‘The Plan to Destroy Taiwan’, The Wire China, Mar. 26, 2023.
By Chris Horton
Why is one of Taiwan’s largest media groups spreading anti-U.S. rhetoric?
Last month, a surprising number of people in Taiwan became utterly convinced that America is planning to destroy their island home.
It all started, as misinformation does, on social media, when a D.C.-based commentator wrote a flippant tweet about President Biden’s “plan for the destruction of Taiwan.” Initially, it drew little attention, but then the comment was translated into Chinese and posted on Facebook, where it went viral. From there, CTI News — a popular YouTube news channel in Taiwan — went on to produce at least 10 segments about “the plan to destroy Taiwan.”
Biden’s supposed plan even found its way into the daily press conference of China’s foreign ministry in Beijing, with the nation’s spokesperson, Mao Ning, saying it had “been revealed by the media that the U.S. government has a plan for the destruction of Taiwan.”
The narrative was gaining so much steam that the American Institute in Taiwan, the de facto U.S. embassy in Taipei, felt compelled to push back, releasing an official statement that described the U.S. commitment to Taiwan as “rock solid.”
But CTI News didn’t seem convinced. The media outlet hosted one of the original posters, who went on to suggest that the U.S. might only be helping Taiwan in order to acquire its cutting-edge semiconductor manufacturing.
Why would CTI News, which is based in Taipei and has 2.1 million followers on YouTube, amplify this conspiracy?
Much of the answer can be found with CTI’s owner, Tsai Eng-meng, a Taiwanese snack-food baron who has made a fortune in China and now owns one of Taiwan’s most influential media groups, Want Want China Times Media Group.
Cut from a similar cloth as Roger Ailes or Rupert Murdoch, the 66-year-old Tsai is known for using his media outlets to promote his own politics, which align closely with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). He is an outspoken supporter of unification with China, for instance, which is a unpopular idea in Taiwan, and he has come under fire in the past for using Want Want’s seven papers, three TV channels and massive web presence to influence political debate on the island.
“Tsai has a great relationship with the Taiwan Affairs Office [the CCP’s agency for handling Taiwan-related matters],” says Puma Shen, chair of Doublethink Lab, a nonprofit in Taipei focused on disinformation. “He has ordered his media outlets to report news that aligns with Beijing’s propaganda.”
Indeed, studies on China’s influence campaigns abroad often cite Tsai and Want Want as a prime example of Beijing’s efforts to outsource propaganda and “commercialize” censorship. Given Want Want’s dependence on the China market — more than 90 percent of its operating activities are in China — the company represents one of the “new media tactics” Beijing is using “to sow local divisions, harm Taiwan’s foreign relations, and destabilize its government,” according to a 2022 report from the D.C.-based nonprofit Freedom House.
Want Want China Times Media Group declined multiple requests for comment.
China’s ultimate goal, of course, is to convince Taiwan to give up its willingness to defend its democracy, and to surrender its sovereignty to China. Yet, because Taiwanese viewers and readers would balk at blatant support for unification, Want Want often delivers more subtle messages — like casting doubt on U.S. intentions in Taiwan.
In January, voters will head to the polls to elect a new president and legislature. Want Want’s media coverage suggests that the U.S. and China will also be on the ballot.
Just four years ago, this message would have hardly resonated with Taiwan’s voters, but analysts say Want Want’s efforts have picked up in recent years and are helping to spread CCP talking points. They are especially gaining ground within the Kuomintang (KMT) political party, which is traditionally more friendly towards Beijing than the current party in power, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).
“I have been alarmed at how widespread anti-U.S. messaging is in Taiwan,” says Kharis Templeman, a senior fellow at Stanford’s Hoover Institution who participates in its Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific. “It has moved from the fringes into mainstream [KMT] news outlets.” The United Daily News, which competes with Want Want newspapers for readers, he says, “now regularly publishes pieces criticizing the government for getting too close to the United States, and editorials that emphasize that the U.S. does not have Taiwan’s best interests at heart, that it is trying to use Taiwan to block China’s rise, that it is seeking a war with China or that it wants to seize Taiwan’s semiconductor industry.”
Although Taiwan is often viewed as a pawn in a geopolitical chess match between Washington and Beijing, the Taiwanese do have agency: In January, voters will head to the polls to elect a new president and legislature. Want Want’s media coverage suggests the U.S. and China are on the ballot.
