occupation was more than 200,000. These estimates are not exaggerated.
That these estimates are not exaggerated is proved by the fact that the number of corpses buried by the burial corps and other groups amounted to 155,000. The deniers are the biggest burials. The deniers say that the existence and burial details of the largest burial group, the Sungseondo, were fabricated after the fact, but the existence of the Sungseondo has actually been confirmed. [*14]
(b) The Japanese government accepted the Tokyo Trials in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, which officially recognized the existence of the Nanking Massacre. Since General Matsui, the supreme commander there, was sentenced to death and the Japanese government agreed to accept the results of the trial, it should accept the results. The current state of affairs, in which there are "hoax" theories about the Tokyo Trials, is a manifestation of numbness to war responsibility and a lack of historical awareness.
(c) At the time, there were strict controls on speech and press, and due to the destruction of evidence by the Japanese military after the war, there was no way to get an accurate figure since the materials were not available. The number of 300,000 is the result of collecting numerous documents from the Nanjing Military Tribunal.
(d) It is not true that the population of Nanking at that time was 200,000, but 400,000-500,000. According to Professor Kasahara, the 200,000 people mentioned in the documents of the International Committee for the Safety Zone is the population within the safety zone. The massacre denial argument leaves out the fact that the Nanking Defense Force had a total of 150,000 soldiers. The Chinese "massacre of 300,000 people" includes the sacrifice of Chinese soldiers. According to the professor, "Including the tens of thousands of civilians killed and the 80,000 Chinese soldiers executed, it is estimated that more than 100,000 people were killed, including nearly 200,000 or more Chinese soldiers.
(e) The problem of numbers is not an essential issue because it can be increased as much as possible if the investigation is carried out and the scope is expanded. The argument that because it is a small number, it is not a massacre conceals the true nature of the incident.
(3) Comparison of the two groups
Comparing the arguments of the two groups, the following points of contention emerge.
(a) Although the two groups share the same understanding of issues such as the fact that the Tokyo Trials were judged based on ex post facto laws of "crimes against peace" and "crimes against humanity," and that the judges and prosecutors were chosen from the Allied countries rather than neutral countries and lacked neutrality, there is a major disagreement about the reliability of the fact-finding process.
(b) In the Tokyo Trials, burial records were also an important factor in determining the number of massacres, but there is no dispute that the burial records submitted by the Chinese side are not from that time, but were created after the war, and there are differing opinions on their reliability.
(c) For example, Professor Kasahara, a pro-genocide advocate, cites the figures of "tens of thousands of civilians killed and about 80,000 Chinese soldiers executed. Further research is needed on the basis of the breakdown of the numbers that are said to be 200,000 or 300,000.
(d) Some pro-genocide advocates argue that "in light of the tragedy of individual sacrifice, the question of numbers - whether it was 10,000, 40,000, 200,000, or 300,000 - is of little significance." It is obvious that the total number is not everything, but it is an important point of contention to grasp the real picture of what happened in Nanking.
3. Conclusion (opinions of the intermediate group, etc.)
In this section, we will look at the views of those who might be called the middle ground between the pro- and anti-genocide camps. Some of the perspectives presented here will be helpful in comparing the arguments of the two groups discussed so far. The number of people killed ranges from a few thousand to tens of thousands, and the views of the middle camp are not uniform, but they all share the view that there were acts of violation of international law (illegal acts) above a certain scale. It should be noted, however, that even those who deny the existence of massacres do not claim that there were no unlawful killings by soldiers, but rather acknowledge the existence of sporadic massacres, so the boundaries between the two are not absolute.
(1) Professor Ikuhiko Hata
Professor Qin, a historian, estimates that there were about 40,000 unlawful killings, although his view can be accepted to some extent by pro-genocide groups, as can be inferred from the fact that Chan introduces it as one of his views in his writings [*15].
(a) Regarding the "policy of not taking prisoners of war" in Lieutenant General Nakajima's diary, he surmised that "the execution of prisoners of war seemed to be the unspoken policy of the troops dispatched to Shanghai and the Central China Area Army. On the other hand, he says, "It does not seem to have been enforced as a unified policy on each unit under command," pointing out the fact that both executions and expulsions were carried out, but he says, "If a unit with prisoners of war in its custody inquired at a higher headquarters, it was instructed to execute them almost without exception.
(b) With regard to the killing of prisoners of war, while there is an element that the killing of surrendered soldiers can be seen as an extension of combat, once they are accepted as prisoners of war, it is a violation of international law to execute them without following due legal procedures. The protection of the laws of war does not apply to soldiers in uniform, and depending on the situation, they may be executed immediately, but the procedure should still be followed.
(c) As for the massacre of civilians, it is assumed that the majority of the massacres were carried out under the guise of "hunting for soldiers in civilian clothes," in which suspected civilians were rounded up and executed. The reason for this is that, although it was supposed to be an inspection process that included military police, interpreters, and Chinese nationals, in reality, "it was difficult to distinguish between civilians and soldiers in civilian clothes," and "all youths were considered to be defeated soldiers or soldiers in civilian clothes.
(d) As a result, we estimate the number of illegal killings to be about 40,000, including 30,000 soldiers and 8,000-12,000 civilians. The Chinese figures were compiled in a hurry to collect and compile victims' allegations in time for the postwar Tokyo Trials, but many of the testimonies were not within the scope of personal experience and observation, and were inflated to the level of "three thousand gray hairs" without malice.
(2) Kairakosha's "History of the Battle of Nanking
The Kairakosha is an organization of former Rikushi graduates and other interested parties.
However, it is said to have made a great contribution to the discovery and organization of the testimonies of those who participated in the war, mainly its members, and records such as battle reports.
However, it is said to have made a great contribution to the large-scale excavation and organization of the testimonies of its members and other records such as battle reports.
(a) As for the "no prisoners of war policy," since the Sino-Japanese War was not a war (author's note: the term "Sino-Japanese Incident" was used at the time), the military center issued an instruction not to call them "prisoners of war," but did not issue any specific instructions on how to treat them. The local military commander Matsui said, "Release them," and the Chief of Staff said, "Make prisoners of war." The diary entry by Division Commander Nakajima may have been a misinterpretation of the Vice-Minister's notice, "Don't take prisoners of war, dispose of them," or it may have been the Division Commander's decision based on his own view, but it is not clear.
(b) Regarding the treatment of enemy surrendered soldiers, defeated soldiers, and soldiers in civilian clothes, in the case of executions, the reason given is that "it is presumed that the Japanese military acted between battles based on mission orders, or that resistance or riots occurred, or that there was great concern about this, but there is little concrete explanation of this in the battle reports.
