Taiwan: Political and Security Issues, CRS, Jan. 10, 2023.
Susan V. Lawrence, Specialist in Asian Affairs
Caitlin Campbell, Analyst in Asian Affairs
Taiwan, which officially calls itself the Republic of China
(ROC), is a self-governing democracy of 23 million people
located across the Taiwan Strait from mainland China. Its
government claims “effective jurisdiction” over the island
of Taiwan, the archipelagos of Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu,
and other outlying islands. Taiwan also claims disputed
geographic features in the East and South China Seas.
Competing interests among the United States, Taiwan, and
the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China)—namely
the PRC’s determination to unify with Taiwan, official and
popular Taiwan resistance to absorption by the PRC, and
U.S. security interests and commitments related to
Taiwan—raise the specter of U.S.-PRC armed conflict over
Taiwan’s fate.
U.S.-Taiwan relations have been unofficial since January 1,
1979, when the United States established diplomatic
relations with the PRC and broke them with Taiwan, over
which the PRC claims sovereignty. The 1979 Taiwan
Relations Act (TRA, P.L. 96-8; 22 U.S.C. §§3301 et seq.)
provides a legal basis for unofficial relations. See also CRS
In Focus IF10256, U.S.-Taiwan Trade Relations.
Modern History and Current Events
Facing defeat at the hands of the Communist Party of China
(CPC) in a civil war on mainland China, in 1949, the
ROC’s then-ruling party, the Kuomintang (KMT), moved
the ROC government to Taiwan. Until 1991, the KMT
continued to assert that the ROC government on Taiwan
was the sole legitimate government of all China. In 1971,
however, U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2758
recognized the PRC’s representatives as “the only
legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations,”
and expelled “the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek,” the
ROC’s then-leader. Taiwan remains outside the U.N. today.
The KMT maintained authoritarian one-party rule on
Taiwan until 1987, when it yielded to public pressure for
political liberalization. The May 2016 inauguration of
President Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party
(DPP) marked Taiwan’s third peaceful transfer of political
power from one party to another. Tsai won a second four-
year term in 2020, and her party retained its majority in
Taiwan’s parliament, the Legislative Yuan. Taiwan is to
hold presidential and legislative elections in 2024.
In August 2022, then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi became
the highest-ranking U.S. official to visit Taiwan since 1997.
The PRC’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) responded to
the visit by conducting exercises in six locations around
Taiwan. PRC state media portrayed the activities as
intended to demonstrate how the PLA could isolate and
attack Taiwan, including by blockading ports, attacking
military bases on Taiwan’s east coast, and controlling
access to the Bashi Channel in the Luzon Strait between
Taiwan and the Philippines. The exercises, which included
missile test-launches over Taiwan, were unprecedented in
scale and established a “new normal” in which PLA ships
and aircraft now operate closer to Taiwan and with more
regularity. The PRC also suspended some cooperation with
the United States and announced sanctions against Pelosi
and her family. Pelosi’s successor as Speaker in the 118th
Congress, Kevin McCarthy, stated in July 2022 that he, too,
would like to lead a delegation to Taiwan as Speaker.
U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan
Since 1979, the United States has maintained a “one-China
policy,” which it currently describes as being guided by the
TRA; U.S.-PRC joint communiqués concluded in 1972,
1978, and 1982; and “Six Assurances” that President
Ronald Reagan communicated to Taiwan’s government in
1982. Under the one-China policy, the United States
maintains official relations with the PRC and unofficial
relations with Taiwan, sells defensive arms to Taiwan,
supports peaceful resolution of cross-Strait differences,
opposes any unilateral changes to the status quo (without
explicitly defining the status quo), and states that it does not
support independence for Taiwan. The U.S. one-China
policy is distinct from the PRC’s “one China principle,”
which defines Taiwan as part of China.
In the U.S.-China joint communiqués, the U.S. government
recognized the PRC government as the “sole legal
government of China,” and acknowledged, but did not
endorse, “the Chinese position that there is but one China
and Taiwan is part of China.” The Six Assurances include
assurances that in negotiating the 1982 communiqué, the
United States did not agree to consult with the PRC on arms
sales to Taiwan or to “take any position regarding
sovereignty over Taiwan.” (See CRS In Focus IF11665,
President Reagan’s Six Assurances to Taiwan.)
Key provisions of the TRA include the following:U.S. relations with Taiwan shall be carried out through
the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), a private
corporation. (AIT Taipei performs many of the same
functions as U.S. embassies elsewhere.)The United States “will make available to Taiwan such
defense articles and defense services in such quantity as
may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a
sufficient self-defense capability.”“The President is directed to inform the Congress
promptly of any threat to the security or the social or
economic system of the people on Taiwan and any
danger to the interests of the United States arising
therefrom. The President and the Congress shall
determine, ... appropriate action by the United States in
response to any such danger.”