STRADDLING THE STRAIT
Anyone who has spent time in China or Taiwan has likely seen Hot Kid, the onesie-wearing cartoon avatar of Want Want Group. Hot Kid’s cherubic, rosy-cheeked face is featured on the packaging of Want Want’s processed snacks, including rice crackers, milk drinks, gummy candies and more at grocery stores and mom-and-pop shops. For many, Hot Kid is a cute image associated with treats from their youth. For some, however, Hot Kid has come to represent chairman and CEO Tsai Eng-meng’s pro-unification agenda.
Tsai Eng-Meng only became a media tycoon relatively recently, starting in 2008. His career in snacks, however, began in 1976, when as a 19-year-old who hadn’t finished high school, he joined his father’s canned food company, I-lan Foodstuffs. Three years later, he was the company’s general manager, working with a Japanese company to bring rice crackers to the Taiwanese market, under the Want Want brand. As Taiwan’s economy boomed and families had more money to spend, Want Want became Taiwan’s dominant rice cracker, and Tsai founded Want Want in 1987 as a standalone food company.
It was a fortuitous time for enterprising business people in Taiwan. The same year that Want Want was established, Taiwan’s 38 years of martial law under the Kuomintang ended, which helped pave the way for democratization and the reemergence of Taiwanese identity in the 1990s. As China was shunned by the U.S. and Europe in the wake of the Tiananmen massacre, Taiwan had the capital, technology and management know-how that its giant neighbor desperately needed for economic development.
Tsai became one of the first generation of taishang: Taiwanese entrepreneurs who do business in China. In 1992, he moved Want Want — whose name in Mandarin, wangwang, means something akin to “prosperous and flourishing” — into the Chinese market, opening its first factory in Changsha, the capital of Hunan Province.
True to its name, Want Want prospered and flourished in China, and continues to do so today. In the 2021/2022 fiscal year, Hong Kong-listed Want Want China Holdings Limited reported CNY24 billion ($3.5 billion) in revenue, and CNY4.2 billion in profits. Forbes estimates Tsai’s current net worth at $6.1 billion.1
As the first foreign-invested factory in Hunan Province and the first rice cracker factory in mainland China, Want Want outmaneuvered its domestic challengers with low prices. Want Want added hotel, hospital and real estate holdings to its China portfolio, which was eventually spun off into San Want China Holdings.
But just as Taiwanese businesses like Want Want were pushing into China in earnest, Taiwanese politics at home entered a new era. KMT infighting had led to two candidates from the blue side of Taiwan’s political spectrum competing in the 2000 presidential election, with the split vote creating just enough room for the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian, the charismatic former mayor of Taipei, to slip through and win the presidency. It was the first time that the Republic of China (ROC) government brought by the KMT to Taiwan in the 1940s had inaugurated a non-KMT president.
Chen vowed to defend Taiwan’s sovereignty, but he also floated the idea of declaring independence (i.e., killing off the ROC) multiple times — an idea that is anathema to both the KMT and CCP. Essentially, the KMT sees Taiwan as a Chinese territory, and even if it opposes the island’s absorption into the PRC, many in the party hope for unification under different circumstances down the road.
“The KMT’s discourse on Taiwan’s national identity has significant but imperfect overlap with the CCP’s,” says Wen-Ti Sung, a political scientist at Australian National University’s Taiwan Studies program. “On the question of whether they want to see unification between Taiwan and the PRC, CCP’s answer is a categorical ‘yes,’ whereas the KMT’s answer is a conditional ‘yes,’ with emphasis on ‘conditional.’”
Following Chen’s narrow re-election in 2004, the KMT reconsidered its former enemy across the strait. Their shared opposition to a Taiwanese state created a strong foundation for rapprochement, with party-to-party ties normalized in 2005. By 2008, Ma Ying-jeou, another former Taiwan mayor, reclaimed the presidency for the KMT and quickly set about opening Taiwan’s tourist destinations, universities and economy to China.
Sitting upon his riches from selling snacks and milk drinks in China, Tsai Eng-meng saw an opportunity in the shifting political landscape. In 2008 and 2009, he went on an acquisition spree, buying up the China Times newspaper, CTV News and its sister channel CTV. He folded his purchases into a new privately held company, Want Want China Times Media Group.
Tsai also became more forthcoming about his desire for unification. In a 2012 interview with The Washington Post, he said matter-of-factly: “Whether you like it or not, unification is going to happen sooner or later … I really hope I can see that.”