(c) As for the execution of soldiers in civilian clothes in the safety zone, the report states that 6,670 people were stabbed to death, and concludes that this was a mopping-up operation against the defeated Chinese soldiers, and that "it was clearly a combat operation aimed at destroying the enemy's defeated soldiers.
(d) Although it does not provide an estimate of the total number of people killed, "The History of the Battle of Nanking through Testimony," which preceded the publication of "The History of the Battle of Nanking," lists both Mr. Masami Unemoto's estimate of 3,000 to 6,000 people massacred and Mr. Yoshiaki Itakura's estimate of 13,000, and says, "I can only apologize deeply to the Chinese people. I am deeply sorry to the Chinese people for what I have done. It concludes, "I am deeply sorry to the Chinese people.
(3) Hisahiko Okazaki, Director, Research Institute [*16]
Hisahiko Okazaki, a former diplomat and historian, has a historical view that Japan's "motive" in the Greater East Asia War was clearly self-defense.
(a) The Tokyo Tribunal was so one-sided and sloppy that, from the point of view of a competent peacetime lawyer, all cases should be dismissed for lack of evidence. Figures such as 20,000 or 300,000 victims are out of the question and ridiculous. It is common sense to know that such figures are for propaganda purposes when you see the number of massacres of the opponents and the brutality of such massacres being exaggeratedly reported by the armies of the two countries at that time. This is the best evidence of the low level of the Tokyo Tribunal that took such things as truth.
(b) On the other hand, it must be admitted that a larger scale of overtaking took place than would normally occur in a normal occupation. Horiba (author's note: Major Kazuo Horiba) of the General Staff wrote, "Some parts of the army are in a state of disrepute, and the results of the capture of Nanking have caused ten years of resentment and damaged the prestige of the Japanese army. After the incident, General Matsui Ishine is said to have lamented, "What have you people done to us? But history cannot be written if we ignore the testimony of such splendid people.
(c) Even so, it's hard to imagine that the civilian toll of assault and other criminal acts by individuals has exceeded a thousand."
(d) The main motive for the trial against Germany was the Holocaust of the Jews, which was brought to Japan, which had nothing to do with it, and even the Nanking Incident, which was merely a case of wartime relaxation of military discipline, was upgraded to a deliberate genocide on a par with the Holocaust, and the aftereffects of that impossibility still remain."
(4) Professor Kitamura
Kitamura, a China researcher and professor at Ritsumeikan University[*17], is the author of "The Quest for the 'Nanjing Incident,'" which has been translated into English. He argues that whether or not to call it a massacre is a matter of "quality," not "number. He argues that whether or not to call it a massacre is a matter of "quality" rather than "number.
(a) In defining genocide, the key question is whether or not the act of killing is related to combat. Soldiers kill each other on the battlefield. "Soldiers kill each other on the battlefield, and whether they like it or not, this must be called a normal act of combat. In contrast, the killing of large numbers of non-combatants and civilians without any combat-related reason, as in the Holocaust, is what we should call a massacre. The Japanese military had no intention of killing ordinary people.
(b) The Allies, who had declared that they would bring Japan's war leaders to justice, needed to position Japan's war as a "wicked war" similar to that of Nazi Germany. This would require a "massacre" on par with the Holocaust. This is where the "Nanking Incident" came in. The Allies decided to take the confusion in Nanking to the level of a massacre, and they did.
(c) The 300,000-odd people killed in the Nanjing trials are inconsistent with the actual situation at the time, which can be seen from various documents. To put it bluntly, there were 300,000 people at the beginning, and the evidence supporting this seems to have been created to fit the 300,000 figure." The origin of the 300,000 figure can be traced back to an article written by Timperley at the beginning of his book "What is Battle?", which stated that "in the fighting in central China alone, Chinese military casualties numbered at least 300,000, with an almost equal number of civilian casualties. But when the article was circulated to the KMT's Central Daily News, it was adapted and changed to "massacre of 300,000 Chinese" in the "Nanjing-Shanghai area.
(d) As for the number of people killed, Mr. Smythe cites the fact that about 1,000 prisoners of war were executed at Makufu Mountain on the outskirts of Nanking, in addition to the 800 executions of soldiers in civilian clothes and the 2,000 civilians killed. With regard to the execution of 1,000 prisoners of war, it is not clear whether it was illegal or legal, and the difficulties in procuring food, along with the lack of observers and the tense situation of the war, make it difficult to justify the mass execution of POWs. In the case of the execution of 1,000 prisoners of war, he did not make a clear judgment on the illegality and legality of the execution, but pointed out that the difficulty in procuring food, along with the lack of monitoring personnel and the tense situation of the war, could be elements to prove that "it is difficult to guarantee one's own security unless one kills them," which should be relied upon in defending the mass execution of prisoners of war.
(5) Judge Pearl.
He represented India as the only expert in international law among the 11 judges at the Tokyo Trials. He argued that the Tokyo Trials were in violation of international law and issued a minority opinion that all the defendants were innocent. He also referred to the Nanking Incident and considered that there were numerous inhumane acts.
(a) Pointing out that much of the evidence presented in the Nanjing Incident was hearsay evidence and one-sided Allied interviews in the field, he said, "Witnesses to incidents on the battlefield are prone to ridiculous delusions of excitement, prejudice and speculation. We must avoid all disturbance of the emotional element and recall that we are here considering an incident that occurred during the war."
(b) Regarding propaganda warfare, he wrote: "In judging the value of the newspaper reports of the time, or anything similar, we must not overlook the role of propaganda designed in wartime. It is a kind of foolish competition for the imagination as a way of enraging the enemy, stirring up the blood of friendly gunmen, and arousing hatred and fear in neutral citizens. We must not be blinded by this."
(c) Even if these facts are not as alleged by the prosecution, and no matter how unsatisfactory the evidence, it cannot be denied that many of the inhumane acts shown here would have been committed."
Comparing the arguments of the two groups while referring to the opinions of the intermediate group, it seems that, in general, the massacre affirmation group tends to rely on testimonies and circumstantial evidence rather than trying to prove the accuracy of figures such as 200,000 or 300,000 people. In particular, they emphasize the conclusions of the Tokyo Trials and take the stance that the conclusions have already been reached. On the other hand, denialists tend to give very low ratings to the testimonies of Westerners and Chinese, emphasizing the importance of records and their consistency as the only way to "prove" that there was no such thing.