The TRA does not require the United States to defend
Taiwan, but it states that it is U.S. policy to maintain the
capacity to do so, creating strategic ambiguity about U.S.
actions in the event of a PRC attack on Taiwan. Some
observers, including some Members of Congress, have
advocated abandoning the policy of strategic ambiguity in
favor of a clear U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan.
Supporters of ambiguity see it as having deterred
provocations from both sides of the Taiwan Strait and as
incentivizing Taiwan to invest in its own defense.
President Biden has sent mixed messages about U.S. policy.
Since August 2021, he has four times appeared to abandon
strategic ambiguity. The most recent instance was in
September 2022, when a CBS News journalist asked, “So
unlike Ukraine, to be clear, sir, U.S. forces, U.S. men and
women would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese
invasion?” and the President answered, “Yes.” White
House officials later said U.S. policy remains unchanged.
PRC Policy Toward Taiwan
At the CPC’s 20th Party Congress in October 2022, China’s
top leader, Xi Jinping, referred to unification with Taiwan
as “a historic mission and an unshakable commitment” and
as necessary for “the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”
He reiterated the CPC’s preference for peaceful unification,
and its proposal for a “One Country, Two Systems”
approach to governance of Taiwan. (An August 2022 PRC
White Paper on Taiwan states that a post-unification
Taiwan would “enjoy a high degree of autonomy as a
special administrative region” of the PRC.) Xi also warned,
however, that the CPC “will never promise to renounce the
use of force.” The PRC’s Anti-Secession Law, passed in
2005, states that in the case of Taiwan’s “secession” from
China, or if the PRC concludes that possibilities for
peaceful unification have been exhausted, “the state shall
employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures
to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
Beijing cut off communication with President Tsai’s
government in 2016, citing her unwillingness to endorse a
formula known as “the 1992 consensus.” The consensus
stipulates that the KMT and the CPC agreed that Taiwan
and mainland China are parts of “one China,” without
agreeing on what “China” means. Xi’s government has also
sought to isolate Taiwan internationally. Since 2016, 9
former Taiwan diplomatic partners have switched
diplomatic recognition to the PRC, leaving Taiwan with 14
such partners. The PRC government has worked to exclude
Taiwan from participation in the work of U.N. agencies,
claiming that U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2758
“confirmed that Taiwan is a part of China.” In October
2022, AIT Chairman James Moriarty accused the PRC of
“intensifying efforts to misuse” the resolution to “preclude
Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the U.N. system.”
Taiwan’s Security
As the PLA has become more capable, the cross-Strait
balance of military power has shifted in the PRC’s favor.
Taiwan’s military is highly capable, but its budget is less
than one-tenth of the PLA’s and it faces equipment,
readiness, and personnel challenges. President Tsai’s
government has accused the PRC of using its growing
military might to conduct a sustained campaign of
intimidation and coercion against the island. Near-daily
PLA operations in and above waters around Taiwan
increase the demands on Taiwan’s military to monitor and
respond to such activities, and could compress the time
available for Taiwan to respond if the PLA attacks.
Taiwan’s military and civilian leaders and U.S. defense
officials broadly agree that Taiwan’s strategy to deter such
an attack should reflect the asymmetric cross-Strait power
balance by targeting PLA weaknesses and harnessing
Taiwan’s natural advantages, such as its fortress-like island
geography. They do not always agree, however, on how to
implement such a strategy. Washington—Taiwan’s primary
arms supplier—seeks to shape Taiwan’s planning and
procurement to focus on deterring an amphibious invasion.
Some in Taiwan argue this approach leaves Taiwan
vulnerable to other forms of coercion short of an invasion.
Uncertainty as to whether and how Washington might aid
Taiwan in the event of an attack informs these debates.
Taiwan and the U.S. Congress
Congress has been influential in shaping U.S.-Taiwan
relations through legislation and participation in
longstanding and emerging debates over whether or how
the United States should support Taiwan. In 2022, the 117th
Congress passed the most comprehensive Taiwan-related
legislation since the TRA in the form of the Taiwan
Enhanced Resilience Act (or TERA, Title LV, Subtitle A of
the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2023, P.L. 117-263). Among other things,
the act authorizes Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
assistance for U.S. arms sales to Taiwan for the first time;
mandates “comprehensive” U.S.-Taiwan military training
programming; and establishes fellowships in Taiwan for
U.S. government officials. The FMF assistance authorized
by TERA includes up to $2 billion a year in loans and up to
$2 billion a year in grant assistance for Taiwan through
FY2027. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (P.L.
117-328) makes up to $2 billion available for FMF loans to
Taiwan in FY2023, but does not appropriate funds for FMF
grant assistance to Taiwan.
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IF10275.pdf