And ever since, according to Paris-based Reporters Without Borders, Tsai “has never concealed his favorable opinion of the regime in Beijing.” And by signal boosting CCP propaganda in Taiwan, Tsai likely made a favorable impression of his own.
After his acquisitions, he became more valuable to the Chinese regime — much more important than someone who only sells rice crackers.
“Owning media outlets in Taiwan gives him more clout with Beijing,” says Wu’er Kaixi, an emeritus board member of Reporters Without Borders, and a student leader in Tiananmen in 1989 who has lived in Taiwan for more than two decades. “After his acquisitions, he became more valuable to the Chinese regime — much more important than someone who only sells rice crackers.”
The growing size and scale of the Want Want media behemoth, however, made many in Taiwan nervous. When Want Want announced in 2011 that it sought to purchase Taiwan’s second-largest cable TV provider, China Network Systems, it was a step too far.
PUSHBACK
The Anti-Media-Monopoly movement, which spanned 2011 and 2012, railed against Want Want for its pro-unification agenda and its influence on public debate. During the movement, which was led by a coalition of academics, journalists and students, Want Want sued students who openly criticized the company online, further infuriating young Taiwanese. (The company is well-known in Taiwan for suing its critics and rarely winning, says Wu’er Kaixi: “They lose all the time, but still it’s an effective tactic to scare people.”)
Want Want’s purchase of China Network Systems was eventually blocked by regulators in 2013, highlighting not only the concern over the company’s ambitions but also the activities of taishang in Taiwan who owe their wealth to China.
Supporting any stance opposed by Beijing is “very difficult” for these cross-strait businesspeople who rely on the Chinese market, says Shelley Rigger, a professor at Davidson College in North Carolina and the author of The Tiger Leading the Dragon: How Taiwan Propelled China’s Economic Rise. “But it’s also difficult for them to promote views that Beijing agrees with — doing so opens them to criticism within Taiwan. In at least Tsai’s case, his pro-Beijing political activity was one of the factors that undermined his ability to expand his media empire back in 2012.”
Beijing kept supporting Tsai, however. According to a 2018 Nikkei Asia investigation into Want Want’s China operations, the company received $587 million in subsidies from the Chinese government between 2004 and 2018, amounting to 11 percent of its net profit during that period. The subsidies are not illegal in Taiwan, but they did raise concerns that Want Want was financially beholden to Beijing. (Want Want did not deny the investigation’s findings, nor admit any wrongdoing.)
Despite the negative attention, Tsai didn’t lay low.
Around this time, he appeared in the mainland Chinese media, bowing and shaking hands with Politburo Standing Committee member Wang Yang, who was then chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. As chair, Wang oversaw the highest-ranking body for united front work, which is tasked with bringing non-CCP actors into the party’s fold in order to achieve its goals.2
Just weeks later, as police cracked down violently on Hong Kong protestors, the Want Want CEO gave a speech before Chinese officials urging Xi Jinping to accelerate the process of “peaceful unification” of Taiwan with China, and implement the “one country, two systems” framework under which Beijing governs Hong Kong.
Although these events highlighted what many people already suspected about Want Want’s editorial agenda, the media group still had significant power and sway among some Taiwanese voters — especially older KMT-aligned voters, who represent about one quarter of the electorate.
Case in point: Han Kuo-yu. A pro-China KMT candidate, Han emerged from the political wilderness on a wave of publicity chiefly driven by Want Want media outlets. His fiery appeals to essentially make Taiwan Chinese again resonated with deep blue voters, and he drew in swing voters with promises of a better economy through closer ties to China.
In 2018, Han scored a major upset when he won the mayor race in Kaohsiung, a port city that had been a DPP stronghold. The KMT won other major cities as well, riding the so-called “Han wave.” With Want Want at his back, Han quickly pivoted to challenging Tsai Ing-wen in the 2020 presidential election. (CTI News later lost its broadcast license because of its relentless boosting of Han, as well as Tsai’s role in editorial decisions.)
Although Tsai would go on to defeat Han in the January 2020 presidential election — mostly due to Han’s troubled campaign — many polls had her losing to the upstart challenger less than one year earlier.
THE PRIZE
There are less than 10 months to go before Taiwan’s January 13th presidential and legislative elections, with polls showing hypothetical matchups between the presumptive DPP nominee — current vice president Lai Ching-te — and several possible KMT candidates running fairly close.