This difference in approach has led to an emotional confrontation, with pro-genocide advocates criticizing the "revision of history" and pro-genocide deniers criticizing the "fabrication of history. The former says, "Even if the number of massacres is actually small, isn't a massacre still a massacre? Don't you recognize the fact of massacre? On the other hand, if what happened in Nanking is the "Nanking Massacre," the latter would provoke the counter-argument that it is appropriate to call mass killings such as the Tokyo Air Raids, the atomic bombings, the Tiananmen Square incident, the 228 Incident in Taiwan, and the Siberian Internment "genocide. I do not think it can be said that they are both appropriate.
The author believes that two points are particularly important when examining the extent of the massacre in the Nanking Incident. The first is to make an academic judgment, including international legal scholars, on whether the killing of surrendered soldiers and handcuffed soldiers can be called an illegal act in light of the nature of international law and the fighting conditions at the time. The other is to review the Smythe survey, burial records and other reliable testimonies to obtain more objective figures on how many innocent people were killed.
In any case, was there or was there not a "massacre"? The current debate, which starts from the approach of "numbers," i.e., how many people were massacred, cannot help but spin out of control. A calm and objective approach that does not rush to conclusions but focuses on the "quality" of what actually happened seems to be the only way to bring the two sides of the debate together. If the two factions continue to make efforts to find points of contact while acknowledging the differences between their arguments, they will not be able to reach a unified conclusion, but they will be able to come up with a constructive two-tiered argument that clearly states the points of contention. The Nanjing Incident is not just a matter of academic research, but has become an important topic for international relations and for the education of the next generation of young people, and historians must work together to explain the facts to the general public in a simple manner. As Professor Kasahara, a pro-genocide advocate, has stated, "What is important is that both Japan and China get closer to the real numbers in the process of empirical clarification of the actual situation and the overall picture of the incident. In other words. In other words, there is a consensus among the two groups that they should deepen their research on the Nanjing Incident and search for the truth.
Chapter 4: The Politics of the Nanjing Incident Issue: Based on a Comparison with the Comfort Women Issue
The fact that the Nanjing Incident has become the subject of such intense national and international controversy is not merely due to differences in academic assessments of the facts. The political nature of the Nanjing Incident is perhaps the core reason for the intersection of controversy, criticism, and neglect. In this chapter, I would like to outline the political nature of the Nanjing Incident by comparing it to the comfort women issue, which became a contentious issue between Japan and the United States in the first half of 2007.
1. Differences between the Nanking Incident and the Comfort Women Issue
(1) How the comfort women issue was adopted in the United States
In July, the U.S. House of Representatives for the first time passed a resolution condemning the Japanese government for the comfort women and demanding an official apology. Several factors have been cited as contributing to its adoption for the first time.
(a) Many members of the House of Representatives became convinced that there had been "forced rendition" by the Japanese military because of errors in the report prepared by the Congressional Research Service. As to whether or not there was a forced conscription, the testimony of former Japanese soldier Seiji Yoshida that he himself was involved in forced conscription in Korea became an important trigger. Although it is clear in Japan that this testimony was fabricated, it was adopted in the first report by the Congressional Research Service and distributed to the members of the House of Representatives. However, the first report by the Congressional Research Service adopted the testimony and distributed it to members of Congress.[*18]
(b) The Japanese government was unable to find any evidence of coercion either through public and private investigations or through direct interviews with Korean comfort women conducted in 1993, but in consideration of the Korean government's request, then Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono issued a statement acknowledging coercion, thus settling the matter politically. Since then, the fact that the Japanese government has not denied the story has led to it being regarded as evidence that the government still acknowledges the existence of forced recruitment.
(c) While the resolution was pending in the House of Representatives, Prime Minister Abe's initial statement that there was "no evidence to support coercion" and an opinion ad in a leading U.S. newspaper by a group of Diet members and intellectuals led to an emotional backlash in the U.S. that Japan was attempting to revise history.
(d) There was a political and religious background that made it difficult to tolerate the existence of comfort women as a human rights issue, since the United States has a strong awareness of human rights and does not approve of prostitution. Even if there was no coercion, once the issue became politicized, it was seen as difficult to defend Japan due to the nature of the problem.
As a representative example of the U.S. view, U.S. Ambassador to Tokyo Christopher Schieffer said, "I believe that the former comfort women of the Japanese military were forced into prostitution. （I think former comfort women of the Japanese military were forced into prostitution, and it is self-evident that such barbaric acts took place. I hope that Japan will not retreat from its historical understanding of the Kono Statement, which acknowledged the forced mobilization of comfort women in 1993. I hope that Japan will not retract its historical understanding of the Kono Statement, which acknowledged the forced mobilization of comfort women in 1993.
With regard to the resolution, a report by the Congressional Research Service pointed out that if other countries were to seek official reparations from Japan now, "there is a possibility that Japan would seek reparations for the 80,000 people killed in the Tokyo air raids during the war and for the damage caused by the atomic bombings. Needless to say, there is a public opinion in the U.S. that it is unacceptable for Japan to reevaluate the war or change its perception of history. The main reason for this is that there is no doubt in the United States, including in academic circles, that the Nanjing Massacre literally existed. Even though Chang's book, in which he ventured his anti-Japanese sentiments as a Chinese citizen, became a bestseller, there is a strong atmosphere in Japan that turns its back on dissent and conservative speech.
(2) Comparison of the Nanjing Incident and the Comfort Women Issue
Compared to the Nanking Incident, the issue of comfort women is much clearer, and in this sense, less politically complex. Like the Nanking Incident, the fact that comfort women existed in the first place and the scale of the problem are not in dispute. As is often pointed out, the main points of contention are: (1) whether, as a general matter, the existence of comfort women should be tolerated as a necessary evil to prevent the rape of civilians and the spread of venereal disease and other problems that could hinder the military's ability to fight; (2) whether there was "coercion" in the recruitment of comfort women, and in particular, how the military was involved; and (3) whether such comfort women existed during the war. If the existence of such comfort women during the war is considered a problem after the war and is not covered by the Peace Treaty, how should the governments of the countries concerned respond humanely and legally?
The Nanking issue, on the other hand, is not only a matter of great differences in the facts and the interpretation of international law at the time, as we have seen above. The Nanking issue, on the other hand, not only has significant differences in the facts and interpretation of international law at the time, but also has a large impact on international politics and is a complex issue. The issue of comfort women is a complex one. In this section, we will discuss the serious international political problems that existed in the Nanking issue without the comfort women issue. The following is a summary of the serious international political problems that exist in the Nanjing issue.
(a) The Tokyo Tribunal found that 200,000 people had been massacred, and the Nanking Military Tribunal found that 300,000 people had been massacred.
(b) If the massacre in Nanking, which was likened to the Holocaust in Germany (about 6 million people died), was not committed in Nanking, it would have a major impact on the legitimacy of the Tokyo Trials itself, and it would be a problem for the prestige of the United States, which led the trials. Similarly, it could affect the prestige of the Western victorious nations involved in the Tokyo Trials, the Nuremberg Trials, and even the postwar system.
(c) The U.S. also carried out the atomic bombings and the air raids on Tokyo (which are said to have killed about 200,000 and 100,000 people, respectively), mass killings of civilians that are highly suspected of violating international law, and the question could arise as to whether this is not genocide. It would be a stain that the U.S., which was supposed to have fought a just war, committed a genocide.
(d) China also has a complicated problem. Those who deny the massacre claim that the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, which led to the Nanjing Incident and triggered the Sino-Japanese War, was a Communist Party plot, and that the Kuomintang, which was in power at the time, fabricated the Nanjing Incident through propaganda and exaggeration. For the current Chinese government, which considers the victory in the Anti-Japanese War as the flagship for the survival of the Communist regime, a review of the Nanjing Incident is not easily accepted.
(e) The genocide deniers cast great doubt on the testimonies of the Chinese and the Westerners who greatly influenced the verdict of the Tokyo Trials, and for the countries involved, it is a matter of prestige and honor not only at the national level but also at the national level. The Chinese testimonies and burial investigations were compiled by the Chinese government, and as a result, four officers were executed during the Nanking trial as well. The key players among the Westerners who influenced the verdict were American scholars, journalists, and church officials.[*19] The U.S. academic community does not seem to support the Nanking deniers.
(f) Japan has long been criticized for the legitimacy of the Tokyo Trials, and if the truth of the Nanking Incident turns out to be nothing like the verdict, it will not only be a matter of honor for the soldiers and their families, but also for the future honor of the nation and its people as a whole.
(g) Thus, for Japan, China, the U.S., and other countries, the issue of Nanking is a matter of national prestige and national honor, making it difficult to compromise easily.
2. Japan's stance on the Nanjing Incident
Based on the above background, I would like to take a look at the Japanese government's stance on the Nanjing Incident and the characteristics of that stance.
(1) Position of the Japanese Government
The reality is that the Japanese government has been consistently watching the controversy. The Japanese government's position is: "The Japanese government believes that it is undeniable that there were many non-combatants killed and looted after the Japanese entered Nanking (1937). However, there are many theories about the specific number of victims, and the government finds it difficult to determine which is the correct number. [*20] To date, the government has taken a low key stance, stating that it will wait and see how the debate progresses.
The message that can be inferred from this short statement can be summarized literally as follows. At the very least, it is important to note that, while there was language acknowledging coercion in the case of the comfort women, there was no language acknowledging the existence of "genocide" in the case of the Nanjing Incident.
(1) While acknowledging that there was some killing and looting in Nanjing, it does not indicate its judgment as to whether it should be called a "massacre. It does not mention the Tokyo Tribunal's finding of fact, and neither affirms nor denies it.
(2) It states that there are various views on the scale of killings, etc., and that the government does not intend to enter into a judgment on the facts.
(3) Regarding the definition of "non-combatants," it is not clear whether it refers to disarmed soldiers, civilians, or both.
The purpose of this report is to explain that it is dangerous for the government to make its own judgment on the issue of historical awareness, which is easily divided by ideology and politics. It is dangerous for the government to make its own judgments on the issue of historical perception, which is highly divisible by ideology and politics. It is dangerous for the government to make its own judgment on the issue of historical awareness, which can be highly divided by ideology and politics. It should be taken in the same context as the Japanese Cabinet's statement that it would leave the evaluation of past issues to the judgment of future historians.[*21]
In Japan, where the leftist view of history has been strong since the end of World War II, government ministers who have spoken out against their own perceptions of history have often been forced to resign, including the recent resignation of Defense Minister Hisama, who stated that he thought the U.S. should not have dropped the atomic bombs.
(2) Textbook descriptions
In his book, Chang writes, "For decades, the Japanese have systematically banned references to the Nanjing Massacre from textbooks. In his book, Mr. Chang criticized the Japanese for "systematically expunging references to the Nanjing Massacre from textbooks for decades," and "Japanese history textbooks either completely ignore the Nanjing Massacre or conveniently interpret the actions of the Japanese military. What has been the Japanese government's response to these views?
Unlike China and South Korea, Japan's textbooks are written by private academic researchers, and the government uses a verification system that "points out defects in light of objective academic results and appropriate materials at the time.
In Japan, the controversy began in the early 1970s when a book proving the existence of the Nanking Incident, which had been buried until then, attracted attention [*22], and since the 1980s, textbook writers have considered the Nanking Incident to have become more credible, and the government has adopted a policy of considering the historical sentiments of neighboring countries [*23]. Since then, Japanese junior and senior high school textbooks have included the "Nanjing Incident" in their textbooks. Since then, the Nanjing Incident has been mentioned in all Japanese junior high and high school textbooks.
In China, it seems that the "Nanjing Massacre" began to appear in textbooks in 1979, roughly around the same time [*24]. Based on these facts, Chang's point is not correct.
In the course of the recent controversy, Japanese textbooks have tended to avoid mentioning figures such as 200,000 or 300,000 people killed, as claimed by the pro-genocide camp [*25]. The same tendency seems to have emerged in Taiwan, which was also involved in the Nanjing Incident [*26].
In any case, the inclusion or exclusion of figures is at the discretion of the author as long as there is a certain level of academic objectivity, and the Japanese government allows a fairly wide range of views. In other words, textbooks describing the Nanking Massacre as 200,000 people will pass the certification test even though they differ from the Japanese government's position, reflecting the fact that opinions on the facts of the Nanking Incident are widely divided.
(3) Compensation and apology
Then, does the Nanking issue raise issues such as reparations, compensation, and apologies?
Although the comfort women issue was not an issue of war crimes and was not addressed at the Tokyo Trials, it could be considered legally settled under the San Francisco Peace Treaty. However, due to the unique nature of the issue, other measures were taken. The Asian Women's Fund was established in 1995 as a Japanese domestic organization for the purpose of apologizing to and reflecting on the comfort women, and with the joint financial contribution of the public and private sectors, the fund made atonement payments to the comfort women and other projects. At the time of the atonement payment, a letter of apology from the Prime Minister was handed to each former comfort woman.
The Nanjing Incident was recognized as a war crime by the Tokyo Tribunal and the Nanjing Military Tribunal, and as mentioned above, five people were sentenced to death. Under the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the conditions for the end of the war, such as the acceptance of the trials (judgments) of the Tokyo Tribunal and other international tribunals, the return of territory, and the obligation to pay reparations, were collectively stipulated and dealt with. In terms of relations with China, the Japan-China Peace Treaty was signed with the Republic of China in 1952, and all postwar matters, including reparations and individual claims, have been dealt with [*27]. Individual cases such as the Nanjing Incident are also included in this blanket process.
In this sense, Chang's statement in his book that not only has Japan not officially apologized to the victims of the Nanjing Incident, but that "the Japanese have paid almost nothing for their war crimes," and his comparison with Germany in condemning the postwar treatment of the Japanese government, are not arguments based on international law and do not match the reality.
Germany, unfortunately, was unable to conclude a peace treaty with the countries concerned due to the division of the East and West, and was unable to deal with the war in general in a lump sum. Therefore, while Japan has completed the settlement of the war by paying huge sums in reparations and quasi-reparations and renouncing claims to personal property, Germany has not paid any reparations to date. Under these circumstances, the German government separated the Holocaust from the issue of reparations and took measures for individual compensation as its own policy. Therefore, it is inappropriate to discuss the Nazi Holocaust and the Nanking Incident in the same way as Mr. Chang does, because it ignores the different situations of Germany and Japan after the war.
In addition, remorse for the war and its victims has been repeatedly expressed by successive administrations, [*28] and this should be considered to include remorse for the victims of the Nanjing Incident.
Chapter 5: Future Prospects - A Proposal for Promoting Quiet Historical Collaboration
As we have seen above, both the pro-genocide and the pro-genocide arguments have their own reasons and evidence for the Nanking Incident, and unless conclusive evidence emerges in the future, it is unlikely that either side will win. In particular, unless the definition of what constitutes "genocide" is determined, it is unlikely that a conclusion will be reached and the debate will continue. Also, since international law is an imperfect law, it is impossible to retroactively determine the illegality of the Nanjing Incident.
Therefore, it seems that the only thing that can be done in the future is to eliminate politics and ideology as much as possible and accumulate academic research. There is no doubt that it will be of great significance for the affirmative and the negative to work together and make a steady effort to reconcile the basic issues. By doing so, it will be possible to clarify to the next generation of Japanese, Chinese, and even people in other countries what happened in Nanjing in a way that is as close to the historical facts as possible.
Under these circumstances, the Abe administration started the Japan-China Joint History Research Project in December 2006 based on the agreement between the leaders of Japan and China. It has been welcomed as a timely initiative, as the future is not possible without facing up to history. The Nanjing Incident is expected to become an important research theme, and I would like to list some points to keep in mind in this effort.
(1) Eliminating Politics: The Role of Government in Stepping Back
Joint research, whether domestic or interstate, should be based on the principles of academic freedom and freedom of expression, and should be separated from politics. The results of such research should be made available to the public in a form that makes it easy to understand both areas of agreement and areas of disagreement. Although it is desirable that the results of such research be reflected in the field of education, it is rather undesirable to make such a precondition because it may easily lead to unjustified involvement by the government and may inhibit the independent academic pursuit of researchers. This is also true from the perspective of ensuring the sovereignty of governments over education for their own citizens, and how the results of joint research are used should be left to the judgment of the educational field and the public in the first instance.
On the other hand, the government should take a step back and encourage individual and joint research. It is important to provide logistical support in the form of funding and venues, and the government can also play a role in alleviating the prejudice that tends to shun studies such as the Nanking Incident because of their political and ideological nature. The government can also play a certain role in the discovery and disclosure of materials. For example, in China, the Nanjing Second Historical Archives has materials related to the Nanjing Incident, but only some of them are open to the public, and it is hoped that they will be fully disclosed in the future.
(2) Comprehensive research
The Nanjing Incident took place in a short span of a few weeks, or even in a long span of about two months from the Battle of Shanghai, but it is necessary to not only investigate the facts of this period, but also to comprehensively study the broader aspects of the background, causes, and course of events, such as why the Sino-Japanese War broke out and led to the Nanjing Incident. In particular, as we have seen earlier, there is a need for a comprehensive study of the background, causes, and course of the war. In particular, as we saw earlier, it is clear that it is important to examine the international laws of war at that time. It is also necessary to look at the incident from the perspective of military operations and military practices of both Japan and China.
In addition, according to Chang's book and Professor Kasahara's research, Japanese soldiers committed barbaric acts not only in Nanking but also in all other battles in China, and it is necessary to look at the discipline of the Japanese military over a long period of time, including after the Nanking Incident.
(3) Long-Term Initiatives
The process of reconciling the historical facts requires a comprehensive approach and is time-consuming. There are numerous testimonies, some of which are not true and some of which contradict each other. For example, in terms of the reliability of the Smythe report, the pro-genocide camp seems to be using Smythe's investigation inside the city as unreliable, while the investigation outside the city is reliable. In the case of the Nanjing Incident, the evaluation process of which testimony to adopt is steady but essential. In addition, the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people do not doubt the existence of the Nanking Massacre as claimed by the world, and it is politically desirable to accumulate discussions without drawing hasty conclusions.
Prior to Japan and China, a joint historical study was conducted between Japan and South Korea for three years starting in 2002, and scholars from both countries took time to discuss the issue. Although it seems that the disparities in the historical perceptions of the two countries have not been sufficiently filled in, it is highly significant that the views of both sides have more in common and mutual understanding has been enhanced, and the second round of joint research is scheduled to begin in 2007.
(4) Objective evaluation
Whether it is China's materialistic view of history or Japan's historical view of the war of aggression versus the war of liberation, while it is inevitable that ideology and thought will enter into interpretation and judgment to some extent, it is important that facts be pursued as facts and that evaluations be conducted with as much objectivity as possible.
In order to achieve this, it would be desirable to include scholars with diverse views, including those belonging to both schools of thought, as well as scholars who have not studied the Nanjing Incident before. In addition to joint historical research between Japan and China, it would be desirable to conduct joint research between Japan, the U.S., and China, as proposed to the Chinese government by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Zoellick in 2005, and to increase objectivity by encouraging diverse research, such as Japan-U.S. and U.S.-China, from multiple perspectives. There is also a proposal for joint research between Japan and Taiwan.
Conclusion
Historical issues are complex. In particular, cases such as the Nanjing Incident, which straddles national borders, are not only difficult to ascertain the facts, but also involve the prestige and honor of the nation and its people, and are likely to stir up nationalism. This is why, even in the recent past, the issue of the prime minister's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine stalled Japan-China relations for more than five years. Even the comfort women issue has undoubtedly had a major ripple effect on Japan-US relations, and even a non-binding resolution will inevitably leave both sides in a sticky situation.
As we have seen above, the impact of the Nanjing issue becoming a political issue again would be far greater than that of the Yasukuni Shrine or the comfort women. The governments of Japan, China, and the United States need to be very careful in their domestic measures and quiet diplomacy to prevent the Nanjing issue from becoming a serious political issue that could provoke nationalism in other countries.
Looking at the situation in Japan, the Koizumi and Abe Cabinets have recently adopted an "assertive diplomacy" as the mainstream, supported by public opinion. This is due in large part to changes in the security environment and generational changes, but the younger generation has a pronounced tendency to tackle history head-on without any ties to it. In the case of the Nanjing Incident, there is a movement among Diet members to reexamine the historical facts, and it is clear that this trend cannot be stopped and is not an outgrowth of bad nationalism.
However, amidst the mountain of problems in China's domestic politics, there is always the fear that growing nationalism will return to the issue of Japan's history. For the Communist regime, the history of victory in the Anti-Japanese War is the basis of its legitimacy, and the regime may use the issue of history again to direct domestic discontent outward.
The U.S. has mixed feelings about this trend of conservatism in Japan: welcome and alarm. On the one hand, it is desirable for the U.S. to work on rebuilding the international order by raising the security awareness of the Japanese people, but on the other hand, it is very concerned about the increasing reexamination of history and would like to suppress it if possible. The U.S. House of Representatives resolution on the comfort women issue took into consideration Japan's opposition by adopting a resolution that emphasized the Japan-U.S. alliance at the same time, but it proved to be a troubling duality.
Under these circumstances, the Nanjing Incident, which marks the 70th anniversary of the incident, has the potential to become a major spark that could once again aggravate Japan-China relations, which are finally on the road to recovery, and create mutual distrust involving the United States as well. In order to avoid such a situation, restraint and cooperation among the governments concerned are desperately needed, and it seems possible.
Although there is no evidence that the U.S. government lobbied Congress to cancel the comfort women resolution, the experience of this political friction should be a lesson for both Japan and the United States.
The Chinese government maintained an attitude of restraint even though it was a party to the comfort women issue between Japan and the US. Since Prime Minister Abe's visit to China last October, China has taken a low key stance on historical issues, including the Nanjing issue, as per Premier Wen Jiabao's speech to the Diet in Japan [*29], and is expected to take a restrained response to the 70th anniversary on December 13 this year.
The Japanese government is also expected to continue to take a similar stance under the Fukuda administration, given that Prime Minister Abe refrained from visiting Yasukuni Shrine in August while relations with China are improving.
Last but not least, I would like to summarize the guidelines that Japan should follow in dealing with the Nanjing issue, based on my previous discussions. I think there are four main points.
(1) Japan should not justify the Nanjing Incident
First, even if the truth of the Nanking Incident is as claimed by the massacre deniers or close to it, it cannot justify Japan's invasion of Nanking and its aggressive acts against all of China. As losers, we must accept the realism of international politics. As Japan is currently in the process of transitioning to a "normal country" (in the direction of conservatism), momentum is building to confront history for the first time since the end of World War II. However, in the United States and other countries, there is a strong atmosphere of condemnation of this as "historical revisionism. Even if we try to stand firm against this, we will not stand a chance, and we will be asked, "Can we say that Japan did not commit any massacres? Isn't it genocide if even one person is slaughtered? If Japan tries to deny it, it means that it has not reflected on its history. This is an irrational argument, but one that is difficult to refute. Once in confrontation mode, the structure of Japan versus the allied forces (China plus the West) will have a serious impact not only on Japan's external image but also on the current unstable international order.
(2) Encourage long-term academic activities
In such an international environment, it would be counterproductive for Japan to unnecessarily repeat its own arguments, as this would easily provoke emotional debate. In order to regain its national honor in the long term, it is appropriate to promote academic activities in the long term, and if the truth is more desirable for Japan, to take the time to quietly disseminate it. Efforts to pursue the truth of history, such as the Nanjing Incident, the comfort women issue, war responsibility, and the causes of war, should be continued quietly not only for their academic value but also so that Japan and the international community can learn lessons from history, and the government should consciously support these efforts through the promotion of academic activities.
(3) Correcting the false image of Japan
The image of Japan as an inhumane country that caused the Nanjing massacre, a country that does not feel remorse for its war of aggression, and a country that refuses to admit its own faults by saying things left and right, has become quite widespread in the international community. Such a bad image will diminish Japan's outstanding soft power and will cause long-term diplomatic losses.
Recently, I heard a young German journalist in Tokyo ask a Japanese dignitary about the comfort women issue, saying, "Compared to Germany, Japan is a country that does not reflect on its past. It will be difficult to correct the image of Japan that has been ingrained in Westerners over a long period of time. From a long-term perspective, Japan should make efforts to seek understanding of Japan's position by proactively communicating Japan's arguments and diplomatic stance. In this sense, it is necessary to actively promote academic exchanges and announcements of academic results to the outside world, and it is highly desirable that the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) and other organizations such as international political scientists, historians, and think tanks related to diplomacy and history promote policies that encourage the dissemination of Japan's policies and views in foreign languages.
(4) A restrained government response
The Japanese government should respond to the historical issue from a long-term perspective, taking into account the above different demands as a whole and basically adopting an attitude of restraint. In doing so, it is important to strike a balance between asserting what should be asserted and conceding what should be conceded. While we should be concerned about situations such as the recent comments by Defense Minister Hisama, in which a cabinet minister's statement of his views on history could lead to his resignation, we should be especially careful not to damage Japan's national interest by having a key government official speak inadvertently about his views on history.
The 1993 Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono Statement [*30], from the perspective of making a political compromise with South Korea, acknowledged the unconfirmed coercion of the government, which in many ways led to the current feud with the U.S. If there was no coercion at the time of recruitment, it would be desirable to take the necessary discussions and procedures and choose an appropriate time to revise it.
During Prime Minister Abe's visit to the U.S. in April, he did not apologize for the comfort women issue, but there were factually incorrect reports that made it seem as if he did, which may have left a misunderstanding both at home and abroad, and this situation is equally undesirable.
The message that Prime Minister Abe wanted to convey in the U.S. was, "The 20th century was also a time when human rights were violated in all areas. Rather than condemning each other for the human rights problems of the past, Prime Minister Abe probably felt that it was time to reflect on the past and build future-oriented international relations.
In February 2006, when he was Chief Cabinet Secretary, Prime Minister Abe also expressed his view that the government should not be the "judge of history" in response to a question from Democratic Party of Japan Representative Ryuzo Sasaki at the House of Representatives Budget Committee. He said that the government should not be the "judge of history" while stating that the ministers' recognition itself is not to be the "judge of history. This is an attitude that should be taken by government officials, but it is also an idea that can be applied to international relations.
These two messages, "future-oriented" and "leave it to historians to decide," can be applied to historical issues in general, but they are especially important when dealing with the sensitive issue of Nanjing.
*The thoughts and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author alone and not those of any organization to which he belongs.
*Annotation
[*1] There are many answers in the National Diet.
[*2] Iris Chang, "The Rape of Nanking", Penguin Books: No translation of freelance journalist Chang's book has been published in Japan. According to US historian Professor Jussier A. Vogel, the book is "intolerably bogus and seriously flawed in many respects," and according to pro-genocide Professor Yutaka Yoshida, "there are so many simple factual errors that it will only provide a target for the various Japanese 'Nanking Incident' hoaxers. According to Professor Yutaka Yoshida, who is a pro-genocide advocate, "There are so many simple factual errors that if we don't do something about it, we may end up providing an easy target for various Japanese 'Nanking Incident' hoaxers. It is believed that this was the reason behind the decision.
[*3] In a survey of Chinese people's attitudes conducted by the China Youth Daily in December 1996, when asked what they associate with Japan (multiple answers), "the Nanjing Massacre" was ranked first with 83.9%. Recently, in a joint survey conducted by a speech NPO and Peking University, "Nanjing Massacre" was ranked first in 2005 and 2006. In the same survey in 2007, 41.9% of students and 45.3% of citizens cited the Nanjing Massacre, which was lower than "cherry blossoms" and "electronics" respectively.
[*4] In the same Osaka book, it says, "Japanese troops met with fierce resistance in many places, and after the occupation of Nanking, they massacred an estimated 200,000 people, which was condemned by other countries. However, the Japanese people were not informed of this fact." (1997 test) and the number of people killed. The Fusosha textbook, which is said to have a strong tendency to deny the Nanking Massacre and has been criticized by China and South Korea, does not mention the Nanking Incident in the text, but in a footnote: "At this time, a large number of Chinese soldiers and civilians were killed or wounded by the Japanese army (Nanking Incident). The actual number of casualties and other aspects of the incident have been questioned, and there are various opinions on the matter, and the controversy continues even today. There are various views on the actual situation, including the number of victims of this incident.
[*5] In the Tokyo Tribunal judgment, two different numbers were used for the number of people killed, "200,000 or more" and "100,000 or more. The number of people killed by the Nanjing Military Tribunal in China was 300,000 or more.
[*6] Spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (regular press conference, June 21, 2007): "The Nanjing Massacre was a brutal criminal act committed by Japanese militarism in its war of aggression against China. This is an open challenge to international justice and the conscience of humanity, and it shows that they do not have the courage to face up to history. In the Nanjing Massacre, more than 300,000 Chinese compatriots were slaughtered, and they are innocent souls who will not tolerate such distortions, evasions, and denials. We would like to emphasize that this year is the 70th anniversary of the Nanjing Massacre, and we hope that Japan will take a serious and responsible attitude, based on the spirit of "taking history as a mirror and facing the future," to properly address the historical issue and handle it appropriately.
[*7] Unless otherwise noted, the arguments of the pro- and anti-genocide factions in this paper are taken from "A Thorough Examination of the Nanking Massacre" by Shudo Higashinakano for the arguments of the pro-genocide faction, and from "13 Lies in the Denial of the Nanking Massacre" for the arguments of the pro-genocide faction. Professor Jukushi Kasahara is the principal author of the latter.
[*8] The International Committee for the Nanjing Safety Zone took on the role of a temporary administrative organization in place of the retreating Nanjing City Administration. It prepared daily reports on support activities for displaced people and incidents that occurred inside and outside the safe zone, and submitted them to the Japanese Embassy in Nanjing. The International Committee consisted of more than 20 Western civilians living in Nanjing and was chaired by Mr. Raabe, a German representative of Siemens AG. The largest number of committee members were Americans, including Bates, a professor of history at Jinling University, and Smythe, a professor of sociology at Jinling University (Jinling University is now Nanjing University), both of whom were missionaries who greatly influenced the Tokyo Trials.
[*9] Since the military central office did not present a basic policy on prisoners of war, and the area forces also did not establish a policy on the handling of prisoners of war, the staff officers gave arbitrary instructions and the military and divisions gave inconsistent instructions, which resulted in the mass killing of prisoners of war. (Akira Fujiwara, "The Japanese Army in Nanking: The Nanking Massacre and Its Background.)
[*10] What War Means," written in 1938 by Australian reporter Timperley, who was the China correspondent for the Manchester Guardian, was the only English-language book published at the time of the Sino-Japanese War that dealt with the Nanking Massacre, and is said to have had a major influence on the judgment of the Nanking Tribunal. According to the massacre deniers, it was the only book published in English at the time of the Sino-Japanese War that dealt with the Nanking Massacre. According to massacre denialists, Timperley was an advisor to the KMT government's International Propaganda Department, and Bates, who claims to have also been an advisor to the KMT government, was a major contributor to the book.
[*11] Higashi Nakano Shudo, "The Nanking Incident: A Reading from the KMT's Top Secret Documents"
[*12] According to Smythe's sampling survey, the number of people killed inside Nanking Castle was 2,400. On top of that, he notes a figure of 12,000 as an estimate based on burial reports (Minoru Kitamura, The Quest for the Nanjing Incident, p. 167). The Smythe Report also conducted a sampling survey of the suburbs of Nanjing, and put the number of civilians killed in the suburbs at nearly 30,000.
[*13] The terms "genocide" in Japanese, "massacre" in Chinese, and "massacre" in English are all equally related to the concept of "killing," despite some differences in nuance, and this paper focuses on this killing. If the focus is on "assault" or "atrocity", mainly rape (in English, "atrocity" or "rape"), a separate discussion is necessary.
[*14] The massacre denialists claim that there is no record of any burial by the Chong Zhen Tang organization and that it was an after-the-fact fabrication by the KMT government. According to the records submitted by the KMT government, the Hong Manjidang disposed of over 40,000 corpses, while the Chong Shan Tang disposed of over 110,000. Professor Kitamura, who seems to belong to the middle camp, says, "Judging from the various documents, there is no doubt that Chong Zhan Tang did exist and buried bodies. However, the scale of their activities was very small, and according to the documents of the government of the People's Republic of China that appeared later, they had only one vehicle. (Minoru Kitamura, "The Quest for the 'Nanking Incident'")
[*15] Ikuhiko Hata, "The Nanking Incident: The Structure of Massacre" (Chuko Shinsho)
[*16] Hisahiko Okazaki, "Hyakunen no Inheritance" (Sankei Shimbun)
[*17] Minoru Kitamura, "'Nanking Jiken': Foreign Correspondents and the Great Debate," Bungei Shunju, July 2007. Minoru Kitamura, "'Nanking Incident
An Exploration of the
[*18] In the second report, Yoshida's testimony was deleted and changed to "it appears that there was no forced rendition," but it is said that this did not change the trend toward the adoption of the resolution that had already been made.
[*19] When Japanese intellectuals attempted to place a rebuttal ad in the U.S. press on the Nanking issue, it was rejected by all the leading newspapers (Yoshiko Sakurai, "'Comfort Women' Opinion Ad Appealing to the American People," Bungei Shunju, August 2007).
The fact that the comfort women issue was able to be published in the Washington Post seems to be proof that the Nanking issue is an extremely sensitive issue for the American intelligentsia. The fact that the comfort women issue was able to be published in the Washington Post seems to indicate that the Nanking issue is an extremely sensitive issue for the American intelligentsia. In addition, according to the author's interviews with people involved in the Nanking issue, American think tanks also have a negative reaction to dealing with the Nanking issue.
[*20] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan website: After the main text, there is the following sentence. Japan recognizes that it has caused great damage and suffering to many countries, especially to the peoples of Asia, through colonial rule and aggression in the past, and is determined to walk the path of a peaceful nation, never to repeat war, always bearing in mind its sincere regret and heartfelt apology.
[*21] For example, in 1982, Foreign Minister Miyazawa said, "I have always answered that I believe that we should wait for the judgment of future historians as to whether or not to call the war of World War II a war of aggression. (House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee Meeting) (Minutes of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, 1982.7.30)
[*22] In 1972, Asahi Shimbun reporter Honda Katsuichi published a book entitled "The Japanese Army in China," a collection of testimonies from Chinese victims of the massacre, and in 1973, a book entitled "What is War?" written by reporter Tin Par Lee in 1938 was unearthed, causing a huge sensation.
[*23] The textbook issue arose in 1982 when China and South Korea protested the inappropriate content of descriptions in Japanese textbooks. As a result, the Japanese government decided to give political consideration to neighboring countries in textbook examinations by establishing the guideline that "necessary consideration must be given from the standpoint of international society and international cooperation. This struck a balance between the state's exclusive authority over the education of its own citizens and the claims of foreign countries.
[*24] Higashi Nakano Shudo, "A Thorough Examination of the 'Nanking Massacre'", p380, "It was not until the era of Deng Xiaoping that the People's Republic of China began to actively claim the Nanking Massacre."
[*25] The certification test is conducted every four years, and of the eight companies that passed the test, only six reported the number of kills in 1997, two in 2001, and one in 2005, a downward trend.
[*26] In Taiwan, where the official textbook system has been replaced by a certification system since around 2000, the Nanking Incident has been simplified, dropped from the text, and in some cases the number of people killed has not been included. One of the reasons for this is that there are doubts as to whether 300,000 is an accurate figure. The opposition Kuomintang (KMT) is opposed to this. In the official textbooks of the KMT regime, it was written, "The Japanese slaughtered our people as they pleased, and the death toll was more than 300,000. This is called the Nanking Massacre. (Yomiuri Shimbun, Morning Edition, February 16, 2007, page 9)
[*27] In April 2007, the Supreme Court of Japan ruled that, by virtue of Paragraph 5 of the 1972 Japan-China Joint Statement, the claims of citizens of the People's Republic of China against the State of Japan or its nationals should no longer be judicially actionable, and that individual claims could not be redressed.
[*28] In 1995, Prime Minister Murayama said, "Japan has caused great damage and suffering to many countries, especially to the people of Asia, through colonial rule and aggression. （I once again express my deepest regret and sincere apology." At the same time At the same time, he stated that he would never repeat the same mistakes again and that he would never go down the path of a military superpower, and subsequent cabinets have expressed similar sentiments at every opportunity.
[*29] In the U.S., an anti-Japanese group called the World Federation for the Protection of the Historical Facts of the Anti-Japanese War has been engaged in a series of anti-Japanese activities, including opposition to Japan's permanent membership on the Security Council, the recent comfort women resolution by the U.S. House of Representatives, and memorial events for the Nanjing Incident. On the occasion of the group's memorial event in December 2006, the congratulatory address by the Chinese Consul General in San Francisco, which was posted in 2005, was not posted on the Consulate-General's website, which seems to be a sign of restraint by the Chinese government.
[*30] The relevant part of the Kono Cabinet Chief Cabinet Secretary's statement regarding the announcement of the results of the investigation into comfort women states, "The recruitment of comfort women was mainly carried out by contractors who received requests from the military, but even in such cases, there were many cases where comfort women were recruited against their will, for example, by sweet-talking or coercion. In addition, there were cases where government officials were directly involved.
Takashi Hoshiyama
Seconded from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Graduated from Keio University in 1956. Master's degree from Harvard University. Assistant Director, Regional Policy Division, Asian Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; First Secretary, Embassy of Cambodia; Counselor, Embassy of the Philippines; Director, Policy Division, Cultural Exchange Department; Director, Information and Communication Division, Minister's Secretariat. Articles: "Cross-Strait Relations: The Structure of the 'Status Quo,'" "The Phase of Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA)," "Japan's Security as a Maritime Nation," "Japan's Diplomacy in Asia," "Thirty-Five Years of Japan-China Relations at a Turning Point," "The Improving Course of Japan-China Relations and the Role of China. The Improving Course of Japan-China Relations and the Role of the United States
.
この記事が気に入ったらサポートをしてみませんか？