Although voters are overwhelmingly in agreement on the issue of Taiwan’s sovereignty, analysts note that continuing to kick the can of Taiwan’s place in the world down the road — “maintaining the status quo” — isn’t a great rhetorical narrative. Both parties struggle to formulate compelling visions about where they want to take the country.
Anti-American sentiments would not be able to fly [in Taiwanese media] if U.S. policies are genuinely promoting Taiwan’s security and economic interests for survival and sustainable development, and if Taiwan is not forced to choose a side in the great power competition.
As a result, says Sung at Australian National University, Taiwanese politics can resemble a pendulum that swings against something, rather than for something.
“For people who are not doing well under the status quo, one natural impulse is to huanren zuozuokan, or to give the other party a shot to see if things improve,” Sung says.
This is a problem for the DPP, which has controlled the presidential office and legislature for seven years now. For the first time in the party’s 37-year history, it is viewed by many as the establishment party, especially by younger voters who have grown up during President Tsai’s two four-year terms. And so far, statements by Lai indicate that his administration would hew close to the pro-U.S., China-skeptic path that Tsai has been on since 2016.
But that status quo may no longer be appealing.
With China’s military posturing towards Taiwan more belligerent than ever and images of a bloody Russian invasion of Ukraine raising concerns that a Chinese invasion could actually happen, CTI News and other Want Want outlets are putting the blame squarely on Tsai Ing-wen, the DPP and Washington.
The strategy, so far, seems to be gaining traction on the blue side of the spectrum. Alexander C. Huang, the KMT’s director of international affairs, says the party’s platform remains strongly “pro-U.S., Japan-friendly, and peace with the Mainland,” but that blame for growing Taiwanese suspicions about the U.S. might lie with the U.S. itself.
“The supermajority of Taiwanese people have always appreciated a sound U.S.-Taiwan relationship,” he says. “Anti-American sentiments would not be able to fly [in Taiwanese media] if U.S. policies are genuinely promoting Taiwan’s security and economic interests for survival and sustainable development, and if Taiwan is not forced to choose a side in the great power competition.”
The U.S.-China rivalry is not going anywhere anytime soon, however, and Taiwan’s uncomfortable position in the middle is likely only going to get more pronounced.
Officially, the U.S. considers Taiwan’s status undetermined, urging the peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues with the consent of the Taiwanese people. But, given China’s military buildup, the desire of Taiwanese people to retain their sovereignty, and the increasingly tense relationship between Beijing and Washington, many in Washington would likely prefer to see a DPP victory.
“The United States has become comfortable with the DPP, while losing connectivity with the KMT over the last few years,” says Ivan Kanapathy, a former member of the National Security Council under both the Trump and Biden administrations and who previously served as military attache to Taiwan. “Occasional reports of former and current KMT leaders supporting CCP narratives create skepticism in Washington.”
Regardless of which party wins, Bonnie S. Glaser, director of the Asia program at the German Marshall Fund in Washington, notes that “Taiwan has a deep and abiding interest in preserving close ties with the United States.” While a KMT victory might mean closer ties to and more communication with Beijing, she says, “the majority of the U.S.-Taiwan cooperation agenda — economic, diplomatic, and defense — would continue.”
Kanapathy also says he wouldn’t expect to see any significant changes in “a KMT-run Taiwan,” mostly because the KMT “would not move as far toward China today as the previous KMT administration did, just like the current DPP government moderated from the previous one.”
But while public opinion in favor of the status quo is a strong moderating force in Taiwan, the same can not be said for China. China, both Glaser and Kanapathy note, would likely continue preparing itself militarily while also putting pressure on a KMT administration to talk about the future of China-Taiwan relations.
This election cycle thus marks a significant fork in the road for Taiwan, with one path leading to closer ties with the U.S. and fellow democracies as well as continued hostility from China, and the other path leading to more friendly interactions with the giant neighbor. Where either path leads is unclear.
What is clear, however, is that Taiwan’s media environment will remain a contentious click-driven battleground of ideas, with Want Want outlets pushing a strong editorial line.
“This news group is so huge, and their influence is growing,” says Wang Tai-li, professor at National Taiwan University’s Graduate Institute of Journalism, noting that people in Taiwan work some of the longest hours in the world and tend to believe the first thing they read or watch on a topic. “That’s where Want Want wins.”